From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] cpu/speculation: Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2024 22:35:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240424053511.grt6tgt34wwpvzog@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZifBT9N0QivOZ2L_@google.com>
On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 07:10:23AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 19, 2024, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > CPU speculative execution mitigations were inadvertently disabled on
> > > non-x86 arches by the following commit:
> > >
> > > f337a6a21e2f ("x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n")
> > >
> > > Fix it by replacing CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS with a new generic
> > > CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS option and moving the x86-specific mitigations to
> > > a separate menu which depends on CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS.
> >
> > Ah drat, I didn't check my mailbox until after Cc'ing Linus my own version[*].
> >
> > I don't have a strong preference between the two, though I do think it's worth
> > nothing that this will (obvioulsy) allow disabling mitigations at compile time
> > on all architectures, which may or may not be desirable.
> >
> > [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240420000556.2645001-2-seanjc@google.com
>
> Josh, when you get a chance, can you weigh in on my menu-preserving approach?
>
> I want to get this resolved asap so that we're not scrambing on Friday again :-)
Yeah, yours looks good. Lemme go ack.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-24 5:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-19 21:09 [PATCH 0/5] x86/bugs: more BHI fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-22 8:09 ` Yujie Liu
2024-05-07 5:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] cpu/speculation: Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86 Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20 0:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-23 14:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-24 5:35 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20 13:58 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-21 5:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-21 20:40 ` Paul McKenney
2024-04-21 21:47 ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-02 23:48 ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-03 15:38 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 19:56 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 20:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 23:33 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 23:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-04 16:48 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:46 ` Josh Poimboeuf
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240424053511.grt6tgt34wwpvzog@treble \
--to=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=alexandre.chartre@oracle.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=geert@linux-m68k.org \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=longman@redhat.com \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.