* Linux 5.10.136
@ 2022-08-11 11:30 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-11 11:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-08-11 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, akpm, torvalds, stable; +Cc: lwn, jslaby, Greg Kroah-Hartman
I'm announcing the release of the 5.10.136 kernel.
All users of the 5.10 kernel series must upgrade.
The updated 5.10.y git tree can be found at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-5.10.y
and can be browsed at the normal kernel.org git web browser:
https://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git;a=summary
thanks,
greg k-h
------------
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 +
Makefile | 2
arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c | 2
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 -
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 21 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 86 ++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 12 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 8 -
drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c | 31 +++--
drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 55 +++++----
drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c | 2
drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 15 ++
drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c | 2
drivers/macintosh/adb.c | 2
drivers/net/tun.c | 114 +++++++++----------
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h | 2
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c | 13 ++
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c | 4
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 3
tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat | 3
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c | 60 ++++++----
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c | 45 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c | 81 +++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c | 9 -
28 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
Aaron Ma (1):
Bluetooth: btusb: Add support of IMC Networks PID 0x3568
Ahmad Fatoum (1):
Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add BCM4349B1 variant
Ben Hutchings (1):
x86/speculation: Make all RETbleed mitigations 64-bit only
Daniel Sneddon (1):
x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections
Dmitry Klochkov (1):
tools/kvm_stat: fix display of error when multiple processes are found
GUO Zihua (1):
crypto: arm64/poly1305 - fix a read out-of-bound
George Kennedy (1):
tun: avoid double free in tun_free_netdev
Greg Kroah-Hartman (1):
Linux 5.10.136
Hakan Jansson (1):
Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add DT compatible for CYW55572
Hilda Wu (5):
Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852C support ID 0x04CA:0x4007
Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852C support ID 0x04C5:0x1675
Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852C support ID 0x0CB8:0xC558
Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852C support ID 0x13D3:0x3587
Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852C support ID 0x13D3:0x3586
Jakub Sitnicki (2):
selftests/bpf: Extend verifier and bpf_sock tests for dst_port loads
selftests/bpf: Check dst_port only on the client socket
Ning Qiang (1):
macintosh/adb: fix oob read in do_adb_query() function
Pawan Gupta (1):
x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence
Raghavendra Rao Ananta (1):
selftests: KVM: Handle compiler optimizations in ucall
Tetsuo Handa (2):
ath9k_htc: fix NULL pointer dereference at ath9k_htc_rxep()
ath9k_htc: fix NULL pointer dereference at ath9k_htc_tx_get_packet()
Tony Luck (1):
ACPI: APEI: Better fix to avoid spamming the console with old error logs
Werner Sembach (2):
ACPI: video: Force backlight native for some TongFang devices
ACPI: video: Shortening quirk list by identifying Clevo by board_name only
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: Linux 5.10.136
2022-08-11 11:30 Linux 5.10.136 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2022-08-11 11:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2022-08-11 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, akpm, torvalds, stable; +Cc: lwn, jslaby, Greg Kroah-Hartman
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 6bd97cd50d62..7e061ed449aa 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -422,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are:
'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
============= ===========================================
+ - EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
+
+ =========================== =======================================================
+ 'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence' CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
+ 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable' CPU is vulnerable
+ 'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB
+ =========================== =======================================================
+
Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
report vulnerability.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 5f4dbcb43307..1730698124c7 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 135
+SUBLEVEL = 136
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Dare mighty things
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
index 01e22fe40823..9f4599014854 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/poly1305-glue.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static void neon_poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src,
{
if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) {
if (!dctx->rset) {
- poly1305_init_arch(dctx, src);
+ poly1305_init_arm64(&dctx->h, src);
src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
dctx->rset = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 16c045906b2a..159646da3c6b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2447,7 +2447,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
config RETHUNK
bool "Enable return-thunks"
depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
- default y
+ default y if X86_64
help
Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard
against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation.
@@ -2456,21 +2456,21 @@ config RETHUNK
config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
- depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 2a51ee2f5a0f..37ba0cdf99aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW (11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@@ -429,5 +430,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -148,6 +148,10 @@
* are restricted to targets in
* kernel.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
+ * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index c3e8e50633ea..0acd99329923 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
- jnz 771b;
+ jnz 771b; \
+ /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
+ lfence;
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -118,13 +120,28 @@
#endif
.endm
+.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
+ ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
+ call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
+ int3
+.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
+ lfence
+.endm
+
/*
* A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
+.ifb \ftr2
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
+.else
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
+.endif
__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
+.Lunbalanced_\@:
+ ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2e5762faf774..859a3f59526c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1291,6 +1291,53 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
}
}
+static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ /*
+ * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
+ * after VM exit:
+ *
+ * 1) RSB underflow
+ *
+ * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+ *
+ * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
+ * the RSB.
+ *
+ * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
+ * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
+ * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
+ * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+ *
+ * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB
+ * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,
+ * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed.
+ */
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+ }
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
+ dump_stack();
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1441,28 +1488,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- /*
- * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
- * after vmexit:
- *
- * 1) RSB underflow
- *
- * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
- *
- * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
- * the RSB.
- *
- * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
- * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
- * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
- * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
- *
- * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it
- * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) ||
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+ spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
/*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
@@ -2215,6 +2241,19 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT))
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
+ else
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
+ } else {
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected";
+ }
+}
+
static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
@@ -2227,12 +2266,13 @@ static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
ibpb_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
stibp_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+ pbrsb_eibrs_state(),
spectre_v2_module_string());
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 901352bd3b42..9fc91482e85e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
#define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(9)
#define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)
@@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
/*
* Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1074,7 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
* good enough for our purposes.
*/
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -1252,6 +1255,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
}
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
+ !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 857fa0fc49fa..982138bebb70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -197,11 +197,13 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
* entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
*
* eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
- * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled
- * before the first unbalanced RET.
+ * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled, and a
+ * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
*/
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
+ X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
+
pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */
pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
index 598fd19b65fa..45973aa6e06d 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/bert.c
@@ -29,16 +29,26 @@
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "BERT: " fmt
+
+#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS 5
#define ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN 1024
static int bert_disable;
+/*
+ * Print "all" the error records in the BERT table, but avoid huge spam to
+ * the console if the BIOS included oversize records, or too many records.
+ * Skipping some records here does not lose anything because the full
+ * data is available to user tools in:
+ * /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT
+ */
static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
unsigned int region_len)
{
struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus =
(struct acpi_hest_generic_status *)region;
int remain = region_len;
+ int printed = 0, skipped = 0;
u32 estatus_len;
while (remain >= sizeof(struct acpi_bert_region)) {
@@ -46,24 +56,26 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
if (remain < estatus_len) {
pr_err(FW_BUG "Truncated status block (length: %u).\n",
estatus_len);
- return;
+ break;
}
/* No more error records. */
if (!estatus->block_status)
- return;
+ break;
if (cper_estatus_check(estatus)) {
pr_err(FW_BUG "Invalid error record.\n");
- return;
+ break;
}
- pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
- if (region_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN)
+ if (estatus_len < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_LEN &&
+ printed < ACPI_BERT_PRINT_MAX_RECORDS) {
+ pr_info_once("Error records from previous boot:\n");
cper_estatus_print(KERN_INFO HW_ERR, estatus);
- else
- pr_info_once("Max print length exceeded, table data is available at:\n"
- "/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/data/BERT");
+ printed++;
+ } else {
+ skipped++;
+ }
/*
* Because the boot error source is "one-time polled" type,
@@ -75,6 +87,9 @@ static void __init bert_print_all(struct acpi_bert_region *region,
estatus = (void *)estatus + estatus_len;
remain -= estatus_len;
}
+
+ if (skipped)
+ pr_info(HW_ERR "Skipped %d error records\n", skipped);
}
static int __init setup_bert_disable(char *str)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
index 7b9793cb55c5..e39d59ad6496 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -424,7 +424,6 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
},
},
@@ -432,59 +431,75 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
},
},
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
.ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xRU"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
},
},
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
- .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+ .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "AURA1501"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
},
},
+ /*
+ * The TongFang PF5PU1G, PF4NU1F, PF5NU1G, and PF5LUXG/TUXEDO BA15 Gen10,
+ * Pulse 14/15 Gen1, and Pulse 15 Gen2 have the same problem as the Clevo
+ * NL5xRU and NL5xNU/TUXEDO Aura 15 Gen1 and Gen2. See the description
+ * above.
+ */
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
- .ident = "Clevo NL5xRU",
+ .ident = "TongFang PF5PU1G",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "EDUBOOK1502"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5PU1G"),
},
},
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
- .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+ .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF4NU1F"),
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .callback = video_detect_force_native,
+ .ident = "TongFang PF4NU1F",
.matches = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1401"),
},
},
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
- .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+ .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SchenkerTechnologiesGmbH"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5NU1G"),
},
},
{
.callback = video_detect_force_native,
- .ident = "Clevo NL5xNU",
+ .ident = "TongFang PF5NU1G",
.matches = {
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Notebook"),
- DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "NL5xNU"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "TUXEDO"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PULSE1501"),
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .callback = video_detect_force_native,
+ .ident = "TongFang PF5LUXG",
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "PF5LUXG"),
},
},
-
/*
* Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics
* for this do not catch.
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
index 1b9743b7f2ef..d263eac784da 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c
@@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ static const struct bcm_subver_table bcm_uart_subver_table[] = {
{ 0x6606, "BCM4345C5" }, /* 003.006.006 */
{ 0x230f, "BCM4356A2" }, /* 001.003.015 */
{ 0x220e, "BCM20702A1" }, /* 001.002.014 */
+ { 0x420d, "BCM4349B1" }, /* 002.002.013 */
+ { 0x420e, "BCM4349B1" }, /* 002.002.014 */
{ 0x4217, "BCM4329B1" }, /* 002.002.023 */
{ 0x6106, "BCM4359C0" }, /* 003.001.006 */
{ 0x4106, "BCM4335A0" }, /* 002.001.006 */
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
index 538232b4c42a..a699e6166aef 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c
@@ -399,6 +399,18 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0xc822), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ /* Realtek 8852CE Bluetooth devices */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x04ca, 0x4007), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x04c5, 0x1675), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x0cb8, 0xc558), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3587), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3586), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH },
+
/* Realtek Bluetooth devices */
{ USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x0bda, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x01),
.driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK },
@@ -416,6 +428,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe0d9), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK |
BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH |
BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES },
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x13d3, 0x3568), .driver_info = BTUSB_MEDIATEK |
+ BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH |
+ BTUSB_VALID_LE_STATES },
/* Additional Realtek 8723AE Bluetooth devices */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x0930, 0x021d), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK },
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
index 259a643377c2..3f6e96a4e114 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
@@ -1489,8 +1489,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id bcm_bluetooth_of_match[] = {
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4345c5" },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4330-bt" },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm43438-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data },
+ { .compatible = "brcm,bcm4349-bt", .data = &bcm43438_device_data },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm43540-bt", .data = &bcm4354_device_data },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm4335a0" },
+ { .compatible = "infineon,cyw55572-bt" },
{ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, bcm_bluetooth_of_match);
diff --git a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
index 73b396189039..afb0942ccc29 100644
--- a/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
+++ b/drivers/macintosh/adb.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ do_adb_query(struct adb_request *req)
switch(req->data[1]) {
case ADB_QUERY_GETDEVINFO:
- if (req->nbytes < 3)
+ if (req->nbytes < 3 || req->data[2] >= 16)
break;
mutex_lock(&adb_handler_mutex);
req->reply[0] = adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address;
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index be9ff6a74ecc..a643b2f2f4de 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ struct tun_struct {
struct tun_prog __rcu *steering_prog;
struct tun_prog __rcu *filter_prog;
struct ethtool_link_ksettings link_ksettings;
+ /* init args */
+ struct file *file;
+ struct ifreq *ifr;
};
struct veth {
@@ -227,6 +230,9 @@ struct veth {
__be16 h_vlan_TCI;
};
+static void tun_flow_init(struct tun_struct *tun);
+static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun);
+
static int tun_napi_receive(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(napi, struct tun_file, napi);
@@ -975,6 +981,49 @@ static int check_filter(struct tap_filter *filter, const struct sk_buff *skb)
static const struct ethtool_ops tun_ethtool_ops;
+static int tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+ struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
+ struct ifreq *ifr = tun->ifr;
+ int err;
+
+ tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
+ if (!tun->pcpu_stats)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
+
+ err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ tun_flow_init(tun);
+
+ dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
+ TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
+ NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
+ dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
+ dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
+ ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
+ NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
+
+ tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
+ (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
+ err = tun_attach(tun, tun->file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
+ ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ tun_flow_uninit(tun);
+ security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
+ free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Net device detach from fd. */
static void tun_net_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
@@ -1216,6 +1265,7 @@ static int tun_net_change_carrier(struct net_device *dev, bool new_carrier)
}
static const struct net_device_ops tun_netdev_ops = {
+ .ndo_init = tun_net_init,
.ndo_uninit = tun_net_uninit,
.ndo_open = tun_net_open,
.ndo_stop = tun_net_close,
@@ -1296,6 +1346,7 @@ static int tun_xdp_tx(struct net_device *dev, struct xdp_buff *xdp)
}
static const struct net_device_ops tap_netdev_ops = {
+ .ndo_init = tun_net_init,
.ndo_uninit = tun_net_uninit,
.ndo_open = tun_net_open,
.ndo_stop = tun_net_close,
@@ -1336,7 +1387,7 @@ static void tun_flow_uninit(struct tun_struct *tun)
#define MAX_MTU 65535
/* Initialize net device. */
-static void tun_net_init(struct net_device *dev)
+static void tun_net_initialize(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
@@ -2268,10 +2319,6 @@ static void tun_free_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
BUG_ON(!(list_empty(&tun->disabled)));
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
- /* We clear pcpu_stats so that tun_set_iff() can tell if
- * tun_free_netdev() has been called from register_netdevice().
- */
- tun->pcpu_stats = NULL;
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
@@ -2784,41 +2831,16 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
tun->rx_batched = 0;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(tun->steering_prog, NULL);
- tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
- if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_free_dev;
- }
+ tun->ifr = ifr;
+ tun->file = file;
- spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
-
- err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_free_stat;
-
- tun_net_init(dev);
- tun_flow_init(tun);
-
- dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
- TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
- NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
- dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
- dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
- ~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
- NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
-
- tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
- (ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
-
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
- err = tun_attach(tun, file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
- ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_free_flow;
+ tun_net_initialize(dev);
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
- if (err < 0)
- goto err_detach;
+ if (err < 0) {
+ free_netdev(dev);
+ return err;
+ }
/* free_netdev() won't check refcnt, to aovid race
* with dev_put() we need publish tun after registration.
*/
@@ -2835,24 +2857,6 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
-
-err_detach:
- tun_detach_all(dev);
- /* We are here because register_netdevice() has failed.
- * If register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev()
- * while dealing with the error, tun->pcpu_stats has been cleared.
- */
- if (!tun->pcpu_stats)
- goto err_free_dev;
-
-err_free_flow:
- tun_flow_uninit(tun);
- security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
-err_free_stat:
- free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
-err_free_dev:
- free_netdev(dev);
- return err;
}
static void tun_get_iff(struct tun_struct *tun, struct ifreq *ifr)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
index 0a1634238e67..6b45e63fae4b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc.h
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf {
struct ath9k_htc_rx {
struct list_head rxbuf;
spinlock_t rxbuflock;
+ bool initialized;
};
#define ATH9K_HTC_TX_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 50 /* ms */
@@ -305,6 +306,7 @@ struct ath9k_htc_tx {
DECLARE_BITMAP(tx_slot, MAX_TX_BUF_NUM);
struct timer_list cleanup_timer;
spinlock_t tx_lock;
+ bool initialized;
};
struct ath9k_htc_tx_ctl {
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
index 30ddf333e04d..43a743ec9d9e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_txrx.c
@@ -808,6 +808,11 @@ int ath9k_tx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vi_queue);
skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.data_vo_queue);
skb_queue_head_init(&priv->tx.tx_failed);
+
+ /* Allow ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID) to operate. */
+ smp_wmb();
+ priv->tx.initialized = true;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1133,6 +1138,10 @@ void ath9k_htc_rxep(void *drv_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ath9k_htc_rxbuf *rxbuf = NULL, *tmp_buf = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
+ /* Check if ath9k_rx_init() completed. */
+ if (!data_race(priv->rx.initialized))
+ goto err;
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->rx.rxbuflock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(tmp_buf, &priv->rx.rxbuf, list) {
if (!tmp_buf->in_process) {
@@ -1188,6 +1197,10 @@ int ath9k_rx_init(struct ath9k_htc_priv *priv)
list_add_tail(&rxbuf->list, &priv->rx.rxbuf);
}
+ /* Allow ath9k_htc_rxep() to operate. */
+ smp_wmb();
+ priv->rx.initialized = true;
+
return 0;
err:
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
index fe29ad4b9023..f315c54bd3ac 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/wmi.c
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ void ath9k_wmi_event_tasklet(struct tasklet_struct *t)
&wmi->drv_priv->fatal_work);
break;
case WMI_TXSTATUS_EVENTID:
+ /* Check if ath9k_tx_init() completed. */
+ if (!data_race(priv->tx.initialized))
+ break;
+
spin_lock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock);
if (priv->tx.flags & ATH9K_HTC_OP_TX_DRAIN) {
spin_unlock_bh(&priv->tx.tx_lock);
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 54ba20492ad1..ec53f52a06a5 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 407de670cd60..144dc164b759 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -148,6 +148,10 @@
* are restricted to targets in
* kernel.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /*
+ * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
+ * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index b9ee2ded381a..7943e748916d 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -4180,7 +4180,8 @@ struct bpf_sock {
__u32 src_ip4;
__u32 src_ip6[4];
__u32 src_port; /* host byte order */
- __u32 dst_port; /* network byte order */
+ __be16 dst_port; /* network byte order */
+ __u16 :16; /* zero padding */
__u32 dst_ip4;
__u32 dst_ip6[4];
__u32 state;
diff --git a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
index b0bf56c5f120..a1efcfbd8b9e 100755
--- a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
+++ b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
@@ -1646,7 +1646,8 @@ Press any other key to refresh statistics immediately.
.format(values))
if len(pids) > 1:
sys.exit('Error: Multiple processes found (pids: {}). Use "-p"'
- ' to specify the desired pid'.format(" ".join(pids)))
+ ' to specify the desired pid'
+ .format(" ".join(map(str, pids))))
namespace.pid = pids[0]
argparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=description_text,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
index af87118e748e..e8b5bf707cd4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sock_fields.c
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Copyright (c) 2019 Facebook */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sched.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
enum bpf_linum_array_idx {
EGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
INGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
+ READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX,
__NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX,
};
@@ -43,8 +46,16 @@ static __u64 child_cg_id;
static int linum_map_fd;
static __u32 duration;
-static __u32 egress_linum_idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
-static __u32 ingress_linum_idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+static bool create_netns(void)
+{
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET), "create netns"))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(system("ip link set dev lo up"), "bring up lo"))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
static void print_sk(const struct bpf_sock *sk, const char *prefix)
{
@@ -92,19 +103,24 @@ static void check_result(void)
{
struct bpf_tcp_sock srv_tp, cli_tp, listen_tp;
struct bpf_sock srv_sk, cli_sk, listen_sk;
- __u32 ingress_linum, egress_linum;
+ __u32 idx, ingress_linum, egress_linum, linum;
int err;
- err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &egress_linum_idx,
- &egress_linum);
+ idx = EGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+ err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &egress_linum);
CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)",
"err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
- err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &ingress_linum_idx,
- &ingress_linum);
+ idx = INGRESS_LINUM_IDX;
+ err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &ingress_linum);
CHECK(err == -1, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd)",
"err:%d errno:%d\n", err, errno);
+ idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX;
+ err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, &idx, &linum);
+ ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem(linum_map_fd, READ_SK_DST_PORT_IDX)");
+ ASSERT_EQ(linum, 0, "failure in read_sk_dst_port on line");
+
memcpy(&srv_sk, &skel->bss->srv_sk, sizeof(srv_sk));
memcpy(&srv_tp, &skel->bss->srv_tp, sizeof(srv_tp));
memcpy(&cli_sk, &skel->bss->cli_sk, sizeof(cli_sk));
@@ -263,7 +279,7 @@ static void test(void)
char buf[DATA_LEN];
/* Prepare listen_fd */
- listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0, 0);
+ listen_fd = start_server(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, "::1", 0xcafe, 0);
/* start_server() has logged the error details */
if (CHECK_FAIL(listen_fd == -1))
goto done;
@@ -331,8 +347,12 @@ static void test(void)
void test_sock_fields(void)
{
- struct bpf_link *egress_link = NULL, *ingress_link = NULL;
int parent_cg_fd = -1, child_cg_fd = -1;
+ struct bpf_link *link;
+
+ /* Use a dedicated netns to have a fixed listen port */
+ if (!create_netns())
+ return;
/* Create a cgroup, get fd, and join it */
parent_cg_fd = test__join_cgroup(PARENT_CGROUP);
@@ -353,17 +373,20 @@ void test_sock_fields(void)
if (CHECK(!skel, "test_sock_fields__open_and_load", "failed\n"))
goto done;
- egress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields,
- child_cg_fd);
- if (CHECK(IS_ERR(egress_link), "attach_cgroup(egress)", "err:%ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(egress_link)))
+ link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.egress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(egress_read_sock_fields)"))
+ goto done;
+ skel->links.egress_read_sock_fields = link;
+
+ link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields, child_cg_fd);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(ingress_read_sock_fields)"))
goto done;
+ skel->links.ingress_read_sock_fields = link;
- ingress_link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.ingress_read_sock_fields,
- child_cg_fd);
- if (CHECK(IS_ERR(ingress_link), "attach_cgroup(ingress)", "err:%ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(ingress_link)))
+ link = bpf_program__attach_cgroup(skel->progs.read_sk_dst_port, child_cg_fd);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "attach_cgroup(read_sk_dst_port"))
goto done;
+ skel->links.read_sk_dst_port = link;
linum_map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.linum_map);
sk_pkt_out_cnt_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sk_pkt_out_cnt);
@@ -372,8 +395,7 @@ void test_sock_fields(void)
test();
done:
- bpf_link__destroy(egress_link);
- bpf_link__destroy(ingress_link);
+ test_sock_fields__detach(skel);
test_sock_fields__destroy(skel);
if (child_cg_fd != -1)
close(child_cg_fd);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
index 7967348b11af..43b31aa1fcf7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sock_fields.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
enum bpf_linum_array_idx {
EGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
INGRESS_LINUM_IDX,
+ READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX,
__NR_BPF_LINUM_ARRAY_IDX,
};
@@ -250,4 +251,48 @@ int ingress_read_sock_fields(struct __sk_buff *skb)
return CG_OK;
}
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_word(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+ __u32 *word = (__u32 *)&sk->dst_port;
+ return word[0] == bpf_htonl(0xcafe0000);
+}
+
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_half(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+ __u16 *half = (__u16 *)&sk->dst_port;
+ return half[0] == bpf_htons(0xcafe);
+}
+
+static __noinline bool sk_dst_port__load_byte(struct bpf_sock *sk)
+{
+ __u8 *byte = (__u8 *)&sk->dst_port;
+ return byte[0] == 0xca && byte[1] == 0xfe;
+}
+
+SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
+int read_sk_dst_port(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __u32 linum, linum_idx;
+ struct bpf_sock *sk;
+
+ linum_idx = READ_SK_DST_PORT_LINUM_IDX;
+
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (!sk)
+ RET_LOG();
+
+ /* Ignore everything but the SYN from the client socket */
+ if (sk->state != BPF_TCP_SYN_SENT)
+ return CG_OK;
+
+ if (!sk_dst_port__load_word(sk))
+ RET_LOG();
+ if (!sk_dst_port__load_half(sk))
+ RET_LOG();
+ if (!sk_dst_port__load_byte(sk))
+ RET_LOG();
+
+ return CG_OK;
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
index ce13ece08d51..8c224eac93df 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
@@ -121,7 +121,25 @@
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
- "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [narrow load]",
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [word load] (backward compatibility)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load]",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -139,7 +157,64 @@
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
- "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [load 2nd byte]",
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load]",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): sk->dst_port [byte load] (invalid)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr = "invalid sock access",
+},
+{
+ "sk_fullsock(skb->sk): past sk->dst_port [half load] (invalid)",
.insns = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
@@ -149,7 +224,7 @@
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct bpf_sock, dst_port) + 1),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, offsetofend(struct bpf_sock, dst_port)),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
index 2f37b90ee1a9..f600311fdc6a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/aarch64/ucall.c
@@ -73,20 +73,19 @@ void ucall_uninit(struct kvm_vm *vm)
void ucall(uint64_t cmd, int nargs, ...)
{
- struct ucall uc = {
- .cmd = cmd,
- };
+ struct ucall uc = {};
va_list va;
int i;
+ WRITE_ONCE(uc.cmd, cmd);
nargs = nargs <= UCALL_MAX_ARGS ? nargs : UCALL_MAX_ARGS;
va_start(va, nargs);
for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i)
- uc.args[i] = va_arg(va, uint64_t);
+ WRITE_ONCE(uc.args[i], va_arg(va, uint64_t));
va_end(va);
- *ucall_exit_mmio_addr = (vm_vaddr_t)&uc;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*ucall_exit_mmio_addr, (vm_vaddr_t)&uc);
}
uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc)
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