From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752929AbaKGVoK (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Nov 2014 16:44:10 -0500 Received: from mail-qc0-f179.google.com ([209.85.216.179]:50245 "EHLO mail-qc0-f179.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752640AbaKGVoH (ORCPT ); Fri, 7 Nov 2014 16:44:07 -0500 From: Paul Moore To: David Howells Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 16:44:03 -0500 Message-ID: <1791526.rYj1Ea3vWT@sifl> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.2 (Linux/3.16.7-gentoo; KDE/4.14.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20141105154217.2555.578.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wednesday, November 05, 2014 03:42:48 PM David Howells wrote: > Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub > discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that > the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. > > Signed-off-by: David Howells > --- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index e66314138b38..f3fe7dbbf741 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3142,6 +3142,19 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode > *inode, u32 *secid) *secid = isec->sid; > } > > +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry > ...*dst, > + const char *name, void *value, size_t *size) > +{ > + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) > + return 1; /* Discard */ I understand that this is just a stub, but I we need to discuss this at some point and I figure better in this patch than elsewhere where it might get lost. For the docker, context= mount use case (similar to SELinux/sVirt) dropping the SELinux xattr is probably an okay behavior. However, I would expect that ultimately this is something we would want to control by policy and/or the presence of a context= label. > + return 0; > +} > + > /* file security operations */ > > static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) > @@ -5868,6 +5881,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { > .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, > .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, > .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, > + .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up, > + .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr, > > .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, > .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe > linux-security-module" in the body of a message to > majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from goalie.tycho.ncsc.mil (goalie [144.51.242.250]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id sA7Li7s8023709 for ; Fri, 7 Nov 2014 16:44:07 -0500 Received: by mail-qa0-f51.google.com with SMTP id f12so2966805qad.10 for ; Fri, 07 Nov 2014 13:44:06 -0800 (PST) From: Paul Moore To: David Howells Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 16:44:03 -0500 Message-ID: <1791526.rYj1Ea3vWT@sifl> In-Reply-To: <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20141105154217.2555.578.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <20141105154248.2555.15813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: "Security-Enhanced Linux \(SELinux\) mailing list" List-Post: List-Help: On Wednesday, November 05, 2014 03:42:48 PM David Howells wrote: > Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub > discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that > the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. > > Signed-off-by: David Howells > --- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index e66314138b38..f3fe7dbbf741 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3142,6 +3142,19 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode > *inode, u32 *secid) *secid = isec->sid; > } > > +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry > ...*dst, > + const char *name, void *value, size_t *size) > +{ > + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) > + return 1; /* Discard */ I understand that this is just a stub, but I we need to discuss this at some point and I figure better in this patch than elsewhere where it might get lost. For the docker, context= mount use case (similar to SELinux/sVirt) dropping the SELinux xattr is probably an okay behavior. However, I would expect that ultimately this is something we would want to control by policy and/or the presence of a context= label. > + return 0; > +} > + > /* file security operations */ > > static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) > @@ -5868,6 +5881,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { > .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, > .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, > .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, > + .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up, > + .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr, > > .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, > .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe > linux-security-module" in the body of a message to > majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com