From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9A6B12F81 for ; Thu, 22 Apr 2021 20:28:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BEE71613FA; Thu, 22 Apr 2021 20:28:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1619123312; bh=zLQ/88ZvjlcczWNF5LPxUk5A51kCmzR4XXTYGv2mDyw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Gi+MK507C3dhvAQJuFvxoKDZRqA8VNrFW7Qr5Z7Rz2AXZku5+OE0gMs+tchM4XFx1 n5M7gzND1eZBWUOrcfFXqOdH0IDQInauSPlovHCc/BZNee2JIHb/BG25TpF+An60vt vsEc6DkhRcxwj7IPlr4gcaauMTMSGqF2w15v3ptY= Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 13:28:31 -0700 From: Andrew Morton To: Sudip Mukherjee Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab , James Bottomley , ksummit@lists.linux.dev, Jiri Kosina Subject: Re: [MAINTAINER SUMMIT] Rethinking the acceptance policy for "trivial" patches Message-Id: <20210422132831.51a711b9c08678a37dad85b5@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: References: <20210422123559.1dc647fb@coco.lan> X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.5.1 (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) X-Mailing-List: ksummit@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Thu, 22 Apr 2021 12:03:24 +0100 Sudip Mukherjee wrote: > May I suggest that we have a separate tree for trivial patches like > the trivial.git tree that Jiri has and all trivial patches goes > through that tree. I'd prefer that such things go through my own hands, please. For reasons such as those that started this discussion. Also, yes, "who sent it" is a key input to how carefully the patch is treated. If I don't recognize the name, I'll go through the patch with a toothcomb due to lack of trust. If I'm still not confident and nobody else has reviewed it (believably) then I simply won't send it upstream. So, obviously, the way to get malicious stuff past me is to forge the sender's email address. But hopefully the developer whose address was forged will be awake enough to say "hey I didn't write that" in response to the 2+ copies which I'll echo back at him/her.