From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for PBRSB_NO
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 18:00:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220809170016.25148-2-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220809170016.25148-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The PBRSB_NO bit indicates that the CPU is not vulnerable to the Post-Barrier
RSB speculative vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 5 +++--
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 1a928ea6af2f..0a8852f3c246 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
#define ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL (_AC(1, ULL) << 18)
#define ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA (_AC(1, ULL) << 19)
#define ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 20)
+#define ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 24)
#define MSR_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define FLUSH_CMD_L1D (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 170f04179347..d2e2dc2a6b91 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL | ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO |
ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL | ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO |
ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO |
- ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA | ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
+ ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA | ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO |
+ ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO);
}
static void __init calculate_pv_max_policy(void)
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ int init_domain_msr_policy(struct domain *d)
ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO |
ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO |
ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA |
- ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO);
+ ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO);
}
d->arch.msr = mp;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index d2cd5459739f..160cc68086c6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
* Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or
* suggestions of which mitigation to use.
*/
- printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "",
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO) ? " SBDR_SSDP_NO" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO) ? " FBSDP_NO" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO) ? " PSDP_NO" : "",
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO) ? " PBRSB_NO" : "",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALWAYS)) ? " IBRS_ALWAYS" : "",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS)) ? " STIBP_ALWAYS" : "",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST)) ? " IBRS_FAST" : "",
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-09 17:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-09 17:00 [PATCH 0/2] x86/spec-ctrl: Reduce HVM RSB overhead Andrew Cooper
2022-08-09 17:00 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-08-10 7:10 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for PBRSB_NO Jan Beulich
2022-08-09 17:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/spec-ctrl: Reduce HVM RSB overhead where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-08-09 20:20 ` Jason Andryuk
2022-08-11 17:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-08-10 8:00 ` Jan Beulich
2022-08-11 18:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-08-11 10:55 ` [PATCH 0/2] x86/spec-ctrl: Reduce HVM RSB overhead Andrew Cooper
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