From: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> To: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> Subject: [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 18:57:13 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20241022015913.3524425-6-samuel.holland@sifive.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20241022015913.3524425-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com> When KASAN is enabled, shadow memory is allocated and mapped for all legitimate kernel addresses, but not for the entire address space. As a result, the kernel can fault when accessing a shadow address computed from a bogus pointer. This can be confusing, because the shadow address computed for (e.g.) NULL looks nothing like a NULL pointer. To assist debugging, if the faulting address might be the result of a KASAN shadow memory address computation, report the range of original memory addresses that would map to the faulting address. Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> --- Changes in v2: - New patch for v2 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c index a9f2b4af8f3f..dae1131221b7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> @@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr, pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address " REG_FMT "\n", msg, addr); + kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr); + bust_spinlocks(0); die(regs, "Oops"); make_task_dead(SIGKILL); -- 2.45.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> To: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> Subject: [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 18:57:13 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20241022015913.3524425-6-samuel.holland@sifive.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20241022015913.3524425-1-samuel.holland@sifive.com> When KASAN is enabled, shadow memory is allocated and mapped for all legitimate kernel addresses, but not for the entire address space. As a result, the kernel can fault when accessing a shadow address computed from a bogus pointer. This can be confusing, because the shadow address computed for (e.g.) NULL looks nothing like a NULL pointer. To assist debugging, if the faulting address might be the result of a KASAN shadow memory address computation, report the range of original memory addresses that would map to the faulting address. Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> --- Changes in v2: - New patch for v2 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c index a9f2b4af8f3f..dae1131221b7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> @@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr, pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address " REG_FMT "\n", msg, addr); + kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr); + bust_spinlocks(0); die(regs, "Oops"); make_task_dead(SIGKILL); -- 2.45.1 _______________________________________________ linux-riscv mailing list linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-22 1:59 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2024-10-22 1:57 [PATCH v2 0/9] kasan: RISC-V support for KASAN_SW_TAGS using pointer masking Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-23 18:41 ` Andrey Konovalov 2024-10-23 18:41 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-10 15:22 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-10 15:22 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-10 15:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-10 15:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-10 22:57 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-10 22:57 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-11 8:58 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-11 8:58 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-11 13:42 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-11 13:42 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-11 18:06 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-11 18:06 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-13 1:28 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-13 1:28 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-13 16:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-13 16:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-14 8:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-14 8:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-17 16:13 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-17 16:13 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-17 18:37 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-17 18:37 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman 2025-02-17 19:00 ` Andrey Konovalov 2025-02-17 19:00 ` Andrey Konovalov 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] kasan: sw_tags: Check kasan_flag_enabled at runtime Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support outline stack tag generation Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov 2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support tag widths less than 8 bits Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 19:30 ` kernel test robot 2024-10-22 19:30 ` kernel test robot 2024-10-22 19:51 ` kernel test robot 2024-10-22 19:51 ` kernel test robot 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland [this message] 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias Samuel Holland 2024-11-05 13:44 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-11-05 13:44 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] riscv: Do not rely on KASAN to define the memory layout Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-11-05 13:47 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-11-05 13:47 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] riscv: Align the sv39 linear map to 16 GiB Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-11-05 13:55 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-11-05 13:55 ` Alexandre Ghiti 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] riscv: Add SBI Firmware Features extension definitions Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] riscv: Implement KASAN_SW_TAGS Samuel Holland 2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland 2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov 2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov
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