All the mail mirrored from lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
To: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 14:44:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5dba5a49-91e5-4988-9018-63b146b5e26c@ghiti.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241022015913.3524425-6-samuel.holland@sifive.com>

Hi Samuel,

On 22/10/2024 03:57, Samuel Holland wrote:
> When KASAN is enabled, shadow memory is allocated and mapped for all
> legitimate kernel addresses, but not for the entire address space. As a
> result, the kernel can fault when accessing a shadow address computed
> from a bogus pointer. This can be confusing, because the shadow address
> computed for (e.g.) NULL looks nothing like a NULL pointer. To assist
> debugging, if the faulting address might be the result of a KASAN shadow
> memory address computation, report the range of original memory
> addresses that would map to the faulting address.
>
> Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v2:
>   - New patch for v2
>
>   arch/riscv/mm/fault.c | 3 +++
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> index a9f2b4af8f3f..dae1131221b7 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>   
>   
>   #include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>   #include <linux/kernel.h>
>   #include <linux/interrupt.h>
>   #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> @@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
>   	pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address " REG_FMT "\n", msg,
>   		addr);
>   
> +	kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr);
> +
>   	bust_spinlocks(0);
>   	die(regs, "Oops");
>   	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);


That's nice, I used to do that by hand :)

Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>

Thanks,

Alex


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
To: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 14:44:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5dba5a49-91e5-4988-9018-63b146b5e26c@ghiti.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241022015913.3524425-6-samuel.holland@sifive.com>

Hi Samuel,

On 22/10/2024 03:57, Samuel Holland wrote:
> When KASAN is enabled, shadow memory is allocated and mapped for all
> legitimate kernel addresses, but not for the entire address space. As a
> result, the kernel can fault when accessing a shadow address computed
> from a bogus pointer. This can be confusing, because the shadow address
> computed for (e.g.) NULL looks nothing like a NULL pointer. To assist
> debugging, if the faulting address might be the result of a KASAN shadow
> memory address computation, report the range of original memory
> addresses that would map to the faulting address.
>
> Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v2:
>   - New patch for v2
>
>   arch/riscv/mm/fault.c | 3 +++
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> index a9f2b4af8f3f..dae1131221b7 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>   
>   
>   #include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>   #include <linux/kernel.h>
>   #include <linux/interrupt.h>
>   #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> @@ -30,6 +31,8 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
>   	pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel %s at virtual address " REG_FMT "\n", msg,
>   		addr);
>   
> +	kasan_non_canonical_hook(addr);
> +
>   	bust_spinlocks(0);
>   	die(regs, "Oops");
>   	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);


That's nice, I used to do that by hand :)

Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>

Thanks,

Alex


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-05 13:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-22  1:57 [PATCH v2 0/9] kasan: RISC-V support for KASAN_SW_TAGS using pointer masking Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:41   ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:41     ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-10 15:22     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:22       ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:52       ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:52         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 22:57         ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-10 22:57           ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-11  8:58           ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11  8:58             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 13:42             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 13:42               ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 18:06           ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 18:06             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-13  1:21             ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13  1:21               ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13  1:28               ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13  1:28                 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13 16:20                 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-13 16:20                   ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-14  8:20                   ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-14  8:20                     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 16:13                     ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 16:13                       ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 18:37                       ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 18:37                         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 19:00                         ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 19:00                           ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] kasan: sw_tags: Check kasan_flag_enabled at runtime Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support outline stack tag generation Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:42   ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:42     ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support tag widths less than 8 bits Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 19:30   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:30     ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:51   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:51     ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:44   ` Alexandre Ghiti [this message]
2024-11-05 13:44     ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] riscv: Do not rely on KASAN to define the memory layout Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:47   ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-11-05 13:47     ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] riscv: Align the sv39 linear map to 16 GiB Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:55   ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-11-05 13:55     ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] riscv: Add SBI Firmware Features extension definitions Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] riscv: Implement KASAN_SW_TAGS Samuel Holland
2024-10-22  1:57   ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:42   ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:42     ` Andrey Konovalov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5dba5a49-91e5-4988-9018-63b146b5e26c@ghiti.fr \
    --to=alex@ghiti.fr \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alexghiti@rivosinc.com \
    --cc=andreyknvl@gmail.com \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=eugenis@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=llvm@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
    --cc=ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com \
    --cc=samuel.holland@sifive.com \
    --cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.