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Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , "Peter Zijlstra" , Dan Williams , Michael Roth , Ashish Kalra Subject: [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 16:15:58 -0600 Message-ID: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.42.0 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: DS2PEPF00003440:EE_|SJ0PR12MB6942:EE_ X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 9a5753c0-cd2b-464a-b234-08dc1ebc7c9f X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230031)(4636009)(346002)(376002)(396003)(39860400002)(136003)(230922051799003)(64100799003)(82310400011)(186009)(1800799012)(451199024)(36840700001)(46966006)(40470700004)(36860700001)(478600001)(86362001)(6666004)(81166007)(356005)(47076005)(40480700001)(40460700003)(82740400003)(83380400001)(2616005)(8936002)(54906003)(4326008)(316002)(30864003)(2906002)(7416002)(5660300002)(36756003)(110136005)(70586007)(70206006)(8676002)(26005)(16526019)(426003)(336012)(41300700001)(36900700001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Jan 2024 22:16:47.2355 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 9a5753c0-cd2b-464a-b234-08dc1ebc7c9f X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DS2PEPF00003440.namprd02.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SJ0PR12MB6942 The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. An SVSM will be present when running at VMPL1 or a lower privilege level. When an SVSM is present, use the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call to perform memory validation instead of issuing the PVALIDATE instruction directly. The validation of a single 4K page is now explicitly identified as such in the function name, pvalidate_4k_page(). The pvalidate_pages() function is used for validating 1 or more pages at either 4K or 2M in size. Each function, however, determines whether it can issue the PVALIDATE directly or whether the SVSM needs to be invoked. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 42 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 22 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 25 +++-- 4 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index 5d2403914ceb..3fbb614c31e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c @@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ static u8 vmpl __section(".data"); static u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __section(".data"); static struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa __section(".data"); +static struct svsm_ca *__svsm_get_caa(void) +{ + return boot_svsm_caa; +} + +static u64 __svsm_get_caa_pa(void) +{ + return boot_svsm_caa_pa; +} + /* * Copy a version of this function here - insn-eval.c can't be used in * pre-decompression code. @@ -135,6 +145,24 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address) /* Include code for early handlers */ #include "../../kernel/sev-shared.c" +static int svsm_protocol(struct svsm_call *call) +{ + struct ghcb *ghcb; + int ret; + + if (boot_ghcb) + ghcb = boot_ghcb; + else + ghcb = NULL; + + do { + ret = ghcb ? __svsm_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call) + : __svsm_msr_protocol(call); + } while (ret == SVSM_ERR_BUSY); + + return ret; +} + bool sev_snp_enabled(void) { return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED; @@ -151,8 +179,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op) * If private -> shared then invalidate the page before requesting the * state change in the RMP table. */ - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 0)) - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) + pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, 0); /* Issue VMGEXIT to change the page state in RMP table. */ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op)); @@ -167,8 +195,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op) * Now that page state is changed in the RMP table, validate it so that it is * consistent with the RMP entry. */ - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1)) - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) + pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, 1); } void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr) @@ -261,6 +289,12 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features()) error("SEV-ES CPU Features missing."); + /* + * Ensure that the boot GHCB isn't used for the PVALIDATE when running + * under an SVSM. + */ + boot_ghcb = NULL; + /* * GHCB Page must be flushed from the cache and mapped encrypted again. * Otherwise the running kernel will see strange cache effects when diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 2f1e583769fc..dbd7fd041689 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -172,6 +172,27 @@ struct svsm_ca { #define SVSM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER 0x80000005 #define SVSM_ERR_INVALID_REQUEST 0x80000006 #define SVSM_ERR_BUSY 0x80000007 +#define SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH 0x80001006 + +/* + * The SVSM PVALIDATE related structures + */ +struct svsm_pvalidate_entry { + u64 page_size : 2, + action : 1, + ignore_cf : 1, + rsvd : 8, + pfn : 52; +}; + +struct svsm_pvalidate_call { + u16 entries; + u16 next; + + u8 rsvd1[4]; + + struct svsm_pvalidate_entry entry[]; +}; /* * SVSM protocol structure @@ -192,6 +213,7 @@ struct svsm_call { #define SVSM_CORE_CALL(x) ((0ULL << 32) | (x)) #define SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA 0 +#define SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE 1 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index 7e9fa5d8889b..f26e872bc5d0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ static u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init; static u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init; static u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init; +static int svsm_protocol(struct svsm_call *call); + static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void) { if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) { @@ -1181,7 +1183,65 @@ static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) } } -static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc) +static int base_pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, bool validate) +{ + return pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate); +} + +static int svsm_pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate) +{ + struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pvalidate_call; + struct svsm_call call = {}; + u64 pvalidate_call_pa; + unsigned long flags; + int ret; + + /* + * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in + * order to avoid paravirt issues. + */ + flags = native_save_fl(); + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) + native_irq_disable(); + + call.caa = __svsm_get_caa(); + + pvalidate_call = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer; + pvalidate_call_pa = __svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer); + + pvalidate_call->entries = 1; + pvalidate_call->next = 0; + pvalidate_call->entry[0].page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K; + pvalidate_call->entry[0].action = validate; + pvalidate_call->entry[0].ignore_cf = 0; + pvalidate_call->entry[0].pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + /* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */ + call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE); + call.rcx = pvalidate_call_pa; + + ret = svsm_protocol(&call); + + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) + native_irq_enable(); + + return ret; +} + +static void pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, bool validate) +{ + int ret; + + ret = vmpl ? svsm_pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, validate) + : base_pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, validate); + + if (ret) { + WARN(1, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, ret); + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); + } +} + +static void base_pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc) { struct psc_entry *e; unsigned long vaddr; @@ -1215,6 +1275,120 @@ static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc) } } +static void svsm_pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc) +{ + struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pvalidate_call; + struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe; + unsigned int call_count, i; + struct svsm_call call = {}; + u64 pvalidate_call_pa; + struct psc_entry *e; + unsigned long flags; + unsigned long vaddr; + bool action; + int ret; + + /* + * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in + * order to avoid paravirt issues. + */ + flags = native_save_fl(); + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) + native_irq_disable(); + + call.caa = __svsm_get_caa(); + + pvalidate_call = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer; + pvalidate_call_pa = __svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer); + + /* Calculate how many entries the CA buffer can hold */ + call_count = sizeof(call.caa->svsm_buffer); + call_count -= offsetof(struct svsm_pvalidate_call, entry); + call_count /= sizeof(pvalidate_call->entry[0]); + + /* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */ + call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE); + call.rcx = pvalidate_call_pa; + + pvalidate_call->entries = 0; + pvalidate_call->next = 0; + + for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) { + e = &desc->entries[i]; + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->entries]; + + pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K; + pe->action = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE; + pe->ignore_cf = 0; + pe->pfn = e->gfn; + + pvalidate_call->entries++; + if (pvalidate_call->entries < call_count && i != desc->hdr.end_entry) + continue; + + ret = svsm_protocol(&call); + if (ret == SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH && + pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].page_size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) { + u64 pfn, pfn_end; + + /* + * The "next" field is the index of the failed entry. Calculate the + * index of the entry after the failed entry before the fields are + * cleared so that processing can continue on from that point (take + * into account the for loop adding 1 to the entry). + */ + i -= pvalidate_call->entries - pvalidate_call->next; + i += 1; + + action = pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].action; + pfn = pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].pfn; + pfn_end = pfn + 511; + + pvalidate_call->entries = 0; + pvalidate_call->next = 0; + for (; pfn <= pfn_end; pfn++) { + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->entries]; + + pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K; + pe->action = action; + pe->ignore_cf = 0; + pe->pfn = pfn; + + pvalidate_call->entries++; + if (pvalidate_call->entries < call_count && pfn != pfn_end) + continue; + + ret = svsm_protocol(&call); + if (ret != SVSM_SUCCESS) + break; + + pvalidate_call->entries = 0; + pvalidate_call->next = 0; + } + } + + if (ret != SVSM_SUCCESS) { + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next]; + vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pe->pfn); + + WARN(1, "Failed to validate address %lx ret=%#x (%d)", vaddr, ret, ret); + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE); + } + + pvalidate_call->entries = 0; + pvalidate_call->next = 0; + } + + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) + native_irq_enable(); +} + +static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc) +{ + vmpl ? svsm_pvalidate_pages(desc) + : base_pvalidate_pages(desc); +} + static int vmgexit_psc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_psc_desc *desc) { int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 3bd7860fbfe1..2fd21090ef6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -161,6 +161,12 @@ static struct svsm_ca *__svsm_get_caa(void) : boot_svsm_caa; } +static u64 __svsm_get_caa_pa(void) +{ + return sev_cfg.cas_initialized ? this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa) + : boot_svsm_caa_pa; +} + static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long sp = regs->sp; @@ -777,7 +783,6 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, { unsigned long paddr_end; u64 val; - int ret; vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK; @@ -785,12 +790,9 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT); while (paddr < paddr_end) { - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) { - /* Page validation must be rescinded before changing to shared */ - ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, false); - if (WARN(ret, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", paddr, ret)) - goto e_term; - } + /* Page validation must be rescinded before changing to shared */ + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) + pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, false); /* * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before @@ -812,12 +814,9 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))) goto e_term; - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) { - /* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */ - ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, true); - if (WARN(ret, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", paddr, ret)) - goto e_term; - } + /* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */ + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) + pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, true); vaddr += PAGE_SIZE; paddr += PAGE_SIZE; -- 2.42.0