From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
<linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <llvm@lists.linux.dev>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 09:58:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <lrlnvcxofcnsm5rou3iwbawyfwtz6mx4gn6eflpm4srhjj37kb@pwsozjgdyxfu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+fCnZfySpeRy0FCFidLdUUeqp97eBdjAqQyYPpz1WxYwcsW9A@mail.gmail.com>
On 2025-02-10 at 23:57:10 +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 4:53 PM Maciej Wieczor-Retman
><maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2025-02-10 at 16:22:41 +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
>> >On 2024-10-23 at 20:41:57 +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>> >>On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 3:59 AM Samuel Holland
>> >><samuel.holland@sifive.com> wrote:
>> >...
>> >>> + * Software Tag-Based KASAN, the displacement is signed, so
>> >>> + * KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is the center of the range.
>> >>> */
>> >>> - if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
>> >>> - return;
>> >>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
>> >>> + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ||
>> >>> + addr >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size)
>> >>> + return;
>> >>> + } else {
>> >>> + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET - max_shadow_size / 2 ||
>> >>> + addr >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size / 2)
>> >>> + return;
>> >>
>> >>Hm, I might be wrong, but I think this check does not work.
>> >>
>> >>Let's say we have non-canonical address 0x4242424242424242 and number
>> >>of VA bits is 48.
>> >>
>> >>Then:
>> >>
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET == 0xffff800000000000
>> >>kasan_mem_to_shadow(0x4242424242424242) == 0x0423a42424242424
>> >>max_shadow_size == 0x1000000000000000
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET - max_shadow_size / 2 == 0xf7ff800000000000
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size / 2 == 0x07ff800000000000 (overflows)
>> >>
>> >>0x0423a42424242424 is < than 0xf7ff800000000000, so the function will
>> >>wrongly return.
>> >
>> >As I understand this check aims to figure out if the address landed in shadow
>> >space and if it didn't we can return.
>> >
>> >Can't this above snippet be a simple:
>> >
>> > if (!addr_in_shadow(addr))
>> > return;
>> >
>> >?
>>
>> Sorry, I think this wouldn't work. The tag also needs to be reset. Does this
>> perhaps work for this problem?
>>
>> if (!addr_in_shadow(kasan_reset_tag((void *)addr)))
>> return;
>
>This wouldn't work as well.
>
>addr_in_shadow() checks whether an address belongs to the proper
>shadow memory area. That area is the result of the memory-to-shadow
>mapping applied to the range of proper kernel addresses.
>
>However, what we want to check in this function is whether the given
>address can be the result of the memory-to-shadow mapping for some
>memory address, including userspace addresses, non-canonical
>addresses, etc. So essentially we need to check whether the given
>address belongs to the area that is the result of the memory-to-shadow
>mapping applied to the whole address space, not only to proper kernel
>addresses.k
Ah, okay, I get it. Would the old version
if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
return;
work if the *addr* had kasan_reset_tag() around it? That would sort of re-unsign
the address only for the purpose of the if().
Also I was thinking about it because x86 even with address masking enabled keeps
bit 63 set, so all kernel addresses will be negative in the signed
kasan_mem_to_shadow(). That's great for simplifying the KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET but
it differs from the TBI and risc-v ideas where half of addresses are negative,
hald positive. So the temporary re-unsigning could maybe make it simpler for x86
and avoid adding separate cases or alternative kasan_non_canonical_hook()
implementation.
--
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
<linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <llvm@lists.linux.dev>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 09:58:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <lrlnvcxofcnsm5rou3iwbawyfwtz6mx4gn6eflpm4srhjj37kb@pwsozjgdyxfu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+fCnZfySpeRy0FCFidLdUUeqp97eBdjAqQyYPpz1WxYwcsW9A@mail.gmail.com>
On 2025-02-10 at 23:57:10 +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 4:53 PM Maciej Wieczor-Retman
><maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2025-02-10 at 16:22:41 +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
>> >On 2024-10-23 at 20:41:57 +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>> >>On Tue, Oct 22, 2024 at 3:59 AM Samuel Holland
>> >><samuel.holland@sifive.com> wrote:
>> >...
>> >>> + * Software Tag-Based KASAN, the displacement is signed, so
>> >>> + * KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is the center of the range.
>> >>> */
>> >>> - if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
>> >>> - return;
>> >>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
>> >>> + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ||
>> >>> + addr >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size)
>> >>> + return;
>> >>> + } else {
>> >>> + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET - max_shadow_size / 2 ||
>> >>> + addr >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size / 2)
>> >>> + return;
>> >>
>> >>Hm, I might be wrong, but I think this check does not work.
>> >>
>> >>Let's say we have non-canonical address 0x4242424242424242 and number
>> >>of VA bits is 48.
>> >>
>> >>Then:
>> >>
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET == 0xffff800000000000
>> >>kasan_mem_to_shadow(0x4242424242424242) == 0x0423a42424242424
>> >>max_shadow_size == 0x1000000000000000
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET - max_shadow_size / 2 == 0xf7ff800000000000
>> >>KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + max_shadow_size / 2 == 0x07ff800000000000 (overflows)
>> >>
>> >>0x0423a42424242424 is < than 0xf7ff800000000000, so the function will
>> >>wrongly return.
>> >
>> >As I understand this check aims to figure out if the address landed in shadow
>> >space and if it didn't we can return.
>> >
>> >Can't this above snippet be a simple:
>> >
>> > if (!addr_in_shadow(addr))
>> > return;
>> >
>> >?
>>
>> Sorry, I think this wouldn't work. The tag also needs to be reset. Does this
>> perhaps work for this problem?
>>
>> if (!addr_in_shadow(kasan_reset_tag((void *)addr)))
>> return;
>
>This wouldn't work as well.
>
>addr_in_shadow() checks whether an address belongs to the proper
>shadow memory area. That area is the result of the memory-to-shadow
>mapping applied to the range of proper kernel addresses.
>
>However, what we want to check in this function is whether the given
>address can be the result of the memory-to-shadow mapping for some
>memory address, including userspace addresses, non-canonical
>addresses, etc. So essentially we need to check whether the given
>address belongs to the area that is the result of the memory-to-shadow
>mapping applied to the whole address space, not only to proper kernel
>addresses.k
Ah, okay, I get it. Would the old version
if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
return;
work if the *addr* had kasan_reset_tag() around it? That would sort of re-unsign
the address only for the purpose of the if().
Also I was thinking about it because x86 even with address masking enabled keeps
bit 63 set, so all kernel addresses will be negative in the signed
kasan_mem_to_shadow(). That's great for simplifying the KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET but
it differs from the TBI and risc-v ideas where half of addresses are negative,
hald positive. So the temporary re-unsigning could maybe make it simpler for x86
and avoid adding separate cases or alternative kasan_non_canonical_hook()
implementation.
--
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-11 8:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-22 1:57 [PATCH v2 0/9] kasan: RISC-V support for KASAN_SW_TAGS using pointer masking Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] kasan: sw_tags: Use arithmetic shift for shadow computation Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:41 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:41 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-10 15:22 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:22 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 15:52 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-10 22:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-10 22:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-11 8:58 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman [this message]
2025-02-11 8:58 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 13:42 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 13:42 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 18:06 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-11 18:06 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13 1:21 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13 1:28 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13 1:28 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-13 16:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-13 16:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-14 8:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-14 8:20 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 16:13 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 16:13 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 18:37 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 18:37 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2025-02-17 19:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2025-02-17 19:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] kasan: sw_tags: Check kasan_flag_enabled at runtime Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support outline stack tag generation Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] kasan: sw_tags: Support tag widths less than 8 bits Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 19:30 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:30 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:51 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 19:51 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] riscv: mm: Log potential KASAN shadow alias Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:44 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-11-05 13:44 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] riscv: Do not rely on KASAN to define the memory layout Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:47 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-11-05 13:47 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] riscv: Align the sv39 linear map to 16 GiB Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-11-05 13:55 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-11-05 13:55 ` Alexandre Ghiti
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] riscv: Add SBI Firmware Features extension definitions Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] riscv: Implement KASAN_SW_TAGS Samuel Holland
2024-10-22 1:57 ` Samuel Holland
2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-10-23 18:42 ` Andrey Konovalov
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