BPF Archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org,
	mhiramat@kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, bpf@vger.kernel.org, rihams@fb.com,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces
Date: Wed,  8 May 2024 14:26:05 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240508212605.4012172-5-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240508212605.4012172-1-andrii@kernel.org>

Add a set of tests to validate that stack traces captured from or in the
presence of active uprobes and uretprobes are valid and complete.

For this we use BPF program that are installed either on entry or exit
of user function, plus deep-nested USDT. One of target funtions
(target_1) is recursive to generate two different entries in the stack
trace for the same uprobe/uretprobe, testing potential edge conditions.

Without fixes in this patch set, we get something like this for one of
the scenarios:

 caller: 0x758fff - 0x7595ab
 target_1: 0x758fd5 - 0x758fff
 target_2: 0x758fca - 0x758fd5
 target_3: 0x758fbf - 0x758fca
 target_4: 0x758fb3 - 0x758fbf
 ENTRY #0: 0x758fb3 (in target_4)
 ENTRY #1: 0x758fd3 (in target_2)
 ENTRY #2: 0x758ffd (in target_1)
 ENTRY #3: 0x7fffffffe000
 ENTRY #4: 0x7fffffffe000
 ENTRY #5: 0x6f8f39
 ENTRY #6: 0x6fa6f0
 ENTRY #7: 0x7f403f229590

Entry #3 and #4 (0x7fffffffe000) are uretprobe trampoline addresses
which obscure actual target_1 and another target_1 invocations. Also
note that between entry #0 and entry #1 we are missing an entry for
target_3, which is fixed in patch #2.

With all the fixes, we get desired full stack traces:

 caller: 0x758fff - 0x7595ab
 target_1: 0x758fd5 - 0x758fff
 target_2: 0x758fca - 0x758fd5
 target_3: 0x758fbf - 0x758fca
 target_4: 0x758fb3 - 0x758fbf
 ENTRY #0: 0x758fb7 (in target_4)
 ENTRY #1: 0x758fc8 (in target_3)
 ENTRY #2: 0x758fd3 (in target_2)
 ENTRY #3: 0x758ffd (in target_1)
 ENTRY #4: 0x758ff3 (in target_1)
 ENTRY #5: 0x75922c (in caller)
 ENTRY #6: 0x6f8f39
 ENTRY #7: 0x6fa6f0
 ENTRY #8: 0x7f986adc4cd0

Now there is a logical and complete sequence of function calls.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 .../bpf/prog_tests/uretprobe_stack.c          | 185 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/uretprobe_stack.c     |  96 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 281 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uretprobe_stack.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uretprobe_stack.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uretprobe_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uretprobe_stack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2974553da6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uretprobe_stack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2024 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "uretprobe_stack.skel.h"
+#include "../sdt.h"
+
+/* We set up target_1() -> target_2() -> target_3() -> target_4() -> USDT()
+ * call chain, each being traced by our BPF program. On entry or return from
+ * each target_*() we are capturing user stack trace and recording it in
+ * global variable, so that user space part of the test can validate it.
+ *
+ * Note, we put each target function into a custom section to get those
+ * __start_XXX/__stop_XXX symbols, generated by linker for us, which allow us
+ * to know address range of those functions
+ */
+__attribute__((section("uprobe__target_4")))
+__weak int target_4(void)
+{
+	STAP_PROBE1(uretprobe_stack, target, 42);
+	return 42;
+}
+
+extern const void *__start_uprobe__target_4;
+extern const void *__stop_uprobe__target_4;
+
+__attribute__((section("uprobe__target_3")))
+__weak int target_3(void)
+{
+	return target_4();
+}
+
+extern const void *__start_uprobe__target_3;
+extern const void *__stop_uprobe__target_3;
+
+__attribute__((section("uprobe__target_2")))
+__weak int target_2(void)
+{
+	return target_3();
+}
+
+extern const void *__start_uprobe__target_2;
+extern const void *__stop_uprobe__target_2;
+
+__attribute__((section("uprobe__target_1")))
+__weak int target_1(int depth)
+{
+	if (depth < 1)
+		return 1 + target_1(depth + 1);
+	else
+		return target_2();
+}
+
+extern const void *__start_uprobe__target_1;
+extern const void *__stop_uprobe__target_1;
+
+extern const void *__start_uretprobe_stack_sec;
+extern const void *__stop_uretprobe_stack_sec;
+
+struct range {
+	long start;
+	long stop;
+};
+
+static struct range targets[] = {
+	{}, /* we want target_1 to map to target[1], so need 1-based indexing */
+	{ (long)&__start_uprobe__target_1, (long)&__stop_uprobe__target_1 },
+	{ (long)&__start_uprobe__target_2, (long)&__stop_uprobe__target_2 },
+	{ (long)&__start_uprobe__target_3, (long)&__stop_uprobe__target_3 },
+	{ (long)&__start_uprobe__target_4, (long)&__stop_uprobe__target_4 },
+};
+
+static struct range caller = {
+	(long)&__start_uretprobe_stack_sec,
+	(long)&__stop_uretprobe_stack_sec,
+};
+
+static void validate_stack(__u64 *ips, int stack_len, int cnt, ...)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (!ASSERT_GT(stack_len, 0, "stack_len"))
+		return;
+
+	stack_len /= 8;
+
+	/* check if we have enough entries to satisfy test expectations */
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(stack_len, cnt, "stack_len2"))
+		return;
+
+	if (env.verbosity >= VERBOSE_NORMAL) {
+		printf("caller: %#lx - %#lx\n", caller.start, caller.stop);
+		for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(targets); i++)
+			printf("target_%d: %#lx - %#lx\n", i, targets[i].start, targets[i].stop);
+		for (i = 0; i < stack_len; i++) {
+			for (j = 1; j < ARRAY_SIZE(targets); j++) {
+				if (ips[i] >= targets[j].start && ips[i] < targets[j].stop)
+					break;
+			}
+			if (j < ARRAY_SIZE(targets)) { /* found target match */
+				printf("ENTRY #%d: %#lx (in target_%d)\n", i, (long)ips[i], j);
+			} else if (ips[i] >= caller.start && ips[i] < caller.stop) {
+				printf("ENTRY #%d: %#lx (in caller)\n", i, (long)ips[i]);
+			} else {
+				printf("ENTRY #%d: %#lx\n", i, (long)ips[i]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	va_start(args, cnt);
+
+	for (i = cnt - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		/* most recent entry is the deepest target function */
+		const struct range *t = va_arg(args, const struct range *);
+
+		ASSERT_GE(ips[i], t->start, "addr_start");
+		ASSERT_LT(ips[i], t->stop, "addr_stop");
+	}
+
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+__attribute__((section("uretprobe_stack_sec")))
+void test_uretprobe_stack(void)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_uprobe_opts, uprobe_opts);
+	struct uretprobe_stack *skel;
+	int err;
+
+	skel = uretprobe_stack__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open"))
+		return;
+
+	err = uretprobe_stack__attach(skel);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	/* trigger */
+	ASSERT_EQ(target_1(0), 42 + 1, "trigger_return");
+
+	/*
+	 * Stacks captured on ENTRY uprobes
+	 */
+
+	/* (uprobe 1) target_1 in stack trace*/
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->entry_stack1, skel->bss->entry1_len,
+		       2, &caller, &targets[1]);
+	/* (uprobe 1, recursed) */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->entry_stack1_recur, skel->bss->entry1_recur_len,
+		       3, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1]);
+	/* (uprobe 2) caller -> target_1 -> target_1 -> target_2 */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->entry_stack2, skel->bss->entry2_len,
+		       4, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1], &targets[2]);
+	/* (uprobe 3) */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->entry_stack3, skel->bss->entry3_len,
+		       5, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1], &targets[2], &targets[3]);
+	/* (uprobe 4) caller -> target_1 -> target_1 -> target_2 -> target_3 -> target_4 */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->entry_stack4, skel->bss->entry4_len,
+		       6, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1], &targets[2], &targets[3], &targets[4]);
+
+	/* (USDT): full caller -> target_1 -> target_1 -> target_2 (uretprobed)
+	 *              -> target_3 -> target_4 (uretprobes) chain
+	 */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->usdt_stack, skel->bss->usdt_len,
+		       6, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1], &targets[2], &targets[3], &targets[4]);
+
+	/*
+	 * Now stacks captured on the way out in EXIT uprobes
+	 */
+
+	/* (uretprobe 4) everything up to target_4, but excluding it */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->exit_stack4, skel->bss->exit4_len,
+		       5, &caller, &targets[1], &targets[1], &targets[2], &targets[3]);
+	/* we didn't install uretprobes on target_2 and target_3 */
+	/* (uretprobe 1, recur) first target_1 call only */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->exit_stack1_recur, skel->bss->exit1_recur_len,
+		       2, &caller, &targets[1]);
+	/* (uretprobe 1) just a caller in the stack trace */
+	validate_stack(skel->bss->exit_stack1, skel->bss->exit1_len,
+		       1, &caller);
+
+cleanup:
+	uretprobe_stack__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uretprobe_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uretprobe_stack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9fdcf396b8f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uretprobe_stack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2024 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+#include <bpf/usdt.bpf.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u64 entry_stack1[32], exit_stack1[32];
+__u64 entry_stack1_recur[32], exit_stack1_recur[32];
+__u64 entry_stack2[32];
+__u64 entry_stack3[32];
+__u64 entry_stack4[32], exit_stack4[32];
+__u64 usdt_stack[32];
+
+int entry1_len, exit1_len;
+int entry1_recur_len, exit1_recur_len;
+int entry2_len, exit2_len;
+int entry3_len, exit3_len;
+int entry4_len, exit4_len;
+int usdt_len;
+
+#define SZ sizeof(usdt_stack)
+
+SEC("uprobe//proc/self/exe:target_1")
+int BPF_UPROBE(uprobe_1)
+{
+	/* target_1 is recursive wit depth of 2, so we capture two separate
+	 * stack traces, depending on which occurence it is
+	 */
+	static bool recur = false;
+
+	if (!recur)
+		entry1_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &entry_stack1, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	else
+		entry1_recur_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &entry_stack1_recur, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+
+	recur = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("uretprobe//proc/self/exe:target_1")
+int BPF_URETPROBE(uretprobe_1)
+{
+	/* see above, target_1 is recursive */
+	static bool recur = false;
+
+	/* NOTE: order of returns is reversed to order of entries */
+	if (!recur)
+		exit1_recur_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &exit_stack1_recur, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	else
+		exit1_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &exit_stack1, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+
+	recur = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("uprobe//proc/self/exe:target_2")
+int BPF_UPROBE(uprobe_2)
+{
+	entry2_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &entry_stack2, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* no uretprobe for target_2 */
+
+SEC("uprobe//proc/self/exe:target_3")
+int BPF_UPROBE(uprobe_3)
+{
+	entry3_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &entry_stack3, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* no uretprobe for target_3 */
+
+SEC("uprobe//proc/self/exe:target_4")
+int BPF_UPROBE(uprobe_4)
+{
+	entry4_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &entry_stack4, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("uretprobe//proc/self/exe:target_4")
+int BPF_URETPROBE(uretprobe_4)
+{
+	exit4_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &exit_stack4, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("usdt//proc/self/exe:uretprobe_stack:target")
+int BPF_USDT(usdt_probe)
+{
+	usdt_len = bpf_get_stack(ctx, &usdt_stack, SZ, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.43.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-08 21:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-08 21:26 [PATCH 0/4] Fix user stack traces captured from uprobes Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-08 21:26 ` [PATCH 1/4] uprobes: rename get_trampoline_vaddr() and make it global Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-08 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] perf,uprobes: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobes Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-15  9:30   ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-05-15 14:32     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-20 15:20       ` Jiri Olsa
2024-05-20 23:56         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-08 21:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] perf,x86: avoid missing caller address in stack traces captured in uprobe Andrii Nakryiko
2024-05-20 15:20   ` Jiri Olsa
2024-05-08 21:26 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240508212605.4012172-5-andrii@kernel.org \
    --to=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rihams@fb.com \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).