From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "~akihirosuda" <suda.kyoto@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev,
serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org,
akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp
Subject: Re: [PATCH linux 0/3] [PATCH] userns: add sysctl "kernel.userns_group_range"
Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 19:14:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87fs7abu0f.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQhBBPyZE24LM6KvYrET2huW-W_YYsyPndpNkn70Mu3Ug@mail.gmail.com> (Paul Moore's message of "Tue, 30 May 2023 17:58:48 -0400")
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> writes:
> On Tue, May 30, 2023 at 2:50 PM ~akihirosuda <akihirosuda@git.sr.ht> wrote:
>>
>> This sysctl limits groups who can create a new userns without
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current userns, so as to mitigate potential kernel
>> vulnerabilities around userns.
>>
>> The sysctl value format is same as "net.ipv4.ping_group_range".
>>
>> To disable creating new unprivileged userns, set the sysctl value to "1
>> 0" in the initial userns.
>>
>> To allow everyone to create new userns, set the sysctl value to "0
>> 4294967294". This is the default value.
>>
>> This sysctl replaces "kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone" that is found in
>> Ubuntu [1] and Debian GNU/Linux.
>>
>> Link: https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-
>> kernel/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/jammy/commit?id=3422764 [1]
>
> Given the challenges around adding access controls to userns
> operations, have you considered using the LSM support that was added
> upstream last year? The relevant LSM hook can be found in commit
> 7cd4c5c2101c ("security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()"),
Paul how have you handled the real world regression I reported against
chromium?
Paul are you aware that the LSM hook can not be used to achieve the
objective of this patchset?
> and although only SELinux currently provides an access control
> implementation, there is no reason you couldn't add support for your
> favorite LSM, or even just a simple BPF LSM to enforce the group
> controls as you've described them here.
Is there a publicly available SELinux policy that uses that LSM hook?
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-02 0:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-30 18:50 [PATCH linux 0/3] [PATCH] userns: add sysctl "kernel.userns_group_range" ~akihirosuda
2023-05-30 11:34 ` [PATCH linux 3/3] " ~akihirosuda
2023-05-31 4:20 ` kernel test robot
2023-05-30 14:42 ` [PATCH linux 1/3] net/ipv4: split group_range logic to kernel/group_range.c ~akihirosuda
2023-05-30 17:31 ` [PATCH linux 2/3] group_range: allow GID from 2147483648 to 4294967294 ~akihirosuda
2023-05-30 21:58 ` [PATCH linux 0/3] [PATCH] userns: add sysctl "kernel.userns_group_range" Paul Moore
2023-05-31 7:50 ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-02 0:14 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2023-06-02 1:01 ` Paul Moore
2023-06-02 1:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2023-06-02 14:50 ` Paul Moore
2023-06-02 21:02 ` Akihiro Suda
2023-06-02 0:06 ` Eric W. Biederman
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