From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE995C433EB for ; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:49:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 4EE8520739 for ; Thu, 16 Jul 2020 12:49:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="BrOie1Yj" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4EE8520739 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-19345-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 26165 invoked by uid 550); 16 Jul 2020 12:49:11 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 26145 invoked from network); 16 Jul 2020 12:49:10 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1594903738; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=uaIPW54kqULYezLBNEp1wzYUF/CfEEz3Uiiha/ZVVF4=; b=BrOie1YjNHmyIUQki9usp5T15LXyJMSAV1PphQ93nb/RhcRmh644137/i8qQQxNXpRRQe0 K838Hmdyhk7Pjg1DwjRbgsi3iUGtDBx0mOvp2D/VMU4ZjX/kCXAsip/Ocv2ZvYjk3jtT8G szq7vSwsj89jsYhj6zVeqpQj2KU3VLI= X-MC-Unique: TG6ruVBSN5WSYIjOFApk0w-1 From: Stefano Garzarella To: Jens Axboe Cc: Alexander Viro , Kernel Hardening , Kees Cook , Aleksa Sarai , Stefan Hajnoczi , Christian Brauner , Sargun Dhillon , Jann Horn , io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jeff Moyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 14:48:30 +0200 Message-Id: <20200716124833.93667-1-sgarzare@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 I fixed some issues that Jens pointed out, and also the TODOs that I left in the previous version. I still have any doubts about patch 3, any advice? RFC v1 -> RFC v2: - added 'restricted' flag in the ctx [Jens] - added IORING_MAX_RESTRICTIONS define - returned EBUSY instead of EINVAL when restrictions are already registered - reset restrictions if an error happened during the registration - removed return value of io_sq_offload_start() RFC v1: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200710141945.129329-1-sgarzare@redhat.com Following the proposal that I send about restrictions [1], I wrote this series to add restrictions in io_uring. I also wrote helpers in liburing and a test case (test/register-restrictions.c) available in this repository: https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/liburing (branch: io_uring_restrictions) Just to recap the proposal, the idea is to add some restrictions to the operations (sqe, register, fixed file) to safely allow untrusted applications or guests to use io_uring queues. The first patch changes io_uring_register(2) opcodes into an enumeration to keep track of the last opcode available. The second patch adds IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode and the code to handle restrictions. The third patch adds IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED flag to start the rings disabled, allowing the user to register restrictions, buffers, files, before to start processing SQEs. I'm not sure if this could help seccomp. An alternative pointed out by Jann Horn could be to register restrictions during io_uring_setup(2), but this requires some intrusive changes (there is no space in the struct io_uring_params to pass a pointer to restriction arrays, maybe we can add a flag and add the pointer at the end of the struct io_uring_params). Another limitation now is that I need to enable every time IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS in the restrictions to be able to start the rings, I'm not sure if we should treat it as an exception. Maybe registering restrictions during io_uring_setup(2) could solve both issues (seccomp integration and IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS registration), but I need some suggestions to properly extend the io_uring_setup(2). Comments and suggestions are very welcome. Thank you in advance, Stefano [1] https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredhat/ Stefano Garzarella (3): io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation fs/io_uring.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h | 56 ++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) -- 2.26.2