From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Security
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 12:21:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180924092136.fqlane5t2p3jx3ee@mwanda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809231518440.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
On Sun, Sep 23, 2018 at 03:20:22PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Sep 2018, Dan Carpenter wrote:
>
> > Sort of related to this. I think we should have a public email list to
> > discuss potential security problems. We've actually talked about making
> > the security@kernel.org list public at some point when people started
> > flooding it with static checker warnings about potential SELinux missing
> > checks.
> >
> > The downsides are 1) Maintainers will be annoyed. They don't want me or
> > anyone to forward them static checker output (they are polite about
> > this). But they also want to be the first to know about real bugs found
> > by static analysis. These are conflicting and impossible desires... 2)
> > Script kiddies will follow the list and learn about bugs earlier. I
> > don't see this as a huge issue if we restricted it to driver specific
> > bugs.
>
> 3) there simply is a need for CRD process for the kernel (which pretty
> much by definition is not happening publicly). Currently, security@
> serves that purpose, so if you make that public, you have to
> instantiate some other process to deal with CRDs.
I'm not saying we would eliminate security@kernel.org. We would keep
that. security@kernel.org also does not want to answer questions about
every "suspicious code" that people find.
For coordinated responses you need linux-distros. security@kernel.org
does not do it.
security@kernel.org is there for two reasons. First we need a contact
to deal with security issues. About half the time when people send us
security reports to security@kernel.org then we just forward it to the
appropriate maintainer. Second, it's has a bunch of core developers for
serious bugs in ptrace or similar which affect everyone. Those kinds of
fixes are risky and complicated. But after a fix is found then distros
are expected to handle the release and getting the CVE etc.
regards,
dan carpenter
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-24 9:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-21 21:14 [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Security James Morris
2018-09-22 13:16 ` Dan Carpenter
2018-09-23 13:15 ` Laura Abbott
2018-09-23 13:20 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-23 18:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-09-23 18:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-24 9:21 ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
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