From: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com>
To: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Cc: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>,
Bruno Bierbaumer <bruno@bierbaumer.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mount.cifs: fix buffer overrun in set_password
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2026 12:24:37 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cauglxiqmzregxmz7qu3ervva3qiszmgs4xeiczmlpwuzmi4lk@6hgpziq22o6p> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <vuah4lb4wtxy3vhw4ywuacfto3dfxke7zldb4oiu3bcpjncrzv@ntdb7jyuzywi>
On Wed, Apr 01, 2026 at 10:40:41AM -0300, Enzo Matsumiya wrote:
> Hi Dave,
>
> On 03/31, David Disseldorp wrote:
> > The existing (j > pass_length) check is insufficient to avoid dst buffer
> > overrun into the start of the adjacent struct parsed_mount_info field.
> > Check for overrun before writing to dst, and account for comma-expansion
> > and null-termination.
> >
> > Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16044
> >
> > Reported-by: Bruno Bierbaumer <bruno@bierbaumer.net>
> > Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
> > ---
> > mount.cifs.c | 8 ++++----
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mount.cifs.c b/mount.cifs.c
> > index 1923913..d41ca6a 100644
> > --- a/mount.cifs.c
> > +++ b/mount.cifs.c
> > @@ -350,13 +350,13 @@ set_password(struct parsed_mount_info *parsed_info, const char *src,
> > unsigned int i = 0, j = 0;
> >
> > while (src[i]) {
> > - if (src[i] == ',')
> > - dst[j++] = ',';
> > - dst[j++] = src[i++];
> > - if (j > pass_length) {
> > + if (j + 2 >= pass_length) {
>
> There is the overrun bug, yes, but unconditionally accounting for comma
> expansion here will crop the password if it has at least 1 comma and
> (unparsed) length == MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE, e.g.:
>
> (password here is <511 * 'a'> + ',')
>
> # echo -e "username=administrator\npassword=$(printf 'a%.0s' {1..511})," > /tmp/creds
> # ./mount.cifs -o credentials=/tmp/creds //w25.vm.test/test /mnt/test
> Converted password too long!
> error 1 (Operation not permitted) opening credential file /tmp/creds
>
>
> Maybe password/password2 could be malloc'd with size
> "strlen(src) + <number of commas in src>" and bounds checked against that?
> Just a thought.
>
Maybe we could have buffers double the size, but that would represent a
behavior change. Passwords containing commas were never guaranteed to
fit in current MOUNT_PASSWD_SIZE sized buffers.
I believe this would be a separate chage.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Enzo
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-01 15:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-31 0:09 [PATCH] mount.cifs: fix buffer overrun in set_password David Disseldorp
2026-03-31 17:44 ` Henrique Carvalho
2026-03-31 23:56 ` Steve French
2026-04-01 0:58 ` David Disseldorp
2026-04-01 2:03 ` Steve French
2026-04-01 13:40 ` Enzo Matsumiya
2026-04-01 15:24 ` Henrique Carvalho [this message]
2026-04-02 1:23 ` David Disseldorp
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