From: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org>,
Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>,
Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>,
Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave
Date: Mon, 13 May 2024 10:21:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZkHNixUeasNCBjMn@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240510-imx-se-if-v1-4-27c5a674916d@nxp.com>
On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 06:57:30PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote:
> NXP hardware IP(s) for secure-enclaves like Edgelock Enclave(ELE),
> are embedded in the SoC to support the features like HSM, SHE & V2X,
> using message based communication interface.
>
> The secure enclave FW communicates on a dedicated messaging unit(MU)
> based interface(s) with application core, where kernel is running.
> It exists on specific i.MX processors. e.g. i.MX8ULP, i.MX93.
>
> This patch adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave,
> for exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s) like EdgeLock Enclave,
> both from:
> - User-Space Applications via character driver.
> - Kernel-space, used by kernel management layers like DM-Crypt.
>
> ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver.
Several review comments inside, but stopping here. I just found v7 of
this series. Could it be that you have resent an older version of this
series instead of the new one??
Sascha
>
> User-space library using this driver:
> - i.MX Secure Enclave library:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
> - i.MX Secure Middle-Ware:
> -- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
>
> Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev | 42 ++
> drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig | 12 +
> drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile | 2 +
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 287 ++++++++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 70 ++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 341 +++++++++
> drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 43 ++
> drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 1339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 151 ++++
> include/linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h | 14 +
> include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h | 88 +++
> 11 files changed, 2389 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..699525af6b86
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
> @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
> +What: /dev/<se>_mu[0-9]+_ch[0-9]+
> +Date: May 2024
> +KernelVersion: 6.8
> +Contact: linux-imx@nxp.com, pankaj.gupta@nxp.com
> +Description:
> + NXP offers multiple hardware IP(s) for secure-enclaves like EdgeLock-
> + Enclave(ELE), SECO. The character device file-descriptors
> + /dev/<se>_mu*_ch* are the interface between user-space NXP's secure-
> + enclave shared-library and the kernel driver.
> +
> + The ioctl(2)-based ABI is defined and documented in
> + [include]<linux/firmware/imx/ele_mu_ioctl.h>
> + ioctl(s) are used primarily for:
> + - shared memory management
> + - allocation of I/O buffers
> + - get mu info
> + - setting a dev-ctx as receiver that is slave to fw
> + - get SoC info
> +
> + The following file operations are supported:
> +
> + open(2)
> + Currently the only useful flags are O_RDWR.
> +
> + read(2)
> + Every read() from the opened character device context is waiting on
> + wakeup_intruptible, that gets set by the registered mailbox callback
> + function; indicating a message received from the firmware on message-
> + unit.
> +
> + write(2)
> + Every write() to the opened character device context needs to acquire
> + mailbox_lock, before sending message on to the message unit.
> +
> + close(2)
> + Stops and free up the I/O contexts that was associated
> + with the file descriptor.
> +
> +Users: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
> + https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
> + crypto/skcipher,
> + drivers/nvmem/imx-ocotp-ele.c
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
> index 183613f82a11..56bdca9bd917 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
> @@ -22,3 +22,15 @@ config IMX_SCU
>
> This driver manages the IPC interface between host CPU and the
> SCU firmware running on M4.
> +
> +config IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE
> + tristate "i.MX Embedded Secure Enclave - EdgeLock Enclave Firmware driver."
> + depends on IMX_MBOX && ARCH_MXC && ARM64
> + default m if ARCH_MXC
> +
> + help
> + It is possible to use APIs exposed by the iMX Secure Enclave HW IP called:
> + - EdgeLock Enclave Firmware (for i.MX8ULP, i.MX93),
> + like base, HSM, V2X & SHE using the SAB protocol via the shared Messaging
> + Unit. This driver exposes these interfaces via a set of file descriptors
> + allowing to configure shared memory, send and receive messages.
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> index 8f9f04a513a8..aa9033e0e9e3 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
> @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
> # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_DSP) += imx-dsp.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_SCU) += imx-scu.o misc.o imx-scu-irq.o rm.o imx-scu-soc.o
> +sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o
> +obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE} += sec_enclave.o
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..0463f26d93c7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> +/*
> + * Copyright 2024 NXP
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/completion.h>
> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +
> +#include "ele_base_msg.h"
> +#include "ele_common.h"
> +
> +int ele_get_info(struct device *dev, struct soc_info *s_info)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree);
> + phys_addr_t get_info_addr;
> + u32 *get_info_data;
> + u32 status;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!priv || !s_info)
> + goto exit;
ret and get_info_addr are used uninitialized when jumping to the exit
label from here.
> +
> + memset(s_info, 0x0, sizeof(*s_info));
> +
> + if (priv->mem_pool_name)
> + get_info_data = get_phy_buf_mem_pool(dev,
> + priv->mem_pool_name,
> + &get_info_addr,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ);
> + else
> + get_info_data = dmam_alloc_coherent(dev,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ,
> + &get_info_addr,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!get_info_data) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + dev_err(dev,
> + "%s: Failed to allocate get_info_addr.\n",
> + __func__);
> + goto exit;
> + }
> +
> + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = plat_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv,
> + (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_REQ,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = upper_32_bits(get_info_addr);
How can this work without triggering a NULL pointer exception? struct se_api_msg
is declared as:
struct se_api_msg {
u32 header; /* u8 Tag; u8 Command; u8 Size; u8 Ver; */
u32 *data;
};
The memory for tx_msg is kzalloced above, so *data is a NULL pointer.
> + tx_msg->data[1] = lower_32_bits(get_info_addr);
> + tx_msg->data[2] = ELE_GET_INFO_READ_SZ;
> + priv->rx_msg = rx_msg;
> + ret = imx_ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + ret = validate_rsp_hdr(priv,
> + priv->rx_msg->header,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_REQ,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + status = RES_STATUS(priv->rx_msg->data[0]);
> + if (status != priv->success_tag) {
> + dev_err(dev, "Command Id[%d], Response Failure = 0x%x",
> + ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, status);
> + ret = -1;
Callers seem to expect an error code. Do you intend to return -EPERM
here?
> + }
> +
> + s_info->imem_state = (get_info_data[ELE_IMEM_STATE_WORD]
> + & ELE_IMEM_STATE_MASK) >> 16;
> + s_info->major_ver = (get_info_data[GET_INFO_SOC_INFO_WORD_OFFSET]
> + & SOC_VER_MASK) >> 24;
> + s_info->minor_ver = ((get_info_data[GET_INFO_SOC_INFO_WORD_OFFSET]
> + & SOC_VER_MASK) >> 16) & 0xFF;
> + s_info->soc_rev = (get_info_data[GET_INFO_SOC_INFO_WORD_OFFSET]
> + & SOC_VER_MASK) >> 16;
> + s_info->soc_id = get_info_data[GET_INFO_SOC_INFO_WORD_OFFSET]
> + & SOC_ID_MASK;
> + s_info->serial_num
> + = (u64)get_info_data[GET_INFO_SL_NUM_MSB_WORD_OFF] << 32
> + | get_info_data[GET_INFO_SL_NUM_LSB_WORD_OFF];
> +exit:
> + if (get_info_addr) {
> + if (priv->mem_pool_name)
> + free_phybuf_mem_pool(dev, priv->mem_pool_name,
> + get_info_data, ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ);
> + else
> + dmam_free_coherent(dev,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ,
> + get_info_data,
> + get_info_addr);
> + }
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int ele_ping(struct device *dev)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree);
> + u32 status;
> + int ret;
> +
> + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_PING_REQ_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_PING_RSP_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = plat_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv,
> + (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_PING_REQ, ELE_PING_REQ_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(dev, "Error: plat_fill_cmd_msg_hdr failed.\n");
> + goto exit;
> + }
> +
> + priv->rx_msg = rx_msg;
> + ret = imx_ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + ret = validate_rsp_hdr(priv,
> + priv->rx_msg->header,
> + ELE_PING_REQ,
> + ELE_PING_RSP_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + status = RES_STATUS(priv->rx_msg->data[0]);
> + if (status != priv->success_tag) {
> + dev_err(dev, "Command Id[%d], Response Failure = 0x%x",
> + ELE_PING_REQ, status);
> + ret = -1;
> + }
> +exit:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int ele_service_swap(struct device *dev,
> + phys_addr_t addr,
> + u32 addr_size, u16 flag)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree);
> + u32 status;
> + int ret;
> +
> + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = plat_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv,
> + (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ,
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = flag;
> + tx_msg->data[1] = addr_size;
> + tx_msg->data[2] = ELE_NONE_VAL;
> + tx_msg->data[3] = lower_32_bits(addr);
> + tx_msg->data[4] = plat_add_msg_crc((uint32_t *)&tx_msg[0],
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ);
> + priv->rx_msg = rx_msg;
> + ret = imx_ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + ret = validate_rsp_hdr(priv,
> + priv->rx_msg->header,
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ,
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + status = RES_STATUS(priv->rx_msg->data[0]);
> + if (status != priv->success_tag) {
> + dev_err(dev, "Command Id[%d], Response Failure = 0x%x",
> + ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ, status);
> + ret = -1;
> + } else {
> + if (flag == ELE_IMEM_EXPORT)
> + ret = priv->rx_msg->data[1];
> + else
> + ret = 0;
> + }
> +exit:
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int ele_fw_authenticate(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t addr)
> +{
> + struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree);
> + struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree);
> + u32 status;
> + int ret;
> +
> + tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ << 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rx_msg) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
> + }
> + ret = plat_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv,
> + (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ,
> + ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
> +
> + tx_msg->data[0] = addr;
> + tx_msg->data[1] = 0x0;
> + tx_msg->data[2] = addr;
Has this been tested? According to the documentation data[0] shall
contain the upper 32bit of the address and data[1] shall contain the
lower 32bit of the address. There is no data[2] for this call.
--
Pengutronix e.K. | |
Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-13 8:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-10 13:27 [PATCH 0/4] Communication Interface to NXP secure-enclave HW IP like Edgelock Enclave Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 13:27 ` [PATCH 1/4] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-13 7:30 ` Sascha Hauer
2024-05-14 10:03 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 13:27 ` [PATCH 2/4] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 14:22 ` Rob Herring (Arm)
2024-05-10 20:09 ` Rob Herring
2024-05-13 15:36 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-21 12:17 ` Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 13:27 ` [PATCH 3/4] arm64: dts: imx8ulp-evk: add nxp secure enclave firmware Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 13:27 ` [PATCH 4/4] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-10 16:41 ` Frank Li
2024-05-10 19:39 ` Amit Singh Tomar
2024-05-13 9:16 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-13 9:12 ` Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-11 5:30 ` kernel test robot
2024-05-11 7:14 ` kernel test robot
2024-05-13 8:21 ` Sascha Hauer [this message]
2024-05-13 11:30 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-13 10:54 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2024-05-17 11:24 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-20 11:02 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2024-05-21 11:57 ` Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-21 12:27 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2024-05-22 10:46 ` Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-22 11:10 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2024-05-22 12:53 ` Pankaj Gupta
2024-05-16 4:47 ` Amit Singh Tomar
2024-05-16 4:52 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZkHNixUeasNCBjMn@pengutronix.de \
--to=s.hauer@pengutronix.de \
--cc=conor+dt@kernel.org \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=devicetree@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=festevam@gmail.com \
--cc=imx@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=kernel@pengutronix.de \
--cc=krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pankaj.gupta@nxp.com \
--cc=robh+dt@kernel.org \
--cc=shawnguo@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).