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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, amir73il@gmail.com, miklos@szeredi.hu,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:46:20 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240130214620.3155380-6-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240130214620.3155380-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Unsupported filesystems currently do not enforce any signatures. Add
support for signature enforcement of the "original" and "portable &
immutable" signatures when EVM_INIT_X509 is enabled.

The "original" signature type contains filesystem specific metadata.
Thus it cannot be copied up and verified. However with EVM_INIT_X509
and EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES enabled, the "original" file signature
may be written.

When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is not set or once it is removed from
/sys/kernel/security/evm by setting EVM_INIT_HMAC for example, it is not
possible to write or remove xattrs on the overlay filesystem.

This change still prevents EVM from writing HMAC signatures on
unsupported filesystem when EVM_INIT_HMAC is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index e96d127b48a2..f49609dfcbc7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -192,7 +192,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
 		return iint->evm_status;
 
-	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+	/*
+	 * On unsupported filesystems with EVM_INIT_X509 not enabled, skip
+	 * signature verification.
+	 */
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_X509) && is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
 	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
@@ -262,7 +266,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
 			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
 				   !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
-				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
+				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) &&
+				   !is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) {
 				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
 						    xattr_value,
 						    xattr_value_len);
@@ -422,9 +427,6 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
-	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
-		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-
 	if (!iint) {
 		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
 		if (!iint)
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-30 21:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-30 21:46 [PATCH 0/5] evm: Support signatures on stacked filesystem Stefan Berger
2024-01-30 21:46 ` [PATCH 1/5] security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 13:25   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 14:25     ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-31 14:56       ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-01 13:35         ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-01 14:18           ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-02 11:58             ` Christian Brauner
2024-02-01 15:41     ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 16:47   ` kernel test robot
2024-01-31 19:06   ` kernel test robot
2024-01-30 21:46 ` [PATCH 2/5] evm: Implement per signature type decision in security_inode_copy_up_xattr Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 13:28   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-30 21:46 ` [PATCH 3/5] ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to overlay backing file Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 13:56   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 14:46     ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-30 21:46 ` [PATCH 4/5] evm: Use the real inode's metadata to calculate metadata hash Stefan Berger
2024-01-31  2:10   ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 13:16     ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 14:40       ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 15:54         ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 17:23           ` Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 17:46             ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-01 12:10               ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-01 13:36                 ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-01 14:11                   ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-01 20:35                     ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-02  9:24                       ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-02 14:59                         ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-02 15:51                           ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-02 16:06                             ` Stefan Berger
2024-02-02 16:17                               ` Amir Goldstein
2024-02-02 16:30                                 ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-31 17:25           ` Stefan Berger
2024-01-30 21:46 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2024-01-31 14:06   ` [PATCH 5/5] evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509 Amir Goldstein
2024-02-01 17:53     ` Mimi Zohar
2024-01-31 13:18 ` [PATCH 0/5] evm: Support signatures on stacked filesystem Amir Goldstein
2024-01-31 14:52   ` Stefan Berger

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