* [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
` (26 more replies)
0 siblings, 27 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
IMA and EVM are not effectively LSMs, especially due to the fact that in
the past they could not provide a security blob while there is another LSM
active.
That changed in the recent years, the LSM stacking feature now makes it
possible to stack together multiple LSMs, and allows them to provide a
security blob for most kernel objects. While the LSM stacking feature has
some limitations being worked out, it is already suitable to make IMA and
EVM as LSMs.
The main purpose of this patch set is to remove IMA and EVM function calls,
hardcoded in the LSM infrastructure and other places in the kernel, and to
register them as LSM hook implementations, so that those functions are
called by the LSM infrastructure like other regular LSMs.
This patch set introduces two new LSMs 'ima' and 'evm', so that functions
can be registered to their respective LSM, and removes the 'integrity' LSM.
integrity_kernel_module_request() was moved to IMA, since deadlock could
occur only there. integrity_inode_free() was replaced with ima_inode_free()
(EVM does not need to free memory).
In order to make 'ima' and 'evm' independent LSMs, it was necessary to
split integrity metadata used by both IMA and EVM, and to let them manage
their own. The special case of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, managed by IMA and
used by EVM, was handled by introducing a new flag in EVM, EVM_NEW_FILE,
managed by two additional LSM hooks, evm_post_path_mknod() and
evm_file_release(), equivalent to their counterparts ima_post_path_mknod()
and ima_file_free().
In addition to splitting metadata, it was decided to embed the
evm_iint_inode structure into the inode security blob, since it is small
and because anyway it cannot rely on IMA anymore allocating it (since it
uses a different structure).
On the other hand, to avoid memory pressure concerns, only a pointer to the
ima_iint_cache structure is stored in the inode security blob, and the
structure is allocated on demand, like before.
Another follow-up change was removing the iint parameter from
evm_verifyxattr(), that IMA used to pass integrity metadata to EVM. After
splitting metadata, and aligning EVM_NEW_FILE with IMA_NEW_FILE, this
parameter was not necessary anymore.
The last part was to ensure that the order of IMA and EVM functions is
respected after they become LSMs. Since the order of lsm_info structures in
the .lsm_info.init section depends on the order object files containing
those structures are passed to the linker of the kernel image, and since
IMA is before EVM in the Makefile, that is sufficient to assert that IMA
functions are executed before EVM ones.
The patch set is organized as follows.
Patches 1-9 make IMA and EVM functions suitable to be registered to the LSM
infrastructure, by aligning function parameters.
Patches 10-18 add new LSM hooks in the same places where IMA and EVM
functions are called, if there is no LSM hook already.
Patch 19 moves integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, as a prerequisite
for removing the 'integrity' LSM.
Patches 20-22 introduce the new standalone LSMs 'ima' and 'evm', and move
hardcoded calls to IMA, EVM and integrity functions to those LSMs.
Patches 23-24 remove the dependency on the 'integrity' LSM by splitting
integrity metadata, so that the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs can use their own.
They also duplicate iint_lockdep_annotate() in ima_main.c, since the mutex
field was moved from integrity_iint_cache to ima_iint_cache.
Patch 25 finally removes the 'integrity' LSM, since 'ima' and 'evm' are now
self-contained and independent.
The patch set applies on top of lsm/next, commit 97280fa1ed94 ("Automated
merge of 'dev' into 'next'").
Changelog:
v9:
- Add new Reviewed-by/Acked-by
- Rewrite documentation of ima_kernel_module_request() (suggested by
Stefan)
- Move evm_inode_post_setxattr() registration after evm_inode_setxattr()
(suggested by Stefan)
v8:
- Restore dynamic allocation of IMA integrity metadata, and store only the
pointer in the inode security blob
- Select SECURITY_PATH both in IMA and EVM
- Rename evm_file_free() to evm_file_release()
- Unconditionally register evm_post_path_mknod()
- Introduce the new ima_iint.c file for the management of IMA integrity
metadata
- Introduce ima_inode_set_iint()/ima_inode_get_iint() in ima.h to
respectively store/retrieve the IMA integrity metadata pointer
- Replace ima_iint_inode() with ima_inode_get() and ima_iint_find(), with
same behavior of integrity_inode_get() and integrity_iint_find()
- Initialize the ima_iint_cache in ima_iintcache_init() and call it from
init_ima_lsm()
- Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA in a separate patch
(suggested by Mimi)
- Compile ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
is enabled
- Remove ima_inode_alloc_security() and ima_inode_free_security(), since
the IMA integrity metadata is not fully embedded in the inode security
blob
- Fixed the missed initialization of ima_iint_cache in
process_measurement() and __ima_inode_hash()
- Add a sentence in 'evm: Move to LSM infrastructure' to mention about
moving evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl() and
evm_inode_post_set_acl() to evm_main.c
- Add a sentence in 'ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure' to
mention about moving ima_inode_remove_acl() to ima_appraise.c
v7:
- Use return instead of goto in __vfs_removexattr_locked() (suggested by
Casey)
- Clarify in security/integrity/Makefile that the order of 'ima' and 'evm'
LSMs depends on the order in which IMA and EVM are compiled
- Move integrity_iint_cache flags to ima.h and evm.h in security/ and
duplicate IMA_NEW_FILE to EVM_NEW_FILE
- Rename evm_inode_get_iint() to evm_iint_inode() and ima_inode_get_iint()
to ima_iint_inode(), check if inode->i_security is NULL, and just return
the pointer from the inode security blob
- Restore the non-NULL checks after ima_iint_inode() and evm_iint_inode()
(suggested by Casey)
- Introduce evm_file_free() to clear EVM_NEW_FILE
- Remove comment about LSM_ORDER_LAST not guaranteeing the order of 'ima'
and 'evm' LSMs
- Lock iint->mutex before reading IMA_COLLECTED flag in __ima_inode_hash()
and restored ima_policy_flag check
- Remove patch about the hardcoded ordering of 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs in
security.c
- Add missing ima_inode_free_security() to free iint->ima_hash
- Add the cases for LSM_ID_IMA and LSM_ID_EVM in lsm_list_modules_test.c
- Mention about the change in IMA and EVM post functions for private
inodes
v6:
- See v7
v5:
- Rename security_file_pre_free() to security_file_release() and the LSM
hook file_pre_free_security to file_release (suggested by Paul)
- Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to ima_main.c (renamed to
ima_kernel_module_request())
- Split the integrity_iint_cache structure into ima_iint_cache and
evm_iint_cache, so that IMA and EVM can use disjoint metadata and
reserve space with the LSM infrastructure
- Reserve space for the entire ima_iint_cache and evm_iint_cache
structures, not just the pointer (suggested by Paul)
- Introduce ima_inode_get_iint() and evm_inode_get_iint() to retrieve
respectively the ima_iint_cache and evm_iint_cache structure from the
security blob
- Remove the various non-NULL checks for the ima_iint_cache and
evm_iint_cache structures, since the LSM infrastructure ensure that they
always exist
- Remove the iint parameter from evm_verifyxattr() since IMA and EVM
use disjoint integrity metaddata
- Introduce the evm_post_path_mknod() to set the IMA_NEW_FILE flag
- Register the inode_alloc_security LSM hook in IMA and EVM to
initialize the respective integrity metadata structures
- Remove the 'integrity' LSM completely and instead make 'ima' and 'evm'
proper standalone LSMs
- Add the inode parameter to ima_get_verity_digest(), since the inode
field is not present in ima_iint_cache
- Move iint_lockdep_annotate() to ima_main.c (renamed to
ima_iint_lockdep_annotate())
- Remove ima_get_lsm_id() and evm_get_lsm_id(), since IMA and EVM directly
register the needed LSM hooks
- Enforce 'ima' and 'evm' LSM ordering at LSM infrastructure level
v4:
- Improve short and long description of
security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(), security_inode_post_set_acl(),
security_inode_post_remove_acl() and security_file_post_open()
(suggested by Mimi)
- Improve commit message of 'ima: Move to LSM infrastructure' (suggested
by Mimi)
v3:
- Drop 'ima: Align ima_post_path_mknod() definition with LSM
infrastructure' and 'ima: Align ima_post_create_tmpfile() definition
with LSM infrastructure', define the new LSM hooks with the same
IMA parameters instead (suggested by Mimi)
- Do IS_PRIVATE() check in security_path_post_mknod() and
security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() on the new inode rather than the
parent directory (in the post method it is available)
- Don't export ima_file_check() (suggested by Stefan)
- Remove redundant check of file mode in ima_post_path_mknod() (suggested
by Mimi)
- Mention that ima_post_path_mknod() is now conditionally invoked when
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y (suggested by Mimi)
- Mention when a LSM hook will be introduced in the IMA/EVM alignment
patches (suggested by Mimi)
- Simplify the commit messages when introducing a new LSM hook
- Still keep the 'extern' in the function declaration, until the
declaration is removed (suggested by Mimi)
- Improve documentation of security_file_pre_free()
- Register 'ima' and 'evm' as standalone LSMs (suggested by Paul)
- Initialize the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs from 'integrity', to keep the
original ordering of IMA and EVM functions as when they were hardcoded
- Return the IMA and EVM LSM IDs to 'integrity' for registration of the
integrity-specific hooks
- Reserve an xattr slot from the 'evm' LSM instead of 'integrity'
- Pass the LSM ID to init_ima_appraise_lsm()
v2:
- Add description for newly introduced LSM hooks (suggested by Casey)
- Clarify in the description of security_file_pre_free() that actions can
be performed while the file is still open
v1:
- Drop 'evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()', 'fs: Fix
description of vfs_tmpfile()' and 'security: Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST',
they were sent separately (suggested by Christian Brauner)
- Replace dentry with file descriptor parameter for
security_inode_post_create_tmpfile()
- Introduce mode_stripped and pass it as mode argument to
security_path_mknod() and security_path_post_mknod()
- Use goto in do_mknodat() and __vfs_removexattr_locked() (suggested by
Mimi)
- Replace __lsm_ro_after_init with __ro_after_init
- Modify short description of security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() and
security_inode_post_set_acl() (suggested by Stefan)
- Move security_inode_post_setattr() just after security_inode_setattr()
(suggested by Mimi)
- Modify short description of security_key_post_create_or_update()
(suggested by Mimi)
- Add back exported functions ima_file_check() and
evm_inode_init_security() respectively to ima.h and evm.h (reported by
kernel robot)
- Remove extern from prototype declarations and fix style issues
- Remove unnecessary include of linux/lsm_hooks.h in ima_main.c and
ima_appraise.c
Roberto Sassu (25):
ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() definition with LSM infrastructure
ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure
evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM
infrastructure
security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
security: Introduce file_post_open hook
security: Introduce file_release hook
security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
integrity: Remove LSM
fs/attr.c | 5 +-
fs/file_table.c | 3 +-
fs/namei.c | 12 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 3 +-
fs/open.c | 1 -
fs/posix_acl.c | 5 +-
fs/xattr.c | 9 +-
include/linux/evm.h | 117 +-------
include/linux/ima.h | 142 ----------
include/linux/integrity.h | 27 --
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 20 +-
include/linux/security.h | 59 ++++
include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 2 +
security/integrity/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 --
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 19 ++
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 195 ++++++++++---
security/integrity/iint.c | 197 +------------
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 148 ++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 23 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 66 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 142 ++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 148 +++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 80 +-----
security/keys/key.c | 10 +-
security/security.c | 263 +++++++++++-------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +-
.../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 6 +
35 files changed, 906 insertions(+), 839 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
` (25 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change ima_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 5a13f0c8495f..b53ae408ad4f 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
- ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry);
+ ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 86b57757c7b1..910a2f11a906 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry);
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
}
static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry)
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 870dde67707b..36c2938a5c69 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
* ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
* @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
*
* Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
*
@@ -636,7 +637,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry)
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
` (24 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change ima_file_mprotect() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the file_mprotect hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++++--
security/security.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 910a2f11a906..b66353f679e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
-extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
+extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
}
static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long prot)
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cc1217ac2c6f..b3f5e8401056 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
/**
* ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
* @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
- * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @reqprot: protection requested by the application
+ * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel
*
* Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
* IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
@@ -465,7 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
*
* On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
*/
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
struct file *file;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7035ee35a393..78928d4c0db1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2832,7 +2832,7 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+ return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
}
/**
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
` (23 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change ima_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 11 +++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index b66353f679e8..077324309c11 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -188,8 +188,9 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
-extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len, int flags);
extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl);
@@ -212,10 +213,12 @@ static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return;
}
-static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len)
+ size_t xattr_value_len,
+ int flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 36c2938a5c69..cb2d0d11aa77 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -750,8 +750,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
return -EACCES;
}
-int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
int digsig = 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 78928d4c0db1..ec572380d0cd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2270,7 +2270,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
` (22 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change ima_inode_removexattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_removexattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 7 +++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 077324309c11..678a03fddd7e 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -200,7 +200,9 @@ static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
{
return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
}
-extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+
+extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name);
#else
static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
{
@@ -231,7 +233,8 @@ static inline int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index cb2d0d11aa77..36abc84ba299 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
-int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name)
{
int result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ec572380d0cd..feb39de74385 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2431,7 +2431,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ ret = ima_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
` (21 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change ima_post_read_file() definition, by making "void *buf" a
"char *buf", so that it can be registered as implementation of the
post_read_file hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 678a03fddd7e..31ef6c3c3207 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b3f5e8401056..02021ee467d3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
+int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
` (20 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change evm_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 +-
include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index b53ae408ad4f..adeba0ec40f1 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
- evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
+ evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
}
return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 36ec884320d9..5cc386312b5a 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
+extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size);
@@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cc7956d7878b..ac34f21122cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
/**
* evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata
+ * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
* @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status
*
@@ -879,7 +880,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int ia_valid)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
return;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
` (19 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change evm_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/evm.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 5cc386312b5a..7de24c1ada90 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size);
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size)
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index ac34f21122cd..12ba3207fd31 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
*
* Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
* verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have
@@ -590,7 +591,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*/
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len)
+ size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index feb39de74385..16361f75c2ae 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size);
+ return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
}
/**
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
` (18 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Change evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the inode_post_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/evm.h | 8 +++++---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 7de24c1ada90..3faabdd47852 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len);
+ size_t xattr_value_len,
+ int flags);
extern int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl)
{
- return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0);
+ return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
}
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len)
+ size_t xattr_value_len,
+ int flags)
{
return;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 12ba3207fd31..d35143179699 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
+ * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations
*
* Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change.
*
@@ -761,7 +762,8 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
* i_mutex lock.
*/
void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+ const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
+ int flags)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 16361f75c2ae..7c240d768a76 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2368,7 +2368,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return;
call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
}
/**
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
` (17 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Add the idmap parameter to the definition, so that evm_inode_setattr() can
be registered as this hook implementation.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 76458b6d53da..b00b16d58413 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_readlink, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *attr)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7c240d768a76..671472b34bbf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2216,7 +2216,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a6bf90ace84c..cedb4cbf072e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3136,7 +3136,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0fdbf04cc258..1b6abfdf7173 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1233,12 +1233,14 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @dentry: the object
* @iattr: for the force flag
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
` (16 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_setattr hook.
At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
file attributes and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/attr.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index adeba0ec40f1..990e1b3a3c91 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+ security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index b00b16d58413..a0e9e48015a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d0eb20f90b26..56c841aa3994 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int ia_valid);
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -879,6 +881,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
+static inline void
+security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int ia_valid)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 671472b34bbf..8b8a03291a8e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2223,6 +2223,22 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @ia_valid: file attributes set
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int ia_valid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed
* @path: file
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:30 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
` (15 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_removexattr hook.
At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
xattr removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/xattr.c | 9 +++++----
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 09d927603433..f891c260a971 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -552,11 +552,12 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
goto out;
error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
- if (!error) {
- fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
- evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
- }
+ fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+ security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
out:
return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index a0e9e48015a4..f849f7d5bb53 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 56c841aa3994..84ae03690340 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -942,6 +943,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
}
+static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *name)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8b8a03291a8e..0f0f2c11ef73 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2453,6 +2453,20 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @name: xattr name
+ *
+ * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
* @dentry: associated dentry
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
` (14 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and
extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on
the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log.
LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the
access mask requested with open().
The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/namei.c | 2 ++
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 4e0de939fea1..ef867f1d6704 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3639,6 +3639,8 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
error = may_open(idmap, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
+ if (!error)
+ error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error)
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error && do_truncate)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index b7c7a9273ea0..e44d8239545b 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
goto out;
}
+ host_err = security_file_post_open(file, may_flags);
+ if (host_err) {
+ fput(file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
if (host_err) {
fput(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index f849f7d5bb53..3c84942d2818 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 84ae03690340..97f2212c13b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
@@ -1074,6 +1075,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0f0f2c11ef73..5b442032c273 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2967,6 +2967,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return fsnotify_open_perm(file);
}
+/**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
+ * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
+ * make decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_post_open, 0, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
/**
* security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
* @file: file
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
` (13 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the file_release hook.
IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes
it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/file_table.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++++
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index b991f90571b4..725407f374fa 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
eventpoll_release(file);
locks_remove_file(file);
+ security_file_release(file);
ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
if (file->f_op->fasync)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 3c84942d2818..7f9e9240606e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
struct kernfs_node *kn)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 97f2212c13b6..2997348afcb7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
struct kernfs_node *kn);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
+void security_file_release(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
@@ -1008,6 +1009,9 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{ }
+
static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{ }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5b442032c273..145e3141339c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2719,6 +2719,17 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
+ */
+void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+ call_void_hook(file_release, file);
+}
+
/**
* security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
* @file: the file
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
` (12 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the path_post_mknod hook.
IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.
LSMs could also take some action after files are created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 5 +++++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index ef867f1d6704..9280aa5d60a7 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -4063,6 +4063,11 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
dentry, mode, 0);
break;
}
+
+ if (error)
+ goto out2;
+
+ security_path_post_mknod(idmap, dentry);
out2:
done_path_create(&path, dentry);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 7f9e9240606e..dba5d8204dc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mkdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rmdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mknod, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, path_post_mknod, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_truncate, const struct path *path)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_symlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2997348afcb7..977dd9f7f51a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1893,6 +1893,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m
int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
unsigned int dev);
+void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path);
int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name);
@@ -1927,6 +1928,10 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *den
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 145e3141339c..b55f9ad294cc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1801,6 +1801,20 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+/**
+ * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security field after file creation
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: new file
+ *
+ * Update inode security field after a file has been created.
+ */
+void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry);
+}
+
/**
* security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed
* @dir: parent directory
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
` (11 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
xattr.
LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
canceled.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 9280aa5d60a7..c7ac7fdf0f25 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3705,6 +3705,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
+ security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index dba5d8204dc5..87f60b47dfca 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 977dd9f7f51a..1cb604282617 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *name,
const struct inode *context_inode);
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
+void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry);
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -811,6 +813,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir,
return 0;
}
+static inline void
+security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b55f9ad294cc..59d49e5c2671 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2014,6 +2014,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
* @old_dentry: existing file
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
` (10 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.
At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/posix_acl.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index e1af20893ebe..7556ee9f8a51 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
error = -EIO;
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+ security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 87f60b47dfca..b0125c99f80a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1cb604282617..c372797e1617 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl);
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl);
int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -915,6 +917,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry,
const char *acl_name)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 59d49e5c2671..f7df58bd5f13 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2351,6 +2351,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
` (9 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_remove_acl hook.
At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/posix_acl.c | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++++
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 7556ee9f8a51..0d2371240c1b 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1246,6 +1246,7 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
error = -EIO;
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+ security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index b0125c99f80a..7e414ba26333 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c372797e1617..4b03c76b91f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -378,6 +378,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
+void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name);
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
@@ -936,6 +939,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{ }
+
static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{ }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f7df58bd5f13..23cdf35b6070 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2414,6 +2414,23 @@ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
}
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on
+ * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
/**
* security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation
* @dentry: file
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
` (8 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the key_post_create_or_update hook.
Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update,
so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation
or update.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
security/keys/key.c | 7 ++++++-
security/security.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 7e414ba26333..7e4683035d34 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_free, struct key *key)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_permission, key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
enum key_need_perm need_perm)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring,
+ struct key *key, const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+ unsigned long flags, bool create)
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4b03c76b91f1..8436f9abf43d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2004,6 +2004,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key);
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
enum key_need_perm need_perm);
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+ unsigned long flags, bool create);
#else
@@ -2031,6 +2034,14 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
+ struct key *key,
+ const void *payload,
+ size_t payload_len,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ bool create)
+{ }
+
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 5b10641debd5..31a8b9408b7c 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -930,6 +930,8 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
goto error_link_end;
}
+ security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
+ true);
ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
flags, true);
@@ -963,10 +965,13 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
- if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+ security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
+ flags, false);
ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
payload, plen,
flags, false);
+ }
goto error_free_prep;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cdf35b6070..f8d9ebeb4c31 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5456,6 +5456,25 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
*buffer = NULL;
return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer);
}
+
+/**
+ * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update
+ * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to
+ * @key: created or updated key
+ * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key
+ * @payload_len: length of payload
+ * @flags: key flags
+ * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated
+ *
+ * Notify the caller of a key creation or update.
+ */
+void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ const void *payload, size_t payload_len,
+ unsigned long flags, bool create)
+{
+ call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload,
+ payload_len, flags, create);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (7 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 1 reply; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain
better what the problem is.
Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
LSM infrastructure).
Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
unavailable").
EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 10 ++++++++
include/linux/integrity.h | 13 ----------
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 ------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/security.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 31ef6c3c3207..0f9af283cbc8 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -256,4 +256,14 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)
+extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
+#else
+static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-
-extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-
-#else
-
-static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 895f4b9ce8c6..de603cf42ac7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
-
-/**
- * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
- * @kmod_name: kernel module name
- *
- * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
- * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
- * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
- * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
- * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
- * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
- *
- * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
- * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
- * also signed with digsig.
- */
-int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 02021ee467d3..3891b83efdb3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -1091,6 +1091,39 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
+ * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
+ * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
+ * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
+ * the same lock cannot be taken again.
+ *
+ * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
+ * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
+ * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
+ * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
+ *
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
+ * avoid the verification loop.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f8d9ebeb4c31..48dc3db4c834 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+ return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
}
/**
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
` (6 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
'integrity').
Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
hardcoded.
Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook
path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always
executed to mark files as new, as before the move.
A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register
ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/file_table.c | 2 -
fs/namei.c | 6 -
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 --
fs/open.c | 1 -
include/linux/ima.h | 104 ------------------
include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 +
security/integrity/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 78 +++++++++----
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
security/keys/key.c | 9 +-
security/security.c | 63 ++---------
.../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 +
14 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 200 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 725407f374fa..1a0962981b48 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
@@ -368,7 +367,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
locks_remove_file(file);
security_file_release(file);
- ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
if (file->f_op->fasync)
file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index c7ac7fdf0f25..1bf7435cdf76 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -3641,8 +3640,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
if (!error)
error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
- if (!error)
- error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error && do_truncate)
error = handle_truncate(idmap, file);
if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
@@ -3706,7 +3703,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
- ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
return 0;
}
@@ -4052,8 +4048,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
case 0: case S_IFREG:
error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
dentry, mode, true);
- if (!error)
- ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry);
break;
case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index e44d8239545b..4349dde92154 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
goto out;
}
- host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
- if (host_err) {
- fput(file);
- goto out;
- }
-
if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
else
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index a84d21e55c39..1cf05a1413aa 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 0f9af283cbc8..23ae24b60ecf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
-extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
-extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct inode *inode);
-extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
-extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
-extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
- bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
@@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
}
-static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id id,
- char *description)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
- bool contents)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
{}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
- struct key *key,
- const void *payload, size_t plen,
- unsigned long flags, bool create);
-#else
-static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
- struct key *key,
- const void *payload,
- size_t plen,
- unsigned long flags,
- bool create) {}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -256,14 +162,4 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)
-extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-#else
-static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
index f8aef9ade549..b3b7fd699b63 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx {
#define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108
#define LSM_ID_BPF 109
#define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110
+#define LSM_ID_IMA 111
/*
* LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index d0ffe37dc1d6..92b63039c654 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
+# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below.
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/
obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index b98bfe9efd0c..475c32615006 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select SECURITY_PATH
select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ const void *payload, size_t plen,
+ unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
/*
* The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
* platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 3891b83efdb3..d0826e864c29 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* Flag files that changed, based on i_version
*/
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
*
* On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
*/
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
struct file *file;
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
u32 secid;
@@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
@@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
* Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
* tmpfiles are in policy.
*/
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct inode *inode)
+
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
@@ -717,8 +717,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
* file data can be written later.
*/
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry)
+static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -753,8 +752,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
- bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -803,8 +802,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -837,7 +836,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
@@ -891,9 +890,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
- char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+ char *description)
{
if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -1114,7 +1113,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
*
* Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
*/
-int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1155,4 +1154,41 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
return error;
}
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+ .name = "ima",
+ .id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+ .name = "ima",
+ .init = init_ima_lsm,
+ .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+};
+
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
/* iint action cache flags */
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 31a8b9408b7c..560790038329 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -932,8 +931,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
true);
- ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
- flags, true);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
@@ -965,13 +962,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
- if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+ if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
flags, false);
- ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
- payload, plen,
- flags, false);
- }
goto error_free_prep;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 48dc3db4c834..a476af7f8aea 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
- (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -1183,12 +1184,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
*/
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
}
/**
@@ -2896,13 +2892,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
- unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+ flags);
}
/**
@@ -2931,12 +2922,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
}
/**
@@ -3245,12 +3231,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
*/
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
}
/**
@@ -3266,12 +3247,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
bool contents)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
@@ -3291,12 +3267,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
@@ -3311,12 +3282,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
*/
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
@@ -3338,13 +3304,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id,
char *description)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
- description);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+ description);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
index 9df29b1e3497..17333787cb2f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules)
case LSM_ID_LANDLOCK:
name = "landlock";
break;
+ case LSM_ID_IMA:
+ name = "ima";
+ break;
default:
name = "INVALID";
break;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
` (5 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
A few additional IMA hooks are needed to reset the cached appraisal
status, causing the file's integrity to be re-evaluated on next access.
Register these IMA-appraisal only functions separately from the rest of IMA
functions, as appraisal is a separate feature not necessarily enabled in
the kernel configuration.
Reuse the same approach as for other IMA functions, move hardcoded calls
from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure. Declare the
functions as static and register them as hook implementations in
init_ima_appraise_lsm(), called by init_ima_lsm().
Also move the inline function ima_inode_remove_acl() from the public ima.h
header to ima_appraise.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 -
include/linux/ima.h | 55 ---------------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 38 +++++++++++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 13 -------
6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 990e1b3a3c91..7e97313e7f70 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include <linux/filelock.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -503,7 +502,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
- ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 23ae24b60ecf..0bae61a15b60 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -92,66 +92,11 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
-extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
-extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len, int flags);
-extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl);
-static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
-}
-
-extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name);
#else
static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
{
return 0;
}
-
-static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c0412100023e..a27fc10f84f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len);
int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len);
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#else
static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -385,6 +386,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
+static inline void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 36abc84ba299..076451109637 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
-void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -750,9 +750,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry,
return -EACCES;
}
-int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
+static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
int digsig = 0;
@@ -781,8 +781,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
return result;
}
-int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
{
if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
@@ -790,8 +790,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
-int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name)
+static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name)
{
int result;
@@ -803,3 +803,23 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
}
return result;
}
+
+static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl),
+};
+
+void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks),
+ lsmid);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index d0826e864c29..b8b8891a9379 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
{
security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+ init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a476af7f8aea..0030af4afa9d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -2309,9 +2308,6 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (ret == 1)
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
@@ -2339,9 +2335,6 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
kacl);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
@@ -2402,9 +2395,6 @@ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
@@ -2504,9 +2494,6 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
if (ret == 1)
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
` (4 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.
Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 2 -
fs/posix_acl.c | 3 -
fs/xattr.c | 2 -
include/linux/evm.h | 113 -----------------
include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 +
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 118 +++++++++++++++---
security/security.c | 43 ++-----
.../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 +
8 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 7e97313e7f70..4d0d75953107 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/filelock.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -502,7 +501,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
- evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
}
return error;
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 0d2371240c1b..5c90239e3f2b 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/filelock.h>
@@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
- evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
}
out_inode_unlock:
@@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
- evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
}
out_inode_unlock:
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -557,7 +556,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
- evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
out:
return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 3faabdd47852..cb481eccc967 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -21,45 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
void *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
-extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
-extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- int flags);
-extern int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
-extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
-extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name);
-static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
-}
-extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl);
-static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
-}
-static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
- return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
-}
-
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
int *xattr_count);
@@ -94,80 +55,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
}
#endif
-static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- int flags)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name,
- struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
struct xattr *xattrs,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
index b3b7fd699b63..33d8c9f4aa6b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx {
#define LSM_ID_BPF 109
#define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110
#define LSM_ID_IMA 111
+#define LSM_ID_EVM 112
/*
* LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d35143179699..0a089af83a45 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -589,9 +589,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires
* requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
*/
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
+static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
@@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
* Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
* the current value is valid.
*/
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name)
{
/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
* there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -672,9 +672,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
* and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
* valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
*/
-int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
{
enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -713,6 +715,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
return -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{
+ return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -761,9 +781,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
* __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's
* i_mutex lock.
*/
-void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
- const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
- int flags)
+static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name,
+ const void *xattr_value,
+ size_t xattr_value_len,
+ int flags)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
return;
@@ -782,6 +804,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
}
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
+ * posix acls.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+ struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+ return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
/**
* evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
@@ -792,7 +829,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
* No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
* vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
*/
-void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *xattr_name)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
return;
@@ -808,6 +846,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
}
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
+ * removing posix acls.
+ */
+static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *acl_name)
+{
+ evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
@@ -831,8 +885,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
* except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
*/
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- struct iattr *attr)
+static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -883,8 +937,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
* This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
* to lock the inode's i_mutex.
*/
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
- int ia_valid)
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+ struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
return;
@@ -901,7 +955,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
-int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
{
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
return 1; /* Discard */
@@ -1004,4 +1058,36 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
return error;
}
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
+ .name = "evm",
+ .id = LSM_ID_EVM,
+};
+
+static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
+ .name = "evm",
+ .init = init_evm_lsm,
+ .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+};
+
late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0030af4afa9d..6b439242d117 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,13 +20,13 @@
#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/overflow.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
- (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0))
/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -1741,10 +1742,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (!xattr_count)
goto out;
- ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
- &xattr_count);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
out:
for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
@@ -2236,14 +2233,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
- int ret;
-
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
@@ -2308,9 +2300,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (ret == 1)
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -2329,15 +2319,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
struct posix_acl *kacl)
{
- int ret;
-
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
- kacl);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
+ kacl);
}
/**
@@ -2390,14 +2375,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
{
- int ret;
-
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
}
/**
@@ -2433,7 +2413,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return;
call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
}
/**
@@ -2494,9 +2473,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
if (ret == 1)
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -2700,7 +2677,7 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
return rc;
}
- return evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
index 17333787cb2f..4d5d4cee2586 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules)
case LSM_ID_IMA:
name = "ima";
break;
+ case LSM_ID_EVM:
+ name = "evm";
+ break;
default:
name = "INVALID";
break;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
` (3 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).
Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.
Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).
Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.
Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().
Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.
Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/evm.h | 8 +--
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 1 +
security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 19 +++++++
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 -
security/security.c | 4 +-
8 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index cb481eccc967..d48d6da32315 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -12,15 +12,12 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
-struct integrity_iint_cache;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen);
extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
+ size_t xattr_value_len);
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
int *xattr_count);
@@ -48,8 +45,7 @@ static inline int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
void *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+ size_t xattr_value_len)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index fba9ee359bc9..861b3bacab82 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config EVM
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select SECURITY_PATH
default n
help
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 53bd7fec93fa..eb1a2c343bd7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -32,6 +32,25 @@ struct xattr_list {
bool enabled;
};
+#define EVM_NEW_FILE 0x00000001
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x00000002
+
+/* EVM integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct evm_iint_cache {
+ unsigned long flags;
+ enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct evm_iint_cache *evm_iint_inode(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return inode->i_security + evm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
extern int evm_initialized;
#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index b1ffd4cc0b44..7552d49d0725 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
int rc = 0;
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
return 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 0a089af83a45..81dbade5b9b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -178,14 +178,14 @@ static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
char *xattr_value,
- size_t xattr_value_len,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+ size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
struct evm_digest digest;
- struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;
if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
@@ -254,8 +254,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
if (!rc) {
- inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
if (iint)
iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
@@ -403,7 +401,6 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
* @xattr_name: requested xattr
* @xattr_value: requested xattr value
* @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
- * @iint: inode integrity metadata
*
* Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored
* security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length
@@ -416,8 +413,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
*/
enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
- void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+ void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -425,13 +421,8 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- if (!iint) {
- iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
- if (!iint)
- return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- }
return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, iint);
+ xattr_value_len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr);
@@ -448,7 +439,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
return INTEGRITY_PASS;
- return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
/*
@@ -526,14 +517,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
/* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */
if (evm_hmac_disabled())
return 0;
- iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
- if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+ iint = evm_iint_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+ if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE))
return 0;
/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
@@ -735,9 +726,9 @@ static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint;
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
if (iint)
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
@@ -1019,6 +1010,42 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
+static int evm_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+ /* Called by security_inode_alloc(), it cannot be NULL. */
+ iint->flags = 0UL;
+ iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void evm_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+ fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+ return;
+
+ if (iint && atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1)
+ iint->flags &= ~EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode);
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+
+ if (iint)
+ iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
void __init evm_load_x509(void)
{
@@ -1071,6 +1098,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, evm_inode_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, evm_file_release),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, evm_post_path_mknod),
};
static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
@@ -1084,10 +1114,16 @@ static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
return 0;
}
+struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct evm_iint_cache),
+ .lbs_xattr_count = 1,
+};
+
DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
.name = "evm",
.init = init_evm_lsm,
.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+ .blobs = &evm_blob_sizes,
};
late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 076451109637..1dd6ee72a20a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
}
status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value,
- rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint);
+ rc < 0 ? 0 : rc);
switch (status) {
case INTEGRITY_PASS:
case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 59eaddd84434..7a97c269a072 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
-#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6b439242d117..de8a9a7b2a30 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1717,8 +1717,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
return 0;
if (initxattrs) {
- /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */
- new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2,
+ /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
+ new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
if (!new_xattrs)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
` (2 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Make the 'ima' LSM independent from the 'integrity' LSM by introducing IMA
own integrity metadata (ima_iint_cache structure, with IMA-specific fields
from the integrity_iint_cache structure), and by managing it directly from
the 'ima' LSM.
Create ima_iint.c and introduce the same integrity metadata management
functions found in iint.c (renamed with ima_). However, instead of putting
metadata in an rbtree, reserve space from IMA in the inode security blob
for a pointer, and introduce the ima_inode_set_iint()/ima_inode_get_iint()
primitives to store/retrieve that pointer. This improves search time from
logarithmic to constant.
Consequently, don't include the inode pointer as field in the
ima_iint_cache structure, since the association with the inode is clear.
Since the inode field is missing in ima_iint_cache, pass the extra inode
parameter to ima_get_verity_digest().
Prefer storing the pointer instead of the entire ima_iint_cache structure,
to avoid too much memory pressure. Use the same mechanism as before, a
cache named ima_iint_cache (renamed from iint_cache), to quickly allocate
a new ima_iint_cache structure when requested by the IMA policy.
Create the new ima_iint_cache in ima_iintcache_init(),
called by init_ima_lsm(), during the initialization of the 'ima' LSM. And,
register ima_inode_free_security() to free the ima_iint_cache structure, if
exists.
Replace integrity_iint_cache with ima_iint_cache in various places of the
IMA code. Also, replace integrity_inode_get() and integrity_iint_find(),
respectively with ima_inode_get() and ima_iint_find().
Finally, move the remaining IMA-specific flags
to security/integrity/ima/ima.h, since they are now unnecessary in the
common integrity layer.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 23 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 27 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 53 ----------
9 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 2499f2485c04..b376d38b4ee6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# Measurement Architecture(IMA).
#
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima_iint.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a27fc10f84f7..11d7c0332207 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern const char boot_aggregate_name[];
/* IMA event related data */
struct ima_event_data {
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
struct file *file;
const unsigned char *filename;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
@@ -119,6 +119,107 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
u64 count;
};
+/* IMA iint action cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
+#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002
+#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004
+#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008
+/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */
+#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020
+#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040
+#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080
+#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100
+#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
+
+/* IMA iint policy rule cache flags */
+#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
+#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
+#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
+#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
+
+#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
+ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
+ IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
+ IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+
+/* IMA iint subaction appraise cache flags */
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
+ IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
+#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
+ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
+ IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
+
+/* IMA iint cache atomic_flags */
+#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0
+#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1
+#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2
+#define IMA_DIGSIG 3
+#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4
+
+/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+ struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
+ u64 version; /* track inode changes */
+ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long measured_pcrs;
+ unsigned long atomic_flags;
+ unsigned long real_ino;
+ dev_t real_dev;
+ enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
+ enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
+ struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes;
+
+static inline struct ima_iint_cache *
+ima_inode_get_iint(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return NULL;
+
+ iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+ return *iint_sec;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return;
+
+ iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+ *iint_sec = iint;
+}
+
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void);
+
extern const int read_idmap[];
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
@@ -152,8 +253,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
struct ima_template_entry *entry);
int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const char *op, const char *cause);
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+ const char *cause);
int ima_init_crypto(void);
void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
@@ -267,10 +368,10 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+ struct modsig *modsig);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
@@ -280,7 +381,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_template_entry **entry,
@@ -318,17 +419,16 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr);
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig);
int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func);
enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len);
@@ -337,14 +437,14 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid);
#else
-static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
@@ -361,14 +461,13 @@ static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file)
{
}
-static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache
- *iint,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+static inline enum integrity_status
+ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
{
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 597ea0c4d72f..b37d043d5748 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
* value is invalidated.
*/
void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const char *op, const char *cause)
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op,
+ const char *cause)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
allowed_algos);
}
-static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode,
struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
{
enum hash_algo alg;
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
* On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data
* hash containing 0's.
*/
- digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
+ digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg);
if (digest_len == 0)
return false;
@@ -237,9 +238,9 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo,
+ struct modsig *modsig)
{
const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
- if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash)) {
+ if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, inode, &hash)) {
audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
result = -ENODATA;
}
@@ -338,8 +339,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* Must be called with iint->mutex held.
*/
-void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc)
@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
}
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1dd6ee72a20a..3497741caea9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
-static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
{
int rc, offset;
u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
}
/* Return specific func appraised cached result */
-enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
}
-static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
enum ima_hooks func,
enum integrity_status status)
{
@@ -152,8 +151,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
}
-static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case MMAP_CHECK:
@@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
*/
-static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
{
@@ -443,7 +441,7 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig,
*
* Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted.
*/
-int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr)
{
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
@@ -477,8 +475,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*
* Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
*/
-int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig)
@@ -603,7 +600,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
/*
* ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
*/
-void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
int rc = 0;
@@ -640,7 +637,7 @@ static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
int action;
if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
@@ -648,7 +645,7 @@ static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return;
action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (iint) {
set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (!action)
@@ -674,12 +671,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e7c9c216c1c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ * - implements the IMA hook: ima_inode_free
+ * - cache integrity information in the inode security blob
+ */
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ima_iint_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_find - Return the iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return the IMA integrity information (iint) associated with an inode, if the
+ * inode was processed by IMA.
+ *
+ * Return: Found iint or NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return ima_inode_get_iint(inode);
+}
+
+#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + 1)
+
+/*
+ * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
+ * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
+ * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
+ * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
+ */
+static inline void ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
+ static struct lock_class_key ima_iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
+
+ int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
+ depth = 0;
+
+ lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &ima_iint_mutex_key[depth]);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ iint->ima_hash = NULL;
+ iint->version = 0;
+ iint->flags = 0UL;
+ iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
+ iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+ mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+ ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+ kfree(iint->ima_hash);
+ mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
+ kmem_cache_free(ima_iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_get - Find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Find an iint associated with an inode, and allocate a new one if not found.
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: An iint on success, NULL on error.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+ if (iint)
+ return iint;
+
+ iint = kmem_cache_alloc(ima_iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!iint)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ima_iint_init_always(iint, inode);
+
+ inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
+ ima_inode_set_iint(inode, iint);
+
+ return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_free - Called on inode free
+ * @inode: Pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Free the iint associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!IS_IMA(inode))
+ return;
+
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+ ima_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL);
+
+ ima_iint_free(iint);
+}
+
+static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = (struct ima_iint_cache *)foo;
+
+ memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+}
+
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+ ima_iint_cache =
+ kmem_cache_create("ima_iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, ima_iint_init_once);
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 63979aefc95f..393f5c7912d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
- struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint,
.filename = boot_aggregate_name };
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b8b8891a9379..c84e8c55333d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
*
*/
static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
int must_measure,
char **pathbuf,
const char **pathname,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
if (!iint)
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
&iint->atomic_flags))
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
}
-static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
@@ -192,12 +192,12 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
inode_lock(inode);
if (action) {
- iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
rc = -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -564,11 +564,11 @@ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
int rc, hash_algo;
if (ima_policy_flag) {
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
if (iint)
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
}
@@ -578,7 +578,6 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
- tmp_iint.inode = inode;
mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
@@ -688,7 +687,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
@@ -700,7 +699,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return;
/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
- iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
@@ -719,7 +718,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*/
static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int must_appraise;
@@ -732,7 +731,7 @@ static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
return;
/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
- iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
@@ -935,7 +934,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int ret = 0;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
- struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
+ struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
.filename = eventname,
.buf = buf,
@@ -1172,6 +1171,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
#endif
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ima_inode_free),
};
static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
@@ -1181,15 +1181,21 @@ static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
static int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
{
+ ima_iintcache_init();
security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid);
return 0;
}
+struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *),
+};
+
DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
.name = "ima",
.init = init_ima_lsm,
.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+ .blobs = &ima_blob_sizes,
};
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f69062617754..c0556907c2e6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
#define DONT_HASH 0x0200
#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
- (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+ (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct ima_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
int ima_policy_flag;
static int temp_ima_appraise;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7a97c269a072..671fc50255f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -20,59 +20,6 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
-/* iint action cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
-#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002
-#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004
-#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008
-/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */
-#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020
-#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040
-#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080
-#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100
-#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
-
-/* iint policy rule cache flags */
-#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
-#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
-#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
-#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
-#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
-#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
-#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
-#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
-
-#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
- IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
- IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
- IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
-
-/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000
-#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000
-#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
- IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
-#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
- IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
- IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
-
-/* iint cache atomic_flags */
-#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0
-#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1
-#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2
-#define IMA_DIGSIG 3
-#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4
-
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 4:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2024-02-16 22:34 ` [PATCH v10 00/25] " Eric Snowberg
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Since now IMA and EVM use their own integrity metadata, it is safe to
remove the 'integrity' LSM, with its management of integrity metadata.
Keep the iint.c file only for loading IMA and EVM keys at boot, and for
creating the integrity directory in securityfs (we need to keep it for
retrocompatibility reasons).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/integrity.h | 14 ---
security/integrity/iint.c | 197 +--------------------------------
security/integrity/integrity.h | 25 -----
security/security.c | 2 -
4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 236 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index ef0f63ef5ebc..459b79683783 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -19,24 +19,10 @@ enum integrity_status {
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,
};
-/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
-extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
-extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
#else
-static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
- integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
{
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index d4419a2a1e24..068ac6c2ae1e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -6,207 +6,14 @@
* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
*
* File: integrity_iint.c
- * - implements the integrity hooks: integrity_inode_alloc,
- * integrity_inode_free
- * - cache integrity information associated with an inode
- * using a rbtree tree.
+ * - initialize the integrity directory in securityfs
+ * - load IMA and EVM keys
*/
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/rbtree.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include "integrity.h"
-static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
-static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __ro_after_init;
-
struct dentry *integrity_dir;
-/*
- * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
-
- while (n) {
- iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
-
- if (inode < iint->inode)
- n = n->rb_left;
- else if (inode > iint->inode)
- n = n->rb_right;
- else
- return iint;
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!IS_IMA(inode))
- return NULL;
-
- read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
- read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
- return iint;
-}
-
-#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH+1)
-
-/*
- * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures
- * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint
- * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs.
- * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details.
- */
-static inline void iint_lockdep_annotate(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
- static struct lock_class_key iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING];
-
- int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth;
-
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING))
- depth = 0;
-
- lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]);
-#endif
-}
-
-static void iint_init_always(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct inode *inode)
-{
- iint->ima_hash = NULL;
- iint->version = 0;
- iint->flags = 0UL;
- iint->atomic_flags = 0UL;
- iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
- mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
- iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode);
-}
-
-static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
-{
- kfree(iint->ima_hash);
- mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex);
- kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- * @return: allocated iint
- *
- * Caller must lock i_mutex
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct rb_node **p;
- struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
-
- iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
- if (iint)
- return iint;
-
- iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!iint)
- return NULL;
-
- iint_init_always(iint, inode);
-
- write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
- p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
- while (*p) {
- parent = *p;
- test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
- rb_node);
- if (inode < test_iint->inode) {
- p = &(*p)->rb_left;
- } else if (inode > test_iint->inode) {
- p = &(*p)->rb_right;
- } else {
- write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
- return test_iint;
- }
- }
-
- iint->inode = inode;
- node = &iint->rb_node;
- inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
- rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
- rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-
- write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- return iint;
-}
-
-/**
- * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free
- * @inode: pointer to the inode
- *
- * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
- */
-void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
-
- if (!IS_IMA(inode))
- return;
-
- write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
- iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
- rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
- write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
- iint_free(iint);
-}
-
-static void iint_init_once(void *foo)
-{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo;
-
- memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
-}
-
-static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
-{
- iint_cache =
- kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
- return 0;
-}
-DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
- .name = "integrity",
- .init = integrity_iintcache_init,
- .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
-};
-
-
/*
* integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 671fc50255f9..50d6f798e613 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -102,31 +102,6 @@ struct ima_file_id {
__u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
} __packed;
-/* integrity data associated with an inode */
-struct integrity_iint_cache {
- struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
- struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
- struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
- u64 version; /* track inode changes */
- unsigned long flags;
- unsigned long measured_pcrs;
- unsigned long atomic_flags;
- unsigned long real_ino;
- dev_t real_dev;
- enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
- enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
- enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
- struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
-};
-
-/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
- * integrity data associated with an inode.
- */
-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
-
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
void *addr, unsigned long count);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index de8a9a7b2a30..4317bcd6ec6a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
-#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
@@ -1598,7 +1597,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
*/
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
- integrity_inode_free(inode);
call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
/*
* The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-15 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 0:25 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-15 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw
To: viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb, kolga, Dai.Ngo,
tom, paul, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin, eric.snowberg,
dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace, casey, shuah,
mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
On Thu, 2024-02-15 at 11:31 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
> integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
> ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain
> better what the problem is.
>
> Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
> and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
> LSM infrastructure).
>
> Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
> passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
> cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
> commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
> unavailable").
>
> EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
> mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
> recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
> by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
> same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
I hope the change of the ima_kernel_module_request() documentation is
fine for everyone.
If not, let me know.
Thanks
Roberto
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 10 ++++++++
> include/linux/integrity.h | 13 ----------
> security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 ------------------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/security.c | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 31ef6c3c3207..0f9af283cbc8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -256,4 +256,14 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
> return false;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS)
> +extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> +#else
> +static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#endif
> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> -
> -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> -
> -#else
> -
> -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> -
> #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> index 895f4b9ce8c6..de603cf42ac7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> @@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
> return ret;
> }
> -
> -/**
> - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> - * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> - *
> - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
> - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
> - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
> - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
> - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
> - *
> - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
> - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
> - * also signed with digsig.
> - */
> -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> -{
> - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 02021ee467d3..3891b83efdb3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -1091,6 +1091,39 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> +
> +/**
> + * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
> + * @kmod_name: kernel module name
> + *
> + * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
> + * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex
> + * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock
> + * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since
> + * the same lock cannot be taken again.
> + *
> + * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm,
> + * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an
> + * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
> + * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
> + *
> + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
> + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
> + * avoid the verification loop.
> + *
> + * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise.
> + */
> +int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> +{
> + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
> +
> static int __init init_ima(void)
> {
> int error;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index f8d9ebeb4c31..48dc3db4c834 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
> ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> + return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
> }
>
> /**
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
2024-02-15 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-16 0:25 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2024-02-16 0:25 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Roberto Sassu, viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb,
kolga, Dai.Ngo, tom, paul, jmorris, serge, dmitry.kasatkin,
eric.snowberg, dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace,
casey, shuah, mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu, Stefan Berger
On Thu, 2024-02-15 at 17:09 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Thu, 2024-02-15 at 11:31 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> >
> > In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
> > integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
> > ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain
> > better what the problem is.
> >
> > Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
> > and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
> > LSM infrastructure).
> >
> > Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
> > passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
> > cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
> > commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
> > unavailable").
> >
> > EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
> > mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
> > recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
> > by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
> > same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>
> I hope the change of the ima_kernel_module_request() documentation is
> fine for everyone.
>
> If not, let me know.
Thanks, Roberto. The updated kernel-doc looks good.
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
@ 2024-02-16 4:43 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-16 7:54 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 22:34 ` [PATCH v10 00/25] " Eric Snowberg
26 siblings, 1 reply; 31+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2024-02-16 4:43 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Roberto Sassu, viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb,
kolga, Dai.Ngo, tom, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin,
eric.snowberg, dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace,
casey, shuah, mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu
On Feb 15, 2024 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>
> IMA and EVM are not effectively LSMs, especially due to the fact that in
> the past they could not provide a security blob while there is another LSM
> active.
>
> That changed in the recent years, the LSM stacking feature now makes it
> possible to stack together multiple LSMs, and allows them to provide a
> security blob for most kernel objects. While the LSM stacking feature has
> some limitations being worked out, it is already suitable to make IMA and
> EVM as LSMs.
>
> The main purpose of this patch set is to remove IMA and EVM function calls,
> hardcoded in the LSM infrastructure and other places in the kernel, and to
> register them as LSM hook implementations, so that those functions are
> called by the LSM infrastructure like other regular LSMs.
As discussed earlier, I've just merged this into the lsm/dev tree; a big
thank you to Roberto for working on this and to all helped along the way
with reviews, testing, etc. I've wanted to see IMA/EVM integrated as
proper LSMs for a while and I'm very happy to finally see it happening.
Mimi, Roberto, I'm going to hold off on merging anything into the lsm/dev
tree for a few days in case you decide you would prefer to take these
patches yourselves. If I don't hear anything from the two of you, I'll
plan to send these to Linus during the next merge window.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure
2024-02-16 4:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
@ 2024-02-16 7:54 ` Roberto Sassu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2024-02-16 7:54 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Paul Moore, viro, brauner, jack, chuck.lever, jlayton, neilb,
kolga, Dai.Ngo, tom, jmorris, serge, zohar, dmitry.kasatkin,
eric.snowberg, dhowells, jarkko, stephen.smalley.work, omosnace,
casey, shuah, mic
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, keyrings, selinux, linux-kselftest,
Roberto Sassu
On Thu, 2024-02-15 at 23:43 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Feb 15, 2024 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
> >
> > IMA and EVM are not effectively LSMs, especially due to the fact that in
> > the past they could not provide a security blob while there is another LSM
> > active.
> >
> > That changed in the recent years, the LSM stacking feature now makes it
> > possible to stack together multiple LSMs, and allows them to provide a
> > security blob for most kernel objects. While the LSM stacking feature has
> > some limitations being worked out, it is already suitable to make IMA and
> > EVM as LSMs.
> >
> > The main purpose of this patch set is to remove IMA and EVM function calls,
> > hardcoded in the LSM infrastructure and other places in the kernel, and to
> > register them as LSM hook implementations, so that those functions are
> > called by the LSM infrastructure like other regular LSMs.
>
> As discussed earlier, I've just merged this into the lsm/dev tree; a big
> thank you to Roberto for working on this and to all helped along the way
> with reviews, testing, etc. I've wanted to see IMA/EVM integrated as
> proper LSMs for a while and I'm very happy to finally see it happening.
Thank you, and thanks to all! That's an excellent news! Excited about
that!
> Mimi, Roberto, I'm going to hold off on merging anything into the lsm/dev
> tree for a few days in case you decide you would prefer to take these
> patches yourselves. If I don't hear anything from the two of you, I'll
> plan to send these to Linus during the next merge window.
Perfect!
Roberto
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2024-02-16 4:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
@ 2024-02-16 22:34 ` Eric Snowberg
26 siblings, 0 replies; 31+ messages in thread
From: Eric Snowberg @ 2024-02-16 22:34 UTC (permalink / raw
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, Christian Brauner, jack@suse.cz,
Chuck Lever III, Jeff Layton, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com,
Dai Ngo, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu
> On Feb 15, 2024, at 3:30 AM, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> The patch set applies on top of lsm/next, commit 97280fa1ed94 ("Automated
> merge of 'dev' into 'next'").
I have tested the ima appraisal portion and have not observed any regressions with
this series. For that part of the code, if you want, feel free to add:
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 31+ messages in thread
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2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 0:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 4:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2024-02-16 7:54 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 22:34 ` [PATCH v10 00/25] " Eric Snowberg
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