From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Matthew Denton <mpdenton@chromium.org>
Cc: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>,
Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 12:03:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240305-gremien-faucht-29973b61fb57@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240305-kontakt-ticken-77fc8f02be1d@brauner>
On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 10:58:31AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 01:41:29AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 09:59:47AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > > Uhm, this will break the seccomp notifier, no? So you can't turn on
> > > > > SECURITY_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_WRITE when you want to use the seccomp
> > > > > notifier to do system call interception and rewrite memory locations of
> > > > > the calling task, no? Which is very much relied upon in various
> > > > > container managers and possibly other security tools.
> > > > >
> > > > > Which means that you can't turn this on in any of the regular distros.
> > > >
> > > > FWIW, it's a run-time toggle, but yes, let's make sure this works
> > > > correctly.
> > > >
> > > > > So you need to either account for the calling task being a seccomp
> > > > > supervisor for the task whose memory it is trying to access or you need
> > > > > to provide a migration path by adding an api that let's caller's perform
> > > > > these writes through the seccomp notifier.
> > > >
> > > > How do seccomp supervisors that use USER_NOTIF do those kinds of
> > > > memory writes currently? I thought they were actually using ptrace?
> > > > Everything I'm familiar with is just using SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD,
> > > > and not doing fancy memory pokes.
> > >
> > > For example, incus has a seccomp supervisor such that each container
> > > gets it's own goroutine that is responsible for handling system call
> > > interception.
> > >
> > > If a container is started the container runtime connects to an AF_UNIX
> > > socket to register with the seccomp supervisor. It stays connected until
> > > it stops. Everytime a system call is performed that is registered in the
> > > seccomp notifier filter the container runtime will send a AF_UNIX
> > > message to the seccomp supervisor. This will include the following fds:
> > >
> > > - the pidfd of the task that performed the system call (we should
> > > actually replace this with SO_PEERPIDFD now that we have that)
> > > - the fd of the task's memory to /proc/<pid>/mem
> > >
> > > The seccomp supervisor will then perform the system call interception
> > > including the required memory reads and writes.
> >
> > Okay, so the patch would very much break that. Some questions, though:
> > - why not use process_vm_writev()?
>
> Because it's inherently racy as I've explained in an earlier mail in
> this thread. Opening /proc/<pid>/mem we can guard via:
>
> // Assume we hold @pidfd for supervised process
>
> int fd_mem = open("/proc/$pid/mem", O_RDWR);:
>
> if (pidfd_send_signal(pidfd, 0, ...) == 0)
> write(fd_mem, ...);
>
> But we can't exactly do:
>
> process_vm_writev(pid, WRITE_TO_MEMORY, ...);
> if (pidfd_send_signal(pidfd, 0, ...) == 0)
> write(fd_mem, ...);
>
> That's always racy. The process might have been reaped before we even
> call pidfd_send_signal() and we're writing to some random process
> memory.
>
> If we wanted to support this we'd need to implement a proposal I had a
> while ago:
>
> #define PROCESS_VM_RW_PIDFD (1 << 0)
>
> process_vm_readv(pidfd, ..., PROCESS_VM_RW_PIDFD);
> process_vm_writev(pidfd, ..., PROCESS_VM_RW_PIDFD);
>
> which is similar to what we did for waitid(pidfd, P_PIDFD, ...)
>
> That would make it possible to use a pidfd instead of a pid in the two
> system calls. Then we can get rid of the raciness and actually use those
> system calls. As they are now, we can't.
What btw, is the Linux sandbox on Chromium doing? Did they finally move
away from SECCOMP_RET_TRAP to SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF? I see:
https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40145101
What ever became of this?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-05 11:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-01 21:34 [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-01 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-02 10:31 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:06 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-04 13:20 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 13:48 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:05 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 14:35 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:56 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-04 17:49 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 8:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 9:41 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 9:58 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 10:12 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 10:32 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 19:34 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-05 19:38 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:31 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 11:03 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-03-05 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:49 ` Matt Denton
2024-03-05 15:38 ` Adrian Ratiu
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