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From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/7] Add check for bpf lsm return value
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:56:46 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240325095653.1720123-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> (raw)

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

A bpf prog returning positive number attached to file_alloc_security hook
will make kernel panic.

Here is a panic log:

[  441.235774] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000009
[  441.236748] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  441.237429] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  441.238119] PGD 800000000b02f067 P4D 800000000b02f067 PUD b031067 PMD 0
[  441.238990] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[  441.239546] CPU: 0 PID: 347 Comm: loader Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-gafe0cbf23373 #22
[  441.240496] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b4
[  441.241933] RIP: 0010:alloc_file+0x4b/0x190
[  441.242485] Code: 8b 04 25 c0 3c 1f 00 48 8b b0 30 0c 00 00 e8 9c fe ff ff 48 3d 00 f0 ff fb
[  441.244820] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c67c40 EFLAGS: 00010203
[  441.245484] RAX: ffff888006a891a0 RBX: ffffffff8223bd00 RCX: 0000000035b08000
[  441.246391] RDX: ffff88800b95f7b0 RSI: 00000000001fc110 RDI: f089cd0b8088ffff
[  441.247294] RBP: ffffc90000c67c58 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[  441.248209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[  441.249108] R13: ffffc90000c67c78 R14: ffffffff8223bd00 R15: fffffffffffffff4
[  441.250007] FS:  00000000005f3300(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  441.251053] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  441.251788] CR2: 00000000000001a9 CR3: 000000000bdc4003 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
[  441.252688] Call Trace:
[  441.253011]  <TASK>
[  441.253296]  ? __die+0x24/0x70
[  441.253702]  ? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x480
[  441.254236]  ? fixup_exception+0x26/0x330
[  441.254750]  ? exc_page_fault+0x6d/0x1c0
[  441.255257]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[  441.255792]  ? alloc_file+0x4b/0x190
[  441.256257]  alloc_file_pseudo+0x9f/0xf0
[  441.256760]  __anon_inode_getfile+0x87/0x190
[  441.257311]  ? lock_release+0x14e/0x3f0
[  441.257808]  bpf_link_prime+0xe8/0x1d0
[  441.258315]  bpf_tracing_prog_attach+0x311/0x570
[  441.258916]  ? __pfx_bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security+0x10/0x10
[  441.259605]  __sys_bpf+0x1bb7/0x2dc0
[  441.260070]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x20/0x30
[  441.260533]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x140
[  441.261004]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[  441.261643] RIP: 0033:0x4b0349
[  441.262045] Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 88
[  441.264355] RSP: 002b:00007fff74daee38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
[  441.265293] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff74daef30 RCX: 00000000004b0349
[  441.266187] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00007fff74daee50 RDI: 000000000000001c
[  441.267114] RBP: 000000000000001b R08: 00000000005ef820 R09: 0000000000000000
[  441.268018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
[  441.268907] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00000000005ef018 R15: 00000000004004e8

The reason is that the positive number returned by bpf prog is not a
valid errno, and could not be filtered out with IS_ERR which is used by
the file system to check errors. As a result, the filesystem mistakenly
uses this random positive number as file pointer, causing panic.

To fix this issue, there are two schemes:

1. Modify the calling sites of file_alloc_security to take positive
   return values as zero.

2. Make the bpf verifier to ensure no unpredicted value returned by
   lsm bpf prog.

Considering that hook file_alloc_security never returned positive number
before bpf lsm was introduced, and other lsm hooks may have the same
problem, scheme 2 is more reasonable.

So this patch set adds lsm return value check in verifier to fix it.

v2:
fix bpf ci failure

v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240316122359.1073787-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com/

Xu Kuohai (7):
  bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return integer with new macro LSM_RET_INT
  bpf, lsm: Add return value range description for lsm hook
  bpf, lsm: Add function to read lsm hook return value range
  bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier
  bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within
  selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c
  selftests/bpf: Add return value checks and corrections for failed
    progs

 include/linux/bpf.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h                       |   8 +
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                 | 433 +++++++++---------
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     |   6 -
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                          |  66 ++-
 kernel/bpf/btf.c                              |   5 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         |  59 ++-
 security/security.c                           |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/err.h       |  10 +
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sig_in_xattr.c   |   4 +
 .../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c         |   8 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/token_lsm.c |   4 +-
 .../bpf/progs/verifier_global_subprogs.c      |   7 +-
 13 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 236 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.2


             reply	other threads:[~2024-03-25  9:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-25  9:56 Xu Kuohai [this message]
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/7] bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return integer with new macro LSM_RET_INT Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/7] bpf, lsm: Add return value range description for lsm hook Xu Kuohai
2024-04-08 17:09   ` KP Singh
2024-04-08 22:15     ` KP Singh
2024-04-10 12:30       ` Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/7] bpf, lsm: Add function to read lsm hook return value range Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/7] bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/7] bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/7] selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c Xu Kuohai
2024-03-25  9:56 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 7/7] selftests/bpf: Add return value checks and corrections for failed progs Xu Kuohai
2024-04-08 21:45 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/7] Add check for bpf lsm return value KP Singh
2024-04-10 12:34   ` Xu Kuohai

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