From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
pc@manguebit.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RESEND][PATCH v3] security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the original IMA call was
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 23:21:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240403222150.GL538574@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240403090749.2929667-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 11:07:49AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> Commit 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call to
> ima_post_path_mknod().
>
> For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() was
> called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather than
> only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call.
>
> However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does
> not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for example,
> not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount).
>
> If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when
> security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to
> the dentry is private.
>
> Move security_path_post_mknod() where the ima_post_path_mknod() call was,
> which is obviously correct from IMA/EVM perspective. IMA/EVM are the only
> in-kernel users, and only need to inspect regular files.
>
> Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjhgDa1uAvwx4ppw@mail.gmail.com/
> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Fixes: 08abce60d63f ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
LGTM...
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-03 22:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-03 9:07 [RESEND][PATCH v3] security: Place security_path_post_mknod() where the original IMA call was Roberto Sassu
2024-04-03 13:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-04-03 15:02 ` Paul Moore
2024-04-03 16:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-03 22:21 ` Al Viro [this message]
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