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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Verma, Vishal L" <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	"paul@paul-moore.com" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"yaelt@google.com" <yaelt@google.com>,
	"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"nichen@iscas.ac.cn" <nichen@iscas.ac.cn>,
	"sumit.garg@linaro.org" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org" <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"nvdimm@lists.linux.dev" <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:40:17 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <49c48e3e96bf0f5ebef14e7328cc8a6ca6380e08.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e3b1a5e532ed86e674385abc4812c5a774f851d4.camel@intel.com>

On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 20:10 +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 14:15 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2024-01-24 at 18:21 +0000, Verma, Vishal L wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2023-11-08 at 07:36 +0000, Chen Ni wrote:
> > > > Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error.
> > > > 
> > > > Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-
> > > > provided decrypted data")
> > > > Signed-off-by: Chen Ni <nichen@iscas.ac.cn>
> > > > ---
> > > >  security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 4 ++++
> > > >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > > > b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > > > index 8af2136069d2..76f55dd13cb8 100644
> > > > --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > > > +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > > > @@ -237,6 +237,10 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const
> > > > char **format,
> > > >  			break;
> > > >  		}
> > > >  		*decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > > +		if (!*decrypted_data) {
> > > > +			pr_info("encrypted_key: decrypted_data is
> > > > missing\n");
> > > > +			break;
> > > > +		}
> > > 
> > > Hello,
> > > 
> > > This patch seems to break keyring usage in CXL and NVDIMM, with the
> > > "decrypted_data is missing" error path being hit. Reverting this commit
> > > fixes the tests. I'm not sure if there are valid scenarios where this is
> > > expected to be empty?
> > > 
> > > Here's an strace snippet of where the error occurs:
> > > 
> > >    keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, "user", "nvdimm-master", 0) = 76300785
> > >    openat(AT_FDCWD, "/sys/devices/platform/cxl_acpi.0/root0/nvdimm-bridge0/ndbus0/nmem0/state", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
> > >    read(3, "idle\n", 1024)                 = 5
> > >    close(3)                                = 0
> > >    keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, "encrypted", "nvdimm:0", 0) = -1 ENOKEY (Required key not available)
> > >    uname({sysname="Linux", nodename="fedora", ...}) = 0
> > >    newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ndctl/keys/nvdimm_0_fedora.blob", 0x7fff23fbc210, 0) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
> > >    add_key("encrypted", "nvdimm:0", "new enc32 user:nvdimm-master 32", 31, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
> > 
> > 
> > Indeed!  The user-provided decrypted data should be optional.   The change needs
> > to be reverted.
> > 
> Ah, thanks for confirming! Would you like me to send a revert patch or
> will you do it?

Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"
    
This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882.
    
New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random
numbers or user-provided decrypted data.  Revert the change requiring
user-provided decrypted data.


Can I add your Reported-by?

Mimi





  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-24 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-08  7:36 [PATCH] KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep Chen Ni
2024-01-24 18:21 ` Verma, Vishal L
2024-01-24 19:15   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-01-24 20:10     ` Verma, Vishal L
2024-01-24 20:40       ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2024-01-24 21:10         ` Verma, Vishal L
2024-01-30 17:22           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-30 17:30             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-30 18:25               ` Dan Williams
2024-02-01 21:43                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-02-02  0:05                   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-12  5:11                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-30 17:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-30 17:20     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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