From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Petr Tesařík" <petr@tesarici.cz>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Ze Gao <zegao2021@gmail.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@intel.com>,
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"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
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"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 10:03:03 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5de7d665-7047-497b-94fb-76ec2af3c9e2@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240222185744.509e4958@meshulam.tesarici.cz>
On 2/22/24 09:57, Petr Tesařík wrote:
> * Hardware designers are adding (other) hardware security defenses to
> ring-0 that are not applied to ring-3.
>
> Could you give an example of these other security defenses, please?
Here's one example:
> https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/data-dependent-prefetcher.html
"DDP is neither trained by nor triggered by supervisor-mode accesses."
But seriously, this is going to be my last message on this topic. I
appreciate your enthusiasm, but I don't see any viable way forward for
this approach.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-22 18:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <fb4a40c7-af9a-406a-95ab-406595f3ffe5@intel.com>
[not found] ` <20240216152435.1575-1-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
[not found] ` <c65eb8f1-2903-4043-a3ab-945d880043b5@intel.com>
[not found] ` <20240216170805.0d0decd5@meshulam.tesarici.cz>
[not found] ` <87y1bktjdk.fsf@meer.lwn.net>
2024-02-16 18:24 ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Roberto Sassu
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 0/5] PoC: convert AppArmor parser to " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 2/5] sbm: enhance buffer mapping API Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 3/5] sbm: x86: infrastructure to fix up sandbox faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 15:51 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 17:57 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-22 18:03 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 5/5] apparmor: parse profiles in sandbox mode Petr Tesarik
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