Linux-Security-Module Archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: "Amir Goldstein" <amir73il@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
	"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
	"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <repnop@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 01/10] landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 23:44:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZhBwstt0zakE4uN2@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cnwpkeovzbumhprco7q2c2y6zxzmxfpwpwe3tyy6c3gg2szgqd@vfzjaw5v5imr>

On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 02:17:29PM -0400, Kent Overstreet wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 06:22:52PM +0200, Günther Noack wrote:
> > Kent, Amir:
> > 
> > Is it intentional that the new FS_IOC_GETUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH IOCTLs
> > can fall back to a IOCTL implementation in struct file_operations?  I found this
> > remark by Amir which sounded vaguely like it might have been on purpose?  Did I
> > understand that correctly?
> > 
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAOQ4uxjvEL4P4vV5SKpHVS5DtOwKpxAn4n4+Kfqawcu+H-MC5g@mail.gmail.com/
> > 
> > Otherwise, I am happy to send a patch to make it non-extensible (the impls in
> > fs/ioctl.c would need to return -ENOTTY).  This would let us reason better about
> > the safety of these IOCTLs for IOCTL security policies enforced by the Landlock
> > LSM. (Some of these file_operations IOCTL implementations do stuff before
> > looking at the cmd number.)
> 
> They're not supposed to be extensible - the generic implementations are
> all we need.

Thank you for confirming, Kent -- I sent you a small patch as part of the next
version of the Landlock patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240405214040.101396-2-gnoack@google.com/

—Günther

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-05 21:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-27 13:10 [PATCH v13 00/10] Landlock: IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 01/10] landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices Günther Noack
2024-03-27 16:57   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-28 12:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-04-02 18:28     ` Günther Noack
2024-04-03 11:15       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-04-05 16:17         ` Günther Noack
2024-04-05 16:22           ` Günther Noack
2024-04-05 18:04             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-04-05 18:17             ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-05 21:44               ` Günther Noack [this message]
2024-04-05 18:01           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 02/10] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-27 16:58   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 03/10] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 04/10] selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 05/10] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 06/10] selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 07/10] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 08/10] landlock: Document IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 09/10] MAINTAINERS: Notify Landlock maintainers about changes to fs/ioctl.c Günther Noack
2024-03-27 13:10 ` [PATCH v13 10/10] fs/ioctl: Add a comment to keep the logic in sync with the Landlock LSM Günther Noack
2024-03-28 12:11   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-28 13:08     ` Paul Moore
2024-03-28 16:43       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-28 17:06         ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZhBwstt0zakE4uN2@google.com \
    --to=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=allenwebb@google.com \
    --cc=amir73il@gmail.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=dtor@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=jorgelo@chromium.org \
    --cc=kent.overstreet@linux.dev \
    --cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=repnop@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).