Linux-Security-Module Archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: xmu@redhat.com, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] netlabel: fix RCU annotation for IPv4 options on socket creation
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 17:44:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d1d6a20f5090829629df76809fc5d25d055be49a.1712849802.git.dcaratti@redhat.com> (raw)

Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used:

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.9.0-rc2+ #637 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by ncat/23333:
  #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ #637
 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0  07/26/2013
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190
  cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0
  netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0
  selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80
  selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460
  security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60
  __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0
  __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70
  __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0
  __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30
  ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b
 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b
 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002
 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001
 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options
under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such
assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook.

Using rcu_dereference_check() instead of rcu_dereference_protected() will
avoid the reported splat for the netlbl_sock_setattr() case, and preserve
the legitimate check when the caller is netlbl_conn_setattr().

Fixes: f6d8bd051c39 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
---
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 8b17d83e5fde..1d0c2a905078 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1876,8 +1876,10 @@ int cipso_v4_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk,
 
 	sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
 
-	old = rcu_dereference_protected(sk_inet->inet_opt,
-					lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+	/* caller either holds rcu_read_lock() (on socket creation)
+	 * or socket lock (in all other cases). */
+	old = rcu_dereference_check(sk_inet->inet_opt,
+				    lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
 	if (inet_test_bit(IS_ICSK, sk)) {
 		sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
 		if (old)
-- 
2.44.0


             reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11 15:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11 15:44 Davide Caratti [this message]
2024-04-11 15:56 ` [PATCH net] netlabel: fix RCU annotation for IPv4 options on socket creation Eric Dumazet
2024-04-11 17:41   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-04-11 19:47     ` Paul Moore
2024-04-11 19:45   ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=d1d6a20f5090829629df76809fc5d25d055be49a.1712849802.git.dcaratti@redhat.com \
    --to=dcaratti@redhat.com \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=xmu@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).