From: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
To: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org, linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4a/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of custom address spaces
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 2021 15:37:29 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211113203732.2098220-6-dmalcolm@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211113203732.2098220-1-dmalcolm@redhat.com>
gcc/analyzer/ChangeLog:
(region::untrusted_p): New.
gcc/testsuite/ChangeLog:
* gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h: New header.
Signed-off-by: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
---
gcc/analyzer/region.cc | 13 +++++++++++++
gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h
diff --git a/gcc/analyzer/region.cc b/gcc/analyzer/region.cc
index bb4f53b8802..b84504dbe42 100644
--- a/gcc/analyzer/region.cc
+++ b/gcc/analyzer/region.cc
@@ -666,6 +666,19 @@ region::symbolic_for_unknown_ptr_p () const
return false;
}
+/* Return true if accessing this region crosses a trust boundary
+ e.g. user-space memory as seen by an OS kernel. */
+
+bool
+region::untrusted_p () const
+{
+ addr_space_t as = get_addr_space ();
+ /* FIXME: treat all non-generic address spaces as untrusted for now. */
+ if (!ADDR_SPACE_GENERIC_P (as))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/* region's ctor. */
region::region (complexity c, unsigned id, const region *parent, tree type)
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0500e20b22b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.dg/analyzer/test-uaccess.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* Shared header for testcases for copy_from_user/copy_to_user. */
+
+/* Adapted from include/linux/compiler.h */
+
+#pragma GCC custom_address_space(__user)
+
+/* Adapted from include/asm-generic/uaccess.h */
+
+extern int copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, long n)
+ __attribute__((access (write_only, 1, 3),
+ access (read_only, 2, 3),
+ returns_zero_on_success
+ ));
+
+extern long copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
+ __attribute__((access (write_only, 1, 3),
+ access (read_only, 2, 3),
+ returns_zero_on_success
+ ));
--
2.26.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-13 20:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-13 20:37 [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1a/6] RFC: Implement "#pragma GCC custom_address_space" David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 1b/6] Add __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-12-09 22:54 ` Martin Sebor
2022-01-06 15:10 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-06 18:59 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/6] Add returns_zero_on_success/failure attributes David Malcolm
2021-11-15 7:03 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-15 14:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-15 22:30 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-15 22:12 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-17 9:23 ` Prathamesh Kulkarni
2021-11-17 22:43 ` Joseph Myers
2021-11-18 20:08 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:45 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-19 21:52 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-11-18 23:34 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-06 18:34 ` Martin Sebor
2021-11-18 23:15 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` David Malcolm [this message]
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 4b/6] analyzer: implement region::untrusted_p in terms of __attribute__((untrusted)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 5/6] analyzer: use region::untrusted_p in taint detection David Malcolm
2021-11-13 20:37 ` [PATCH 6/6] Add __attribute__ ((tainted)) David Malcolm
2022-01-06 14:08 ` PING (C/C++): " David Malcolm
2022-01-10 21:36 ` PING^2 " David Malcolm
2022-01-12 4:36 ` Jason Merrill
2022-01-12 15:33 ` David Malcolm
2022-01-13 19:08 ` Jason Merrill
2022-01-14 1:25 ` [committed] Add __attribute__ ((tainted_args)) David Malcolm
2021-11-13 23:20 ` [PATCH 0/6] RFC: adding support to GCC for detecting trust boundaries Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-14 2:54 ` David Malcolm
2021-11-14 13:54 ` Miguel Ojeda
2021-12-06 18:12 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-06 19:40 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 0:06 ` David Malcolm
2021-12-09 0:41 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-09 16:42 ` Martin Sebor
2021-12-09 23:40 ` Segher Boessenkool
2021-12-08 23:11 ` David Malcolm
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