From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75B25C433ED for ; Mon, 5 Apr 2021 09:02:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B2D8613A0 for ; Mon, 5 Apr 2021 09:02:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237492AbhDEJCj (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Apr 2021 05:02:39 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42968 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237251AbhDEJA5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Apr 2021 05:00:57 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2646E613A0; Mon, 5 Apr 2021 09:00:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1617613251; bh=ssdvpNYE2C6BADPNpqOLtX2jNFdbbC/9YJwSammmHJU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aPyXhyec4GSjaJXuRsX5vDnuiryhp/NeZ7VbVD7Cvtn/didFHK31FL62SR1Oxu3/Z yi+ZFBGyTEFEuxV3OQBGuvbRk8BxD+IuoHPd2tIafIwYRy+1TlAjyE9Dn1/hf58aaz lF9D03HBysMorLz0jFSx1IFZ7/G6edn5H21KuAcQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Sunyi Shao , Jakub Kicinski , Mat Martineau , Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 03/56] ipv6: weaken the v4mapped source check Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2021 10:53:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20210405085022.669204721@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: <20210405085022.562176619@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20210405085022.562176619@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Jakub Kicinski [ Upstream commit dcc32f4f183ab8479041b23a1525d48233df1d43 ] This reverts commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3. Commit 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") introduced an input check against v4mapped addresses. Use of such addresses on the wire is indeed questionable and not allowed on public Internet. As the commit pointed out https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 lists potential issues. Unfortunately there are applications which use v4mapped addresses, and breaking them is a clear regression. For example v4mapped addresses (or any semi-valid addresses, really) may be used for uni-direction event streams or packet export. Since the issue which sparked the addition of the check was with TCP and request_socks in particular push the check down to TCPv6 and DCCP. This restores the ability to receive UDPv6 packets with v4mapped address as the source. Keep using the IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS statistic to minimize the user-visible changes. Fixes: 6af1799aaf3f ("ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address") Reported-by: Sunyi Shao Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Acked-by: Mat Martineau Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/dccp/ipv6.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ---------- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index b438bed6749d..2cd3508a3786 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) return 0; /* discard, don't send a reset here */ + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); + return 0; + } + if (dccp_bad_service_code(sk, service)) { dcb->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_BAD_SERVICE_CODE; goto drop; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c index acf0749ee5bb..57d84accbf1e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c @@ -222,16 +222,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr)) goto err; - /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses - * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack - * model can not deal properly with these. - * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example. - * - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02 - */ - if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr)) - goto err; - skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr); IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr); diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 6e84f2eb08d6..8d822df83b08 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1039,6 +1039,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!ipv6_unicast_destination(skb)) goto drop; + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) { + __IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS); + return 0; + } + return tcp_conn_request(&tcp6_request_sock_ops, &tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops, sk, skb); -- 2.30.1