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From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2024 11:12:52 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1f6f4477-0f2a-434a-8c89-3b5d51d61581@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <67893f352bc54de61160bfe251cba0bdf0431f37.1711405593.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>


On 3/25/24 3:26 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Config-fs provides support to hide individual attribute entries. Using
> this support, base the display of the SVSM related entries on the presence
> of an SVSM.
>
> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/coco/core.c        |  4 ++++
>  drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c     | 14 ++++++++++----
>  include/linux/cc_platform.h |  8 ++++++++
>  3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> index d07be9d05cd0..efa0f648f754 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  
>  #include <asm/coco.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/sev.h>
>  
>  enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE;
>  u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;
> @@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
>  	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
>  		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
>  
> +	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT:
> +		return snp_get_vmpl();
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
>  	 * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> index 46f230bf13ac..d30471874e87 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> @@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ static struct tsm_report_state *to_state(struct tsm_report *report)
>  	return container_of(report, struct tsm_report_state, report);
>  }
>  
> +static bool provider_visibility(const struct config_item *item,
> +				const struct configfs_attribute *attr)
> +{
> +	return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT);
> +}
> +

Any comment about the following query? I think introducing a CC flag for this use
case is over kill.

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6b90b223-46e0-4e6d-a17c-5caf72e3c949@linux.intel.com/

>  static int try_advance_write_generation(struct tsm_report *report)
>  {
>  	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
> @@ -144,7 +150,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_provider_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>  
>  	return len;
>  }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_provider);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_provider, provider_visibility);
>  
>  static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>  					     const char *buf, size_t len)
> @@ -165,7 +171,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>  
>  	return len;
>  }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid, provider_visibility);
>  
>  static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>  							 const char *buf, size_t len)
> @@ -186,7 +192,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg
>  
>  	return len;
>  }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version, provider_visibility);
>  
>  static ssize_t tsm_report_inblob_write(struct config_item *cfg,
>  				       const void *buf, size_t count)
> @@ -333,7 +339,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_manifestblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
>  
>  	return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_MANIFEST);
>  }
> -CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX);
> +CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_VISIBLE_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX, provider_visibility);
>  
>  #define TSM_DEFAULT_ATTRS() \
>  	&tsm_report_attr_generation, \
> diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> index cb0d6cd1c12f..f1b4266c1484 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> @@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ enum cc_attr {
>  	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
>  	 */
>  	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
> +
> +	/**
> +	 * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT: Guest is running under an SVSM
> +	 *
> +	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and is
> +	 * running under a Secure VM Service Module (SVSM).
> +	 */
> +	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT,
>  };
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM

-- 
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-09 18:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-25 22:26 [PATCH v3 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-12 16:19   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:41   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-04-17 11:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 20:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-17 20:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 18:38         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-21  7:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 17:03   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-04-17 20:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 21:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-22 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:04   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 15:28   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 16:12   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  4:54   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:47       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  4:55   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:57       ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  5:37   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 16:19       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  5:46   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:01     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 18:25       ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 19:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 20:03           ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 18:12   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan [this message]
2024-04-12 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:16       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:48         ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 20:13           ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 21:50             ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 22:03               ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  6:09                 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  6:08             ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  6:05         ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16  5:47   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16  6:03   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:10     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky

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