From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 18:41:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f0117eab-4e58-3d59-961f-f8f44a146605@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1b0d8ec8e671ad957a2ad888725ce24edeedf74a.1711405593.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 3/25/2024 11:26 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Currently, the enforce_vmpl0() function uses a set argument when testing
> for VMPL0 and terminates the guest if the guest is not running at VMPL0.
>
> Make the function more generic by moving it into the common code, renaming
> it, allowing it to take an argument for use in the VMPL0 check (RMPADJUST
> instruction) and return the result of the check, allowing the caller to
> determine the action taken based on the result.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
This is preparatory patch for patch3.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 13 ++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index 5ad0ff4664f1..49dc9661176d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -335,10 +335,9 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
> sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SEV_ES_GEN_REQ);
> }
>
> -static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
> +static bool running_at_vmpl0(void *va)
> {
> u64 attrs;
> - int err;
>
> /*
> * RMPADJUST modifies RMP permissions of a lesser-privileged (numerically
> @@ -347,12 +346,11 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
> *
> * If the guest is running at VMPL0, it will succeed. Even if that operation
> * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux
> - * SNP guests are supported only on VMPL0 so VMPL1 or higher permission masks
> - * changing is a don't-care.
> + * SNP guests running at VMPL0 only run at VMPL0, so VMPL1 or higher
> + * permission mask changes are a don't-care.
> */
> attrs = 1;
> - if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs))
> - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
> + return !rmpadjust((unsigned long)va, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, attrs);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -588,7 +586,8 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
> if (!(get_hv_features() & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP))
> sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
>
> - enforce_vmpl0();
> + if (!running_at_vmpl0(&boot_ghcb_page))
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
> }
>
> if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-12 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-25 22:26 [PATCH v3 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 17:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 17:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-12 16:19 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:41 ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]
2024-04-17 11:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 20:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-17 20:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 18:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-21 7:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 17:03 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-04-17 20:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-18 21:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-22 22:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 16:04 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-04-12 15:28 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 16:12 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 4:54 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:47 ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 4:55 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 15:57 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 5:37 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 16:19 ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 5:46 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 18:25 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 19:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 20:03 ` Dan Williams
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-09 18:12 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-12 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 19:48 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-15 21:50 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-15 22:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 6:09 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 6:08 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 6:05 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 5:47 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 6:03 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-16 16:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-25 22:26 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
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