From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH 20/34] x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2015 17:14:52 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20151204011452.AA84FFA8@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20151204011424.8A36E365@viggo.jf.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in software. However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not violating protection key permissions. It was assumed that all faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable) bit. But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys: instruction faults. Instruction faults never run afoul of protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches. So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection key checks. We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION. This is because handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault flags. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> --- b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 +- b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 +- b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 5 ++++- b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 ++++++-- b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h | 2 +- b/include/linux/mm.h | 1 + b/mm/gup.c | 11 +++++++++-- b/mm/memory.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.286746596 -0800 +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.301747276 -0800 @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.288746687 -0800 +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.302747322 -0800 @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.289746732 -0800 +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.302747322 -0800 @@ -300,8 +300,11 @@ static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { + /* pkeys never affect instruction fetches */ + if (execute) + return true; /* allow access if the VMA is not one from this process */ if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma)) return true; diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/mm/fault.c --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.291746823 -0800 +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.303747367 -0800 @@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ static inline bool bad_area_access_from_ if (error_code & PF_PK) return true; /* this checks permission keys on the VMA: */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), + (error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign)) return true; return false; } @@ -1112,7 +1113,8 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, s * faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a * page. */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), + (error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; if (error_code & PF_WRITE) { @@ -1267,6 +1269,8 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un if (error_code & PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; + if (error_code & PF_INSTR) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; /* * When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to diff -puN include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h --- a/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.293746914 -0800 +++ b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.303747367 -0800 @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/linux/mm.h --- a/include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.294746959 -0800 +++ b/include/linux/mm.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.304747413 -0800 @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16]; #define FAULT_FLAG_TRIED 0x20 /* Second try */ #define FAULT_FLAG_USER 0x40 /* The fault originated in userspace */ #define FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN 0x80 /* faulting for non current tsk/mm */ +#define FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION 0x100 /* The fault was during an instruction fetch */ /* * vm_fault is filled by the the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/gup.c --- a/mm/gup.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.296747050 -0800 +++ b/mm/gup.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.304747413 -0800 @@ -396,7 +396,11 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD)) return -EFAULT; } - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign)) + /* + * gups are always data accesses, not instruction + * fetches, so execute=0 here + */ + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, 0, foreign)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } @@ -576,8 +580,11 @@ bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_st /* * The architecture might have a hardware protection * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access. + * + * gup always represents data access, not instruction + * fetches, so execute=0 here: */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, 0, foreign)) return false; return true; diff -puN mm/memory.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/memory.c --- a/mm/memory.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.298747141 -0800 +++ b/mm/memory.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.306747503 -0800 @@ -3346,6 +3346,7 @@ static int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_s pte_t *pte; if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, + flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION, flags & FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN)) return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV; _
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH 20/34] x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2015 17:14:52 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20151204011452.AA84FFA8@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20151204011424.8A36E365@viggo.jf.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in software. However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not violating protection key permissions. It was assumed that all faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable) bit. But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys: instruction faults. Instruction faults never run afoul of protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches. So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection key checks. We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION. This is because handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault flags. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> --- b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 +- b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 +- b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 5 ++++- b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 8 ++++++-- b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h | 2 +- b/include/linux/mm.h | 1 + b/mm/gup.c | 11 +++++++++-- b/mm/memory.c | 1 + 8 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.286746596 -0800 +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.301747276 -0800 @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.288746687 -0800 +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.302747322 -0800 @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.289746732 -0800 +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.302747322 -0800 @@ -300,8 +300,11 @@ static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { + /* pkeys never affect instruction fetches */ + if (execute) + return true; /* allow access if the VMA is not one from this process */ if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma)) return true; diff -puN arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable arch/x86/mm/fault.c --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.291746823 -0800 +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.303747367 -0800 @@ -908,7 +908,8 @@ static inline bool bad_area_access_from_ if (error_code & PF_PK) return true; /* this checks permission keys on the VMA: */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), + (error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign)) return true; return false; } @@ -1112,7 +1113,8 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, s * faults just to hit a PF_PK as soon as we fill in a * page. */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, (error_code & PF_WRITE), + (error_code & PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; if (error_code & PF_WRITE) { @@ -1267,6 +1269,8 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, un if (error_code & PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; + if (error_code & PF_INSTR) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; /* * When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to diff -puN include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h --- a/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.293746914 -0800 +++ b/include/asm-generic/mm_hooks.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.303747367 -0800 @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(str } static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - bool write, bool foreign) + bool write, bool execute, bool foreign) { /* by default, allow everything */ return true; diff -puN include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable include/linux/mm.h --- a/include/linux/mm.h~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.294746959 -0800 +++ b/include/linux/mm.h 2015-12-03 16:21:27.304747413 -0800 @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16]; #define FAULT_FLAG_TRIED 0x20 /* Second try */ #define FAULT_FLAG_USER 0x40 /* The fault originated in userspace */ #define FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN 0x80 /* faulting for non current tsk/mm */ +#define FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION 0x100 /* The fault was during an instruction fetch */ /* * vm_fault is filled by the the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's diff -puN mm/gup.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/gup.c --- a/mm/gup.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.296747050 -0800 +++ b/mm/gup.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.304747413 -0800 @@ -396,7 +396,11 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_are if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD)) return -EFAULT; } - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign)) + /* + * gups are always data accesses, not instruction + * fetches, so execute=0 here + */ + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, 0, foreign)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } @@ -576,8 +580,11 @@ bool vma_permits_fault(struct vm_area_st /* * The architecture might have a hardware protection * mechanism other than read/write that can deny access. + * + * gup always represents data access, not instruction + * fetches, so execute=0 here: */ - if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, foreign)) + if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, 0, foreign)) return false; return true; diff -puN mm/memory.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable mm/memory.c --- a/mm/memory.c~pkeys-allow-execute-on-unreadable 2015-12-03 16:21:27.298747141 -0800 +++ b/mm/memory.c 2015-12-03 16:21:27.306747503 -0800 @@ -3346,6 +3346,7 @@ static int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_s pte_t *pte; if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, + flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION, flags & FAULT_FLAG_FOREIGN)) return VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV; _ -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-04 1:19 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 145+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2015-12-04 1:14 [PATCH 00/34] x86: Memory Protection Keys (v5) Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 01/34] mm, gup: introduce concept of "foreign" get_user_pages() Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 02/34] x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 03/34] x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 04/34] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 05/34] x86, pkeys: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 06/34] x86, pkeys: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 07/34] x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 08/34] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 09/34] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 14:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 14:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 10/34] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 15:15 ` [PATCH 10/34] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bitsy Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 15:15 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 16:34 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 16:34 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 17:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 17:24 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:06 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:29 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:29 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:35 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:35 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 11/34] x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 12/34] signals, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 13/34] x86, pkeys: fill in pkey field in siginfo Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 14/34] x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 15:18 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 15:18 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 15/34] mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 17:26 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 17:26 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 16/34] x86, mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:01 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:01 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:30 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:30 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 17/34] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:11 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:11 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 18/34] mm: add gup flag to indicate "foreign" mm access Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 19/34] x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:14 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen [this message] 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 20/34] x86, pkeys: differentiate instruction fetches Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 21/34] x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:19 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 22/34] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:20 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 23/34] x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:21 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:21 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 24/34] mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` [PATCH 25/34] x86, pkeys: add arch_validate_pkey() Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:14 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:39 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:39 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 26/34] mm: implement new mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-05 6:50 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-05 6:50 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-05 6:50 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-07 16:44 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-07 16:44 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-09 11:08 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-09 11:08 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-09 15:48 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-09 15:48 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-09 16:45 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-09 16:45 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-09 16:45 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-09 17:05 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-09 17:05 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-09 17:05 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-11 20:13 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-11 20:13 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 27/34] x86, pkeys: make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:41 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:41 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 28/34] x86: wire up mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:44 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 19:06 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 19:06 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 20:38 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 20:38 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 20:38 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 29/34] x86: separate out LDT init from context init Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:45 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:45 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 30/34] x86, fpu: allow setting of XSAVE state Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-08 18:48 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-08 18:48 ` Thomas Gleixner 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 31/34] x86, pkeys: allocation/free syscalls Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 32/34] x86, pkeys: add pkey set/get syscalls Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 33/34] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` [PATCH 34/34] x86, pkeys: Documentation Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 1:15 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 23:31 ` [PATCH 00/34] x86: Memory Protection Keys (v5) Andy Lutomirski 2015-12-04 23:31 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-12-04 23:38 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 23:38 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-04 23:38 ` Dave Hansen 2015-12-11 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-12-11 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2015-12-11 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
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