All the mail mirrored from lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Gary Lin via Grub-devel <grub-devel@gnu.org>
To: The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@gnu.org>
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>,
	Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
	Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
	shkhisti@microsoft.com, jaskaran.khurana@microsoft.com,
	christopher.co@microsoft.com, daniel.mihai@microsoft.com,
	jaredz@redhat.com, development@efficientek.com,
	jejb@linux.ibm.com, mchang@suse.com, patrick.colp@oracle.com,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 14/20] tpm2: Support authorized policy
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:02:00 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240425080206.23902-15-glin@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240425080206.23902-1-glin@suse.com>

This commit handles the TPM2_PolicyAuthorize command from the key file
in TPM 2.0 Key File format.

TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is the essential command to support authorized
policy which allows the users to sign TPM policies with their own keys.
Per TPM 2.0 Key File(*1), CommandPolicy for TPM2_PolicyAuthorize
comprises 'TPM2B_PUBLIC pubkey', 'TPM2B_DIGEST policy_ref', and
'TPMT_SIGNATURE signature'. To verify the signature, the current policy
digest is hashed with the hash algorithm written in 'signature', and then
'signature' is verified with the hashed policy digest and 'pubkey'. Once
TPM accepts 'signature', TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is invoked to authorize the
signed policy.

To create the key file with authorized policy, here are the pcr-oracle(*2)
commands:

  # Generate the RSA key and create the authorized policy file
  $ pcr-oracle \
	--rsa-generate-key \
	--private-key policy-key.pem \
	--auth authorized.policy \
	create-authorized-policy 0,2,4,7,9

  # Seal the secret with the authorized policy
  $ pcr-oracle \
	--key-format tpm2.0 \
	--auth authorized.policy \
	--input disk-secret.txt \
	--output sealed.key \
	seal-secret

  # Sign the predicted PCR policy
  $ pcr-oracle \
	--key-format tpm2.0 \
	--private-key policy-key.pem \
	--from eventlog \
	--stop-event "grub-file=grub.cfg" \
	--after \
	--input sealed.key \
	--output sealed.tpm \
	sign 0,2,4,7,9

Then specify the key file and the key protector to grub.cfg in the EFI
system partition:

tpm2_key_protector_init -a RSA --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm
cryptomount -u <PART_UUID> -P tpm2

For any change in the boot components, just run the 'sign' command again
to update the signature in sealed.tpm, and TPM can unseal the key file
with the updated PCR policy.

(*1) https://www.hansenpartnership.com/draft-bottomley-tpm2-keys.html
(*2) https://github.com/okirch/pcr-oracle

Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 grub-core/tpm2/module.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+)

diff --git a/grub-core/tpm2/module.c b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c
index 3db25ceca..e83b02865 100644
--- a/grub-core/tpm2/module.c
+++ b/grub-core/tpm2/module.c
@@ -650,6 +650,87 @@ grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session,
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+grub_tpm2_protector_policyauthorize (TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session,
+				     struct grub_tpm2_buffer *cmd_buf)
+{
+  TPM2B_PUBLIC pubkey;
+  TPM2B_DIGEST policy_ref;
+  TPMT_SIGNATURE signature;
+  TPM2B_DIGEST pcr_policy;
+  TPM2B_DIGEST pcr_policy_hash;
+  TPMI_ALG_HASH sig_hash;
+  TPMT_TK_VERIFIED verification_ticket;
+  TPM_HANDLE pubkey_handle = 0;
+  TPM2B_NAME pubname;
+  TPM_RC rc;
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &pubkey);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &policy_ref);
+  grub_tpm2_mu_TPMT_SIGNATURE_Unmarshal (cmd_buf, &signature);
+  if (cmd_buf->error != 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("Failed to unmarshal the buffer for TPM2_PolicyAuthorize"));
+
+  /* Retrieve Policy Digest */
+  rc = TPM2_PolicyGetDigest (session, NULL, &pcr_policy, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Failed to get policy digest (TPM2_PolicyGetDigest: 0x%x)."),
+		       rc);
+
+  /* Calculate the digest of the polcy for VerifySignature */
+  sig_hash = TPMT_SIGNATURE_get_hash_alg (&signature);
+  if (sig_hash == TPM_ALG_NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+		       N_("Failed to get the hash algorithm of the signature"));
+
+  rc = TPM2_Hash (NULL, (TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *)&pcr_policy, sig_hash,
+		  TPM_RH_NULL, &pcr_policy_hash, NULL, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Failed to create PCR policy hash (TPM2_Hash: 0x%x)"),
+		       rc);
+
+  /* Load the public key */
+  rc = TPM2_LoadExternal (NULL, NULL, &pubkey, TPM_RH_OWNER,
+			  &pubkey_handle, &pubname, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+		       N_("Failed to load public key (TPM2_LoadExternal: 0x%x)"),
+		       rc);
+
+  /* Verify the signature against the public key and the policy digest */
+  rc = TPM2_VerifySignature (pubkey_handle, NULL, &pcr_policy_hash, &signature,
+			     &verification_ticket, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+			N_("Failed to verify signature (TPM2_VerifySignature: 0x%x)"),
+			rc);
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  /* Authorize the signed policy with the public key and the verification ticket */
+  rc = TPM2_PolicyAuthorize (session, NULL, &pcr_policy, &policy_ref, &pubname,
+			     &verification_ticket, NULL);
+  if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
+    {
+      err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE,
+			N_("Failed to authorize PCR policy (TPM2_PolicyAuthorize: 0x%x)"),
+			rc);
+      goto error;
+    }
+
+  err = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+error:
+  TPM2_FlushContext (pubkey_handle);
+
+  return err;
+}
+
 static grub_err_t
 grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (tpm2key_policy_t policy, TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION session)
 {
@@ -669,6 +750,9 @@ grub_tpm2_protector_enforce_policy (tpm2key_policy_t policy, TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSIO
     case TPM_CC_PolicyPCR:
       err = grub_tpm2_protector_policypcr (session, &buf);
       break;
+    case TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize:
+      err = grub_tpm2_protector_policyauthorize (session, &buf);
+      break;
     default:
       return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
 			 N_("Unknown TPM Command: 0x%x"), policy->cmd_code);
-- 
2.35.3


_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
Grub-devel@gnu.org
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-25  8:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-25  8:01 [PATCH v13 00/20] Automatic Disk Unlock with TPM2 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 01/20] posix_wrap: tweaks in preparation for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 02/20] libtasn1: import libtasn1-4.19.0 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 03/20] libtasn1: disable code not needed in grub Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 04/20] libtasn1: changes for grub compatibility Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-30 13:14   ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 05/20] libtasn1: fix the potential buffer overrun Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 06/20] libtasn1: compile into asn1 module Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 07/20] asn1_test: test module for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 08/20] libtasn1: Add the documentation Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-27  8:27   ` Glenn Washburn
2024-04-29  6:21     ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 09/20] key_protector: Add key protectors framework Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 10/20] tpm2: Add TPM Software Stack (TSS) Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 11/20] key_protector: Add TPM2 Key Protector Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 12/20] cryptodisk: Support key protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 13/20] util/grub-protect: Add new tool Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel [this message]
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 15/20] tpm2: Implement NV index Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 16/20] cryptodisk: Fallback to passphrase Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 17/20] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 18/20] diskfilter: look up cryptodisk devices first Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 19/20] tpm2: Enable tpm2 module for grub-emu Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 20/20] tests: Add tpm2_test Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-26 22:18   ` Glenn Washburn
2024-04-29  8:10     ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-30  8:09       ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240425080206.23902-15-glin@suse.com \
    --to=grub-devel@gnu.org \
    --cc=christopher.co@microsoft.com \
    --cc=daniel.kiper@oracle.com \
    --cc=daniel.mihai@microsoft.com \
    --cc=development@efficientek.com \
    --cc=dja@axtens.net \
    --cc=glin@suse.com \
    --cc=hegatta@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=jaredz@redhat.com \
    --cc=jaskaran.khurana@microsoft.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=mchang@suse.com \
    --cc=patrick.colp@oracle.com \
    --cc=shkhisti@microsoft.com \
    --cc=stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.