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From: Gary Lin via Grub-devel <grub-devel@gnu.org>
To: The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@gnu.org>
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>,
	Hernan Gatta <hegatta@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
	Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>,
	shkhisti@microsoft.com, jaskaran.khurana@microsoft.com,
	christopher.co@microsoft.com, daniel.mihai@microsoft.com,
	jaredz@redhat.com, development@efficientek.com,
	jejb@linux.ibm.com, mchang@suse.com, patrick.colp@oracle.com,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 18/20] diskfilter: look up cryptodisk devices first
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:02:04 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240425080206.23902-19-glin@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240425080206.23902-1-glin@suse.com>

When using disk auto-unlocking with TPM 2.0, the typical grub.cfg may
look like this:

  tpm2_key_protector_init --tpm2key=(hd0,gpt1)/boot/grub2/sealed.tpm
  cryptomount -u <PART-UUID> -P tpm2
  search --fs-uuid --set=root <FS-UUID>

Since the disk search order is based on the order of module loading, the
attacker could insert a malicious disk with the same FS-UUID root to
trick grub2 to boot into the malicious root and further dump memory to
steal the unsealed key.

Do defend against such an attack, we can specify the hint provided by
'grub-probe' to search the encrypted partition first:

search --fs-uuid --set=root --hint='cryptouuid/<PART-UUID>' <FS-UUID>

However, for LVM on an encrypted partition, the search hint provided by
'grub-probe' is:

  --hint='lvmid/<VG-UUID>/<LV-UUID>'

It doesn't guarantee to look up the logical volume from the encrypted
partition, so the attacker may have the chance to fool grub2 to boot
into the malicious disk.

To minimize the attack surface, this commit tweaks the disk device search
in diskfilter to look up cryptodisk devices first and then others, so
that the auto-unlocked disk will be found first, not the attacker's disk.

Cc: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
index 21e239511..df1992305 100644
--- a/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
+++ b/grub-core/disk/diskfilter.c
@@ -226,15 +226,32 @@ scan_devices (const char *arname)
   int need_rescan;
 
   for (pull = 0; pull < GRUB_DISK_PULL_MAX; pull++)
-    for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
-      if (p->id != GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_DISKFILTER_ID
-	  && p->disk_iterate)
-	{
-	  if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
-	    return;
-	  if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
-	    return;
-	}
+    {
+      /* look up the crytodisk devices first */
+      for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
+	if (p->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID
+	    && p->disk_iterate)
+	  {
+	    if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
+	      return;
+	    if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
+	      return;
+	    break;
+	  }
+
+      /* check the devices other than crytodisk */
+      for (p = grub_disk_dev_list; p; p = p->next)
+	if (p->id == GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_CRYPTODISK_ID)
+	  continue;
+	else if (p->id != GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_DISKFILTER_ID
+	    && p->disk_iterate)
+	  {
+	    if ((p->disk_iterate) (scan_disk_hook, NULL, pull))
+	      return;
+	    if (arname && is_lv_readable (find_lv (arname), 1))
+	      return;
+	  }
+    }
 
   scan_depth = 0;
   need_rescan = 1;
-- 
2.35.3


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-25  8:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-25  8:01 [PATCH v13 00/20] Automatic Disk Unlock with TPM2 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 01/20] posix_wrap: tweaks in preparation for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 02/20] libtasn1: import libtasn1-4.19.0 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 03/20] libtasn1: disable code not needed in grub Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 04/20] libtasn1: changes for grub compatibility Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-30 13:14   ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 05/20] libtasn1: fix the potential buffer overrun Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 06/20] libtasn1: compile into asn1 module Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 07/20] asn1_test: test module for libtasn1 Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 08/20] libtasn1: Add the documentation Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-27  8:27   ` Glenn Washburn
2024-04-29  6:21     ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 09/20] key_protector: Add key protectors framework Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 10/20] tpm2: Add TPM Software Stack (TSS) Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 11/20] key_protector: Add TPM2 Key Protector Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 12/20] cryptodisk: Support key protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:01 ` [PATCH v13 13/20] util/grub-protect: Add new tool Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 14/20] tpm2: Support authorized policy Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 15/20] tpm2: Implement NV index Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 16/20] cryptodisk: Fallback to passphrase Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 17/20] cryptodisk: wipe out the cached keys from protectors Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel [this message]
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 19/20] tpm2: Enable tpm2 module for grub-emu Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-25  8:02 ` [PATCH v13 20/20] tests: Add tpm2_test Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-26 22:18   ` Glenn Washburn
2024-04-29  8:10     ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel
2024-04-30  8:09       ` Gary Lin via Grub-devel

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