From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/15] x86/sev: Shorten snp_secrets_page_layout to snp_secrets_page
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 15:30:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240425133024.GIZipa8F1tkFGXuNNZ@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bc8d58302c6ab66c3beeab50cce3ec2c6bd72d6c.1713974291.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:57:57AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 995f94467101..6949fbccec40 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static u64 __init get_secrets_page(void)
>
> static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
> {
> - struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
> + struct snp_secrets_page *layout;
Yes, and I'd go change that "layout" name to "secrets" too because
layout doesn't make any sense when talking about a secrets page.
This, OTOH:
addr = secrets->os_area.ap_jump_table_pa;
means something: the address comes from the secrets page. Not from the
"layout". :-)
IOW, diff ontop:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 25056346bc18..790e4818f7c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static u64 __init get_secrets_page(void)
static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
{
- struct snp_secrets_page *layout;
+ struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
void __iomem *mem;
u64 pa, addr;
@@ -662,9 +662,9 @@ static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
return 0;
}
- layout = (__force struct snp_secrets_page *)mem;
+ secrets = (__force struct snp_secrets_page *)mem;
- addr = layout->os_area.ap_jump_table_pa;
+ addr = secrets->os_area.ap_jump_table_pa;
iounmap(mem);
return addr;
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 04a7bd1e4314..654290a8e1ba 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
*/
struct snp_guest_msg secret_request, secret_response;
- struct snp_secrets_page *layout;
+ struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
struct snp_req_data input;
union {
struct snp_report_req report;
@@ -743,26 +743,26 @@ static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
};
-static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page *layout, u32 **seqno)
+static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page *secrets, u32 **seqno)
{
u8 *key = NULL;
switch (id) {
case 0:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
- key = layout->vmpck0;
+ *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
+ key = secrets->vmpck0;
break;
case 1:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
- key = layout->vmpck1;
+ *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
+ key = secrets->vmpck1;
break;
case 2:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
- key = layout->vmpck2;
+ *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
+ key = secrets->vmpck2;
break;
case 3:
- *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
- key = layout->vmpck3;
+ *seqno = &secrets->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
+ key = secrets->vmpck3;
break;
default:
break;
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static void unregister_sev_tsm(void *data)
static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct sev_guest_platform_data *data;
- struct snp_secrets_page *layout;
+ struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
struct miscdevice *misc;
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (!mapping)
return -ENODEV;
- layout = (__force void *)mapping;
+ secrets = (__force void *)mapping;
ret = -ENOMEM;
snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
goto e_unmap;
ret = -EINVAL;
- snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
+ snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
goto e_unmap;
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
snp_dev->dev = dev;
- snp_dev->layout = layout;
+ snp_dev->secrets = secrets;
/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-25 13:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-24 15:57 [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] x86/sev: Shorten snp_secrets_page_layout to snp_secrets_page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-25 13:30 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking more straight forward Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-05-02 9:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-02 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 15:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 10:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 13:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-06 14:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 8:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 20:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 19:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 23:57 ` [svsm-devel] " Jacob Xu
2024-05-02 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 20:51 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:48 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:58 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-29 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 19:28 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-01 5:18 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-01 20:15 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-02 3:40 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-02 17:29 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-03 16:10 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 11:37 ` [svsm-devel] " Jörg Rödel
2024-05-03 16:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 7:43 ` Jörg Rödel
2024-05-03 11:38 ` [svsm-devel] [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Jörg Rödel
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