From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 02/15] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 10:57:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <afda29585c2724b9698003f24cefa77eb35f4ffb.1713974291.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1713974291.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
The snp_init() function in boot/compressed/sev.c is local to that file, is
not called from outside of the file and is independent of the snp_init()
function in kernel/sev.c. Change the name to better differentiate when
each function is used.
Move the renamed snp_init() and related functions up in the file to avoid
having to add a forward declaration and make the function static.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index ec71846d28c9..5ad0ff4664f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -413,6 +413,85 @@ void snp_check_features(void)
}
}
+/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
+ unsigned int cfg_table_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
+ cfg_table_len,
+ EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
+ * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
+ * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
+ *
+ * - via an entry in the EFI config table
+ * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
+ *
+ * Scan for the blob in that order.
+ */
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
+ if (cc_info)
+ goto found_cc_info;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
+ if (!cc_info)
+ return NULL;
+
+found_cc_info:
+ if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
+
+ return cc_info;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
+ * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
+ */
+static bool early_snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
+
+ if (!bp)
+ return false;
+
+ cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
+ if (!cc_info)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
+ * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
+ * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
+ * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
+ * more details.
+ */
+ setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
+
+ /*
+ * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
+ * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
+ * phase.
+ */
+ bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities
*
@@ -463,7 +542,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
/*
- * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
+ * Do an initial SEV capability check before early_snp_init() which
* loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
* without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
*
@@ -478,7 +557,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
* Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
* against CPUID/MSR values later.
*/
- snp = snp_init(bp);
+ snp = early_snp_init(bp);
/* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */
@@ -535,85 +614,6 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void)
return m.q;
}
-/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
-static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_efi(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- unsigned long cfg_table_pa;
- unsigned int cfg_table_len;
- int ret;
-
- ret = efi_get_conf_table(bp, &cfg_table_pa, &cfg_table_len);
- if (ret)
- return NULL;
-
- return (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)efi_find_vendor_table(bp, cfg_table_pa,
- cfg_table_len,
- EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initial set up of SNP relies on information provided by the
- * Confidential Computing blob, which can be passed to the boot kernel
- * by firmware/bootloader in the following ways:
- *
- * - via an entry in the EFI config table
- * - via a setup_data structure, as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol
- *
- * Scan for the blob in that order.
- */
-static struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob_efi(bp);
- if (cc_info)
- goto found_cc_info;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob_setup_data(bp);
- if (!cc_info)
- return NULL;
-
-found_cc_info:
- if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
-
- return cc_info;
-}
-
-/*
- * Indicate SNP based on presence of SNP-specific CC blob. Subsequent checks
- * will verify the SNP CPUID/MSR bits.
- */
-bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
-{
- struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
-
- if (!bp)
- return false;
-
- cc_info = find_cc_blob(bp);
- if (!cc_info)
- return false;
-
- /*
- * If a SNP-specific Confidential Computing blob is present, then
- * firmware/bootloader have indicated SNP support. Verifying this
- * involves CPUID checks which will be more reliable if the SNP
- * CPUID table is used. See comments over snp_setup_cpuid_table() for
- * more details.
- */
- setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
-
- /*
- * Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
- * config table doesn't need to be searched again during early startup
- * phase.
- */
- bp->cc_blob_address = (u32)(unsigned long)cc_info;
-
- return true;
-}
-
void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt)
{
/*
--
2.43.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-24 15:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-24 15:57 [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] x86/sev: Shorten snp_secrets_page_layout to snp_secrets_page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-25 13:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:57 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking more straight forward Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-05-02 9:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-02 15:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 15:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-20 13:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 15:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-22 16:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 10:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 13:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-06 14:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 8:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 19:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 20:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 19:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 18:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-22 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 12:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 12:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 13:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 13:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 23:57 ` [svsm-devel] " Jacob Xu
2024-05-02 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 20:51 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:48 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:58 ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-29 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 19:28 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-01 5:18 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-01 20:15 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-02 3:40 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-02 17:29 ` Dan Williams
2024-05-03 16:10 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 11:37 ` [svsm-devel] " Jörg Rödel
2024-05-03 16:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 7:43 ` Jörg Rödel
2024-05-03 11:38 ` [svsm-devel] [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Jörg Rödel
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