From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Sagi Shahar <sagis@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 103/103] KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
Date: Sun, 7 Aug 2022 15:02:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2d75ad1098b6bd6b2559472bbeedaf50e797612c.1659854791.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1659854790.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Add a high level design document on TDX changes to TDP MMU.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 417 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 417 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2d91c94e6d8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Design of TDP MMU for TDX support
+=================================
+This document describes a (high level) design for TDX support of KVM TDP MMU of
+x86 KVM.
+
+In this document, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the current
+"VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.
+
+
+Background of TDX
+=================
+TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
+using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
+keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
+Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
+encryption keys.
+
+In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
+allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical address.
+The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME accesses and
+private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared HKID on the
+host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.
+
+During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
+as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
+Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
+(Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in the
+host VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same
+as with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data
+exchange needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current
+EPT functionality even for TDs.
+
+The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
+pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private key.
+Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX interface
+functions (SEAMCALLs), and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT
+because not all functionalities are available.
+
+Since the execution of such interface functions takes much longer time than
+accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to mirror the
+Secure EPT for the TD. And we think there are at least two options today in
+terms of the timing for executing such SEAMCALLs:
+
+1. synchronous, i.e. while walking the TDP page tables, or
+2. post-walk, i.e. record what needs to be done to the real Secure EPT during
+ the walk, and execute SEAMCALLs later.
+
+The option 1 seems to be more intuitive and simpler, but the Secure EPT
+concurrency rules are different from the ones of the TDP or EPT. For example,
+MEM.SEPT.RD acquire shared access to the whole Secure EPT tree of the target
+
+Secure EPT(SEPT) operations
+---------------------------
+Secure EPT is an Extended Page Table for GPA-to-HPA translation of TD private
+HPA. A Secure EPT is designed to be encrypted with the TD's ephemeral private
+key. SEPT pages are allocated by the host VMM via Intel TDX functions, but their
+content is intended to be hidden and is not architectural.
+
+Unlike the conventional EPT, the CPU can't directly read/write its entry.
+Instead, TDX SEAMCALL API is used. Several SEAMCALLs correspond to operation on
+the EPT entry.
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD():
+
+ Add a secure EPT page from the secure EPT tree. This corresponds to updating
+ the non-leaf EPT entry with present bit set
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.REMOVE():
+
+ Remove the secure page from the secure EPT tree. There is no corresponding
+ to the EPT operation.
+
+* TDH.MEM.SEPT.RD():
+
+ Read the secure EPT entry. This corresponds to reading the EPT entry as
+ memory. Please note that this is much slower than direct memory reading.
+
+* TDH.MEM.PAGE.ADD() and TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG():
+
+ Add a private page to the secure EPT tree. This corresponds to updating the
+ leaf EPT entry with present bit set.
+
+* THD.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE():
+
+ Remove a private page from the secure EPT tree. There is no corresponding
+ to the EPT operation.
+
+* TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK():
+
+ This (mostly) corresponds to clearing the present bit of the leaf EPT entry.
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT. To remove it
+ from the secure EPT, TDH.MEM.SEPT.REMOVE() and TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE() needs to
+ be called.
+
+* TDH.MEM.TRACK():
+
+ Increment the TLB epoch counter. This (mostly) corresponds to EPT TLB flush.
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT. To remove it
+ from the secure EPT, tdh_mem_page_remove() needs to be called.
+
+
+Adding private page
+-------------------
+The procedure of populating the private page looks as follows.
+
+1. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(512G level)
+2. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(1G level)
+3. TDH.MEM.SEPT.ADD(2M level)
+4. TDH.MEM.PAGE.AUG(4K level)
+
+Those operations correspond to updating the EPT entries.
+
+Dropping private page and TLB shootdown
+---------------------------------------
+The procedure of dropping the private page looks as follows.
+
+1. TDH.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK(4K level)
+
+ This mostly corresponds to clear the present bit in the EPT entry. This
+ prevents (or blocks) TLB entry from creating in the future. Note that the
+ private page is still linked in the secure EPT tree and the existing cache
+ entry in the TLB isn't flushed.
+
+2. TDH.MEM.TRACK(range) and TLB shootdown
+
+ This mostly corresponds to the EPT TLB shootdown. Because all vcpus share
+ the same Secure EPT, all vcpus need to flush TLB.
+
+ * TDH.MEM.TRACK(range) by one vcpu. It increments the global internal TLB
+ epoch counter.
+
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+ * Other vcpu exits to VMM from guest TD and then re-enter. TDH.VP.ENTER().
+ * TDH.VP.ENTER() checks the TLB epoch counter and If its TLB is old, flush
+ TLB.
+
+ Note that only single vcpu issues tdh_mem_track().
+
+ Note that the private page is still linked in the secure EPT tree, unlike the
+ conventional EPT.
+
+3. TDH.MEM.PAGE.PROMOTE, TDH.MEM.PAGEDEMOTE(), TDH.MEM.PAGE.RELOCATE(), or
+ TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE()
+
+ There is no corresponding operation to the conventional EPT.
+
+ * When changing page size (e.g. 4K <-> 2M) TDH.MEM.PAGE.PROMOTE() or
+ TDH.MEM.PAGE.DEMOTE() is used. During those operation, the guest page is
+ kept referenced in the Secure EPT.
+
+ * When migrating page, TDH.MEM.PAGE.RELOCATE(). This requires both source
+ page and destination page.
+ * when destroying TD, TDH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE() removes the private page from the
+ secure EPT tree. In this case TLB shootdown is not needed because vcpus
+ don't run any more.
+
+The basic idea for TDX support
+==============================
+Because shared EPT is the same as the existing EPT, use the existing logic for
+shared EPT. On the other hand, secure EPT requires additional operations
+instead of directly reading/writing of the EPT entry.
+
+On EPT violation, The KVM mmu walks down the EPT tree from the root, determines
+the EPT entry to operate, and updates the entry. If necessary, a TLB shootdown
+is done. Because it's very slow to directly walk secure EPT by TDX SEAMCALL,
+TDH.MEM.SEPT.RD(), the mirror of secure EPT is created and maintained. Add
+hooks to KVM MMU to reuse the existing code.
+
+EPT violation on shared GPA
+---------------------------
+(1) EPT violation on shared GPA or zapping shared GPA
+ ::
+
+ walk down shared EPT tree (the existing code)
+ |
+ |
+ V
+ shared EPT tree (CPU refers.)
+
+(2) update the EPT entry. (the existing code)
+
+ TLB shootdown in the case of zapping.
+
+
+EPT violation on private GPA
+----------------------------
+(1) EPT violation on private GPA or zapping private GPA
+ ::
+
+ walk down the mirror of secure EPT tree (mostly same as the existing code)
+ |
+ |
+ V
+ mirror of secure EPT tree (KVM MMU software only. reuse of the existing code)
+
+(2) update the (mirrored) EPT entry. (mostly same as the existing code)
+
+(3) call the hooks with what EPT entry is changed
+ ::
+
+ |
+ NEW: hooks in KVM MMU
+ |
+ V
+ secure EPT root(CPU refers)
+
+(4) the TDX backend calls necessary TDX SEAMCALLs to update real secure EPT.
+
+The major modification is to add hooks for the TDX backend for additional
+operations and to pass down which EPT, shared EPT, or private EPT is used, and
+twist the behavior if we're operating on private EPT.
+
+The following depicts the relationship.
+::
+
+ KVM | TDX module
+ | | |
+ -------------+---------- | |
+ | | | |
+ V V | |
+ shared GPA private GPA | |
+ CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ V V | V
+ shared EPT private EPT<-------mirror----->Secure EPT
+ | | | |
+ | \--------------------+------\ |
+ | | | |
+ V | V V
+ shared guest page | private guest page
+ |
+ |
+ non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
+ |
+
+shared EPT: CPU and KVM walk with shared GPA
+ Maintained by the existing code
+private EPT: KVM walks with private GPA
+ Maintained by the twisted existing code
+secure EPT: CPU walks with private GPA.
+ Maintained by TDX module with TDX SEAMCALLs via hooks
+
+
+Tracking private EPT page
+=========================
+Shared EPT pages are managed by struct kvm_mmu_page. They are linked in a list
+structure. When necessary, the list is traversed to operate on. Private EPT
+pages have different characteristics. For example, private pages can't be
+swapped out. When shrinking memory, we'd like to traverse only shared EPT pages
+and skip private EPT pages. Likewise, page migration isn't supported for
+private pages (yet). Introduce an additional list to track shared EPT pages and
+track private EPT pages independently.
+
+At the beginning of EPT violation, the fault handler knows fault GPA, thus it
+knows which EPT to operate on, private or shared. If it's private EPT,
+an additional task is done. Something like "if (private) { callback a hook }".
+Since the fault handler has deep function calls, it's cumbersome to hold the
+information of which EPT is operating. Options to mitigate it are
+
+1. Pass the information as an argument for the function call.
+2. Record the information in struct kvm_mmu_page somehow.
+3. Record the information in vcpu structure.
+
+Option 2 was chosen. Because option 1 requires modifying all the functions. It
+would affect badly to the normal case. Option 3 doesn't work well because in
+some cases, we need to walk both private and shared EPT.
+
+The role of the EPT page can be utilized and one bit can be curved out from
+unused bits in struct kvm_mmu_page_role. When allocating the EPT page,
+initialize the information. Mostly struct kvm_mmu_page is available because
+we're operating on EPT pages.
+
+
+The conversion of private GPA and shared GPA
+============================================
+A page of a given GPA can be assigned to only private GPA xor shared GPA at one
+time. The GPA can't be accessed simultaneously via both private GPA and shared
+GPA. On guest startup, all the GPAs are assigned as private. Guest converts
+the range of GPA to shared (or private) from private (or shared) by MapGPA
+hypercall. MapGPA hypercall takes the start GPA and the size of the region. If
+the given start GPA is shared, VMM converts the region into shared (if it's
+already shared, nop). If the start GPA is private, VMM converts the region into
+private. It implies the guest won't access the unmapped region. private(or
+shared) region after converting to shared(or private).
+
+If the guest TD triggers an EPT violation on the already converted region, the
+access won't be allowed (loop in EPT violation) until other vcpu converts back
+the region.
+
+KVM MMU records which GPA is allowed to access, private or shared by xarray.
+
+
+The original TDP MMU and race condition
+=======================================
+Because vcpus share the EPT, once the EPT entry is zapped, we need to shootdown
+TLB. Send IPI to remote vcpus. Remote vcpus flush their down TLBs. Until TLB
+shootdown is done, vcpus may reference the zapped guest page.
+
+TDP MMU uses read lock of mmu_lock to mitigate vcpu contention. When read lock
+is obtained, it depends on the atomic update of the EPT entry. (On the other
+hand legacy MMU uses write lock.) When vcpu is populating/zapping the EPT entry
+with a read lock held, other vcpu may be populating or zapping the same EPT
+entry at the same time.
+
+To avoid the race condition, the entry is frozen. It means the EPT entry is set
+to the special value, REMOVED_SPTE which clears the present bit. And then after
+TLB shootdown, update the EPT entry to the final value.
+
+Concurrent zapping
+------------------
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry (atomically set the value to REMOVED_SPTE)
+ If other vcpu froze the entry, restart page fault.
+3. TLB shootdown
+
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+ * TLB flush (local and remote)
+
+ For each entry update, TLB shootdown is needed because of the
+ concurrency.
+4. atomically set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+Concurrent populating
+---------------------
+In the case of populating the non-present EPT entry, atomically update the EPT
+entry.
+
+1. read lock
+
+2. atomically update the EPT entry
+ If other vcpu frozen the entry or updated the entry, restart page fault.
+
+3. read unlock
+
+In the case of updating the present EPT entry (e.g. page migration), the
+operation is split into two. Zapping the entry and populating the entry.
+
+1. read lock
+2. zap the EPT entry. follow the concurrent zapping case.
+3. populate the non-present EPT entry.
+4. read unlock
+
+Non-concurrent batched zapping
+------------------------------
+In some cases, zapping the ranges is done exclusively with a write lock held.
+In this case, the TLB shootdown is batched into one.
+
+1. write lock
+2. zap the EPT entries by traversing them
+3. TLB shootdown
+4. write unlock
+
+For Secure EPT, TDX SEAMCALLs are needed in addition to updating the mirrored
+EPT entry.
+
+TDX concurrent zapping
+----------------------
+Add a hook for TDX SEAMCALLs at the step of the TLB shootdown.
+
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry(set the value to REMOVED_SPTE)
+3. TLB shootdown via a hook
+
+ * TLB.MEM.RANGE.BLOCK()
+ * TLB.MEM.TRACK()
+ * send IPI to remote vcpus
+
+4. set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+TDX concurrent populating
+-------------------------
+TDX SEAMCALLs are required in addition to operating the mirrored EPT entry. The
+frozen entry is utilized by following the zapping case to avoid the race
+condition. A hook can be added.
+
+1. read lock
+2. freeze the EPT entry
+3. hook
+
+ * TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD() for non-leaf or TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG() for leaf.
+
+4. set the EPT entry to the final value
+5. read unlock
+
+Without freezing the entry, the following race can happen. Suppose two vcpus
+are faulting on the same GPA and the 2M and 4K level entries aren't populated
+yet.
+
+* vcpu 1: update 2M level EPT entry
+* vcpu 2: update 4K level EPT entry
+* vcpu 2: TDX SEAMCALL to update 4K secure EPT entry => error
+* vcpu 1: TDX SEAMCALL to update 2M secure EPT entry
+
+
+TDX non-concurrent batched zapping
+----------------------------------
+For simplicity, the procedure of concurrent populating is utilized. The
+procedure can be optimized later.
+
+
+Co-existing with unmapping guest private memory
+===============================================
+TODO. This needs to be addressed.
+
+
+Restrictions or future work
+===========================
+The following features aren't supported yet at the moment.
+
+* optimizing non-concurrent zap
+* Large page
+* Page migration
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-07 22:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 165+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-07 22:00 [PATCH v8 000/103] KVM TDX basic feature support isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 001/103] KVM: x86: Move check_processor_compatibility from init ops to runtime ops isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 002/103] Partially revert "KVM: Pass kvm_init()'s opaque param to additional arch funcs" isaku.yamahata
2022-08-11 9:59 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-25 19:48 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 003/103] KVM: Refactor CPU compatibility check on module initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 7:16 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-11 11:16 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-11 17:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-12 11:35 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-15 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-15 23:06 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-23 5:27 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-09-01 9:03 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-09-01 14:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 004/103] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 8:38 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-11 11:38 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 005/103] KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 006/103] KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 007/103] KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 008/103] x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about TDX module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 8:49 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 009/103] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-08 10:41 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-25 20:16 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-10 8:18 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-25 20:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 010/103] KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from confidential VMs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 011/103] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 012/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 013/103] KVM: TDX: Define " isaku.yamahata
2022-08-11 3:15 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-25 21:50 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:00 ` [PATCH v8 014/103] KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 015/103] KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 016/103] KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 017/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 018/103] KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers isaku.yamahata
2022-08-23 3:39 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-23 15:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-26 4:48 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-30 6:51 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-31 3:40 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-08-26 6:24 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 019/103] x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 7:17 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 020/103] KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-24 0:53 ` Erdem Aktas
2022-08-26 6:44 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-27 3:52 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-29 19:09 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-30 8:57 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-30 9:26 ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-08-30 12:01 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 021/103] KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 022/103] KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 4:07 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-29 19:17 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-31 2:18 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 023/103] KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters isaku.yamahata
2022-08-29 8:08 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-31 5:51 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 024/103] KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 025/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 026/103] KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 3:20 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 027/103] KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-30 9:10 ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 028/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 029/103] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 030/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-31 7:07 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 031/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 032/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE isaku.yamahata
2022-08-09 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-31 8:03 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 033/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis isaku.yamahata
2022-08-08 10:14 ` Huang, Kai
2022-09-01 5:54 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 034/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 035/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 6:07 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 036/103] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 037/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 038/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map() isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 6:48 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 039/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 7:12 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 040/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Require TDP MMU for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 041/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 7:44 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 042/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page isaku.yamahata
2022-09-01 8:59 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 043/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 044/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 6:38 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 045/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 046/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 047/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 048/103] KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:05 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 049/103] KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:23 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 050/103] KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-09-02 7:27 ` Yuan Yao
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 051/103] KVM: TDX: don't request KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 052/103] KVM: x86/VMX: introduce vmx tlb_remote_flush and tlb_remote_flush_with_range isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 053/103] KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support isaku.yamahata
2022-08-16 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-08-16 23:04 ` Huang, Kai
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 054/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 055/103] KVM: Add functions to track whether GFN is private or shared isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 056/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Let vcpu re-try when faulting page type conflict isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 057/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 058/103] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 059/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 060/103] KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 061/103] KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 062/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 063/103] KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 064/103] KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 065/103] KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 066/103] KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 067/103] KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 068/103] KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 069/103] [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 070/103] KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 071/103] KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 072/103] KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 073/103] KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:01 ` [PATCH v8 074/103] KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 075/103] KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 076/103] KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 077/103] KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 078/103] KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 079/103] KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 080/103] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 081/103] KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 082/103] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 083/103] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 084/103] KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 085/103] KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 086/103] KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 087/103] KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 088/103] KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls (TDG.VP.VMCALL) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 089/103] KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 090/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 091/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 092/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 093/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 094/103] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 095/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-17 22:40 ` Sagi Shahar
2022-08-26 6:46 ` Isaku Yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 096/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 097/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 098/103] KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 099/103] KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 100/103] KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 101/103] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` [PATCH v8 102/103] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX) isaku.yamahata
2022-08-07 22:02 ` isaku.yamahata [this message]
2022-08-08 3:47 ` [PATCH v8 000/103] KVM TDX basic feature support Bagas Sanjaya
2022-08-08 20:44 ` Isaku Yamahata
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