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From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,  selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx()
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:44:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ4bUoJNhjGAdrPAuHQr3DvK-hLRwt8xUS1tuZgqx3sJVw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhSG14u5UUYiU6kUDt8jGMPkHAs67F_kc5Xt+w_P_zEovw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 4:56 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 2:49 PM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote:
> > unix_socket test is failing because type_transition rule is not being
> > applied to newly created server socket, leading to a denial when the
> > client tries to connect. I believe that once worked; will see if I can
> > find the last working kernel.
>
> If we had a socket type transition on new connections I think it would
> have been a *long* time ago.  I don't recall us supporting that, but
> it's possible I've simply forgotten.
>
> That isn't to say I wouldn't support something like that, it could be
> interesting, but we would want to make sure it applies to all
> connection based sockets and not just AF_UNIX.  Although for the vast
> majority of users it would probably only be useful for AF_UNIX as you
> would need a valid peer label to do a meaningful transition.

Sorry, I probably wasn't clear. I mean that the Unix socket files are
NOT being labeled in accordance with the type_transition rules in
policy. Which does work on local file systems and used to work on NFS,
so this is a regression at some point (but not new to Ondrej's patch).

  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-30 15:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-26 10:44 [PATCH] security: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx() Ondrej Mosnacek
2024-01-26 14:32 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2024-01-26 15:03 ` Stephen Smalley
2024-01-26 16:04   ` Stephen Smalley
2024-01-26 17:15     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2024-01-29 19:48       ` Stephen Smalley
2024-01-29 21:55         ` Paul Moore
2024-01-30 15:44           ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2024-01-30 16:31             ` Paul Moore
2024-01-26 16:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-01-26 22:18 ` Paul Moore

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