* [PATCH net v2 0/3] Check if FIPS mode is enabled when running selftests
@ 2023-06-09 16:43 Magali Lemes
2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem, dsahern, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, shuah, tianjia.zhang,
vfedorenko
Cc: andrei.gherzan, linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, netdev
Some test cases from net/tls, net/fcnal-test and net/vrf-xfrm-tests
that rely on cryptographic functions to work and use non-compliant FIPS
algorithms fail in FIPS mode.
In order to allow these tests to pass in a wider set of kernels,
- for net/tls, skip the test variants that use the ChaCha20-Poly1305
and SM4 algorithms, when FIPS mode is enabled;
- for net/fcnal-test, skip the MD5 tests, when FIPS mode is enabled;
- for net/vrf-xfrm-tests, replace the algorithms that are not
FIPS-compliant with compliant ones.
Changes in v2:
- Add R-b tags.
- Put fips_non_compliant into the variants.
- Turn fips_enabled into a static global variable.
- Read /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled only once at main().
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230607174302.19542-1-magali.lemes@canonical.com/
Magali Lemes (3):
selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled
selftests: net: vrf-xfrm-tests: change authentication and encryption
algos
selftests: net: fcnal-test: check if FIPS mode is enabled
tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 27 ++-
tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh | 32 ++--
3 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 16:43 [PATCH net v2 0/3] Check if FIPS mode is enabled when running selftests Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 ` Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 17:53 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] selftests: net: vrf-xfrm-tests: change authentication and encryption algos Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] selftests: net: fcnal-test: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes 2 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang Cc: andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel TLS selftests use the ChaCha20-Poly1305 and SM4 algorithms, which are not FIPS compliant. When fips=1, this set of tests fails. Add a check and only run these tests if not in FIPS mode. Fixes: 4f336e88a870 ("selftests/tls: add CHACHA20-POLY1305 to tls selftests") Fixes: e506342a03c7 ("selftests/tls: add SM4 GCM/CCM to tls selftests") Signed-off-by: Magali Lemes <magali.lemes@canonical.com> --- Changes in v2: - Put fips_non_compliant into the variants. - Turn fips_enabled into a static global variable. - Read /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled only once at main(). tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 175 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 174 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c index e699548d4247..0725c60f227c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 #define SOL_TLS 282 +static int fips_enabled = 0; + struct tls_crypto_info_keys { union { struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 aes128; @@ -235,7 +237,7 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT(tls) { uint16_t tls_version; uint16_t cipher_type; - bool nopad; + bool nopad, fips_non_compliant; }; FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 12_aes_gcm) @@ -254,24 +256,28 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 12_chacha) { .tls_version = TLS_1_2_VERSION, .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + .fips_non_compliant = true, }; FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 13_chacha) { .tls_version = TLS_1_3_VERSION, .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + .fips_non_compliant = true, }; FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 13_sm4_gcm) { .tls_version = TLS_1_3_VERSION, .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM, + .fips_non_compliant = true, }; FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 13_sm4_ccm) { .tls_version = TLS_1_3_VERSION, .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM, + .fips_non_compliant = true, }; FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(tls, 12_aes_ccm) @@ -311,6 +317,9 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(tls) int one = 1; int ret; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + return; + tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12); @@ -343,6 +352,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendfile) int filefd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY); struct stat st; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_GE(filefd, 0); fstat(filefd, &st); EXPECT_GE(sendfile(self->fd, filefd, 0, st.st_size), 0); @@ -357,6 +369,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, send_then_sendfile) struct stat st; char *buf; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_GE(filefd, 0); fstat(filefd, &st); buf = (char *)malloc(st.st_size); @@ -406,6 +421,10 @@ static void chunked_sendfile(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, TEST_F(tls, multi_chunk_sendfile) { + + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + chunked_sendfile(_metadata, self, 4096, 4096); chunked_sendfile(_metadata, self, 4096, 0); chunked_sendfile(_metadata, self, 4096, 1); @@ -433,6 +452,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_max) char recv_mem[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN]; char buf[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(buf, sizeof(buf)); EXPECT_GE(send(self->fd, buf, send_len, 0), 0); @@ -446,6 +468,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_small) int send_len = 10; char buf[10]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1; EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1); @@ -458,6 +483,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, msg_more) int send_len = 10; char buf[10 * 2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, MSG_MORE), send_len); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_DONTWAIT), -1); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); @@ -472,6 +500,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, msg_more_unsent) int send_len = 10; char buf[10]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, MSG_MORE), send_len); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_DONTWAIT), -1); } @@ -485,6 +516,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_single) struct iovec vec; char buf[13]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + vec.iov_base = (char *)test_str; vec.iov_len = send_len; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr)); @@ -505,6 +539,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_fragmented) struct msghdr msg; int i, frags; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + for (frags = 1; frags <= MAX_FRAGS; frags++) { for (i = 0; i < frags; i++) { vec[i].iov_base = (char *)test_str; @@ -536,6 +573,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_large) size_t recvs = 0; size_t sent = 0; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr)); while (sent++ < sends) { struct iovec vec = { (void *)mem, send_len }; @@ -564,6 +604,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_multiple) char *buf; int i; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr)); for (i = 0; i < iov_len; i++) { test_strs[i] = (char *)malloc(strlen(test_str) + 1); @@ -601,6 +644,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, sendmsg_multiple_stress) int len_cmp = 0; int i; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(struct msghdr)); for (i = 0; i < iov_len; i++) { test_strs[i] = (char *)malloc(strlen(test_str) + 1); @@ -629,6 +675,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, splice_from_pipe) char mem_recv[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN]; int p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); EXPECT_GE(write(p[1], mem_send, send_len), 0); EXPECT_GE(splice(p[0], NULL, self->fd, NULL, send_len, 0), 0); @@ -644,6 +693,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, splice_from_pipe2) int p2[2]; int p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(mem_send, sizeof(mem_send)); ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); @@ -666,6 +718,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, send_and_splice) char buf[10]; int p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len2, 0), send_len2); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len2, MSG_WAITALL), send_len2); @@ -685,6 +740,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, splice_to_pipe) char mem_recv[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN]; int p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(mem_send, sizeof(mem_send)); ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); @@ -705,6 +763,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, splice_cmsg_to_pipe) if (self->notls) SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); EXPECT_EQ(tls_send_cmsg(self->fd, 100, test_str, send_len, 0), 10); EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, send_len, 0), -1); @@ -728,6 +789,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, splice_dec_cmsg_to_pipe) if (self->notls) SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); EXPECT_EQ(tls_send_cmsg(self->fd, 100, test_str, send_len, 0), 10); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1); @@ -748,6 +812,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_and_splice) int half = send_len / 2; int p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, mem_send, send_len, 0), send_len); /* Recv hald of the record, splice the other half */ @@ -766,6 +833,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, peek_and_splice) int chunk = TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN / 4; int n, i, p[2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(mem_send, sizeof(mem_send)); ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); @@ -797,6 +867,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recvmsg_single) struct msghdr hdr; struct iovec vec; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr)); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); vec.iov_base = (char *)buf; @@ -815,6 +888,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recvmsg_single_max) struct iovec vec; struct msghdr hdr; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(send_mem, sizeof(send_mem)); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, send_mem, send_len, 0), send_len); @@ -840,6 +916,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recvmsg_multiple) memrnd(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len); for (i = 0; i < msg_iovlen; i++) { iov_base[i] = (char *)malloc(iov_len); @@ -862,6 +941,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, single_send_multiple_recv) char send_mem[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN * 2]; char recv_mem[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN * 2]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(send_mem, sizeof(send_mem)); EXPECT_GE(send(self->fd, send_mem, total_len, 0), 0); @@ -879,6 +961,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, multiple_send_single_recv) char recv_mem[2 * 10]; char send_mem[10]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(send_mem, sizeof(send_mem)); EXPECT_GE(send(self->fd, send_mem, send_len, 0), 0); @@ -897,6 +982,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, single_send_multiple_recv_non_align) char recv_mem[recv_len * 2]; char send_mem[total_len]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memrnd(send_mem, sizeof(send_mem)); EXPECT_GE(send(self->fd, send_mem, total_len, 0), 0); @@ -915,6 +1003,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_partial) int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1; char recv_mem[18]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + memset(recv_mem, 0, sizeof(recv_mem)); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, recv_mem, strlen(test_str_first), @@ -932,6 +1023,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_nonblock) char buf[4096]; bool err; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT), -1); err = (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK); EXPECT_EQ(err, true); @@ -943,6 +1037,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_peek) int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1; char buf[15]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_PEEK), send_len); EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(test_str, buf, send_len), 0); @@ -959,6 +1056,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_peek_multiple) char buf[15]; int i; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); for (i = 0; i < num_peeks; i++) { EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_PEEK), -1); @@ -977,6 +1077,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_peek_multiple_records) int len; char buf[64]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + len = strlen(test_str_first); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_first, len, 0), len); @@ -1026,6 +1129,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_peek_large_buf_mult_recs) int len; char buf[64]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + len = strlen(test_str_first); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_first, len, 0), len); @@ -1046,6 +1152,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_lowat) char recv_mem[20]; int lowat = 8; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, send_mem, 10, 0), 10); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, send_mem, 5, 0), 5); @@ -1067,6 +1176,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, bidir) char buf[10]; int ret; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + if (!self->notls) { struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12; @@ -1102,6 +1214,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, pollin) char buf[10]; int send_len = 10; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); fd.fd = self->cfd; fd.events = POLLIN; @@ -1120,6 +1235,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, poll_wait) struct pollfd fd = { 0, 0, 0 }; char recv_mem[15]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + fd.fd = self->cfd; fd.events = POLLIN; EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); @@ -1135,6 +1253,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, poll_wait_split) char send_mem[20] = {}; char recv_mem[15]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + fd.fd = self->cfd; fd.events = POLLIN; /* Send 20 bytes */ @@ -1160,6 +1281,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, blocking) size_t data = 100000; int res = fork(); + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_NE(res, -1); if (res) { @@ -1202,6 +1326,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, nonblocking) int flags; int res; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + flags = fcntl(self->fd, F_GETFL, 0); fcntl(self->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK); fcntl(self->cfd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK); @@ -1343,31 +1470,49 @@ test_mutliproc(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, struct _test_data_tls *self, TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_even) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, false, 6, 6); } TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_readers) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, false, 4, 12); } TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_writers) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, false, 10, 2); } TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_sendpage_even) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, true, 6, 6); } TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_sendpage_readers) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, true, 4, 12); } TEST_F(tls, mutliproc_sendpage_writers) { + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + test_mutliproc(_metadata, self, true, 10, 2); } @@ -1378,6 +1523,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, control_msg) int send_len = 10; char buf[10]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + if (self->notls) SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); @@ -1406,6 +1554,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, shutdown) int send_len = 10; char buf[10]; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + ASSERT_EQ(strlen(test_str) + 1, send_len); EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len); @@ -1421,6 +1572,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, shutdown_unsent) char const *test_str = "test_read"; int send_len = 10; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, MSG_MORE), send_len); shutdown(self->fd, SHUT_RDWR); @@ -1432,6 +1586,9 @@ TEST_F(tls, shutdown_reuse) struct sockaddr_in addr; int ret; + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) + SKIP(return, "Unsupported cipher in FIPS mode"); + shutdown(self->fd, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(self->cfd, SHUT_RDWR); close(self->cfd); @@ -1865,4 +2022,20 @@ TEST(prequeue) { close(cfd); } +#define main test_main TEST_HARNESS_MAIN +#undef main +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + int res; + FILE *f; + + f = fopen("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", "r"); + if (f) { + res = fscanf(f, "%d", &fips_enabled); + if (res != 1) + ksft_print_msg("ERROR: Couldn't read /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled\n"); + fclose(f); + } + + return test_main(argc, argv); +} -- 2.34.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 17:53 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 18:52 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 2023-06-09 20:15 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2023-06-09 17:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Magali Lemes Cc: davem, edumazet, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang, andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 13:43:22 -0300 Magali Lemes wrote: > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > index e699548d4247..0725c60f227c 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ > #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 > #define SOL_TLS 282 > > +static int fips_enabled = 0; No need to zero init static variables, but really instead of doing the main() hack you should init this to a return value of a function. And have that function read the value. > struct tls_crypto_info_keys { > union { > struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 aes128; > @@ -311,6 +317,9 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(tls) > int one = 1; > int ret; > > + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) > + return; Eh, let me help you, this should really be part of the SETUP() function but SETUP() doesn't currently handle SKIP(). So you'll need to add this to your series: diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h index d8bff2005dfc..3091c345452e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ /** * FIXTURE_SETUP() - Prepares the setup function for the fixture. - * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_* and ASSERT_* work correctly. + * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_*, ASSERT_* etc. work correctly. * * @fixture_name: fixture name * @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ /** * FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() - * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_* and ASSERT_* work correctly. + * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_*, ASSERT_* etc. work correctly. * * @fixture_name: fixture name * @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ if (setjmp(_metadata->env) == 0) { \ fixture_name##_setup(_metadata, &self, variant->data); \ /* Let setup failure terminate early. */ \ - if (!_metadata->passed) \ + if (!_metadata->passed || _metadata->skip) \ return; \ _metadata->setup_completed = true; \ fixture_name##_##test_name(_metadata, &self, variant->data); \ ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 17:53 ` Jakub Kicinski @ 2023-06-09 18:52 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 2023-06-09 19:21 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 20:15 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Magali Lemes do Sacramento @ 2023-06-09 18:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jakub Kicinski Cc: davem, edumazet, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang, andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel Hi! On Fri, Jun 9, 2023 at 2:53 PM Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 13:43:22 -0300 Magali Lemes wrote: > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > index e699548d4247..0725c60f227c 100644 > > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ > > #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 > > #define SOL_TLS 282 > > > > +static int fips_enabled = 0; > > No need to zero init static variables, but really instead of doing > the main() hack you should init this to a return value of a function. > And have that function read the value. > I'm not sure I understand what you mean here. I agree we want to avoid reading the /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled file for every test. However, correct me where I'm wrong, if we want to have fips_enabled as a static global variable I don't think we can directly initialize it from the return value of a function. Could you clarify that, please? Best regards, Magali > > struct tls_crypto_info_keys { > > union { > > struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 aes128; > > > @@ -311,6 +317,9 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(tls) > > int one = 1; > > int ret; > > > > + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) > > + return; > > Eh, let me help you, this should really be part of the SETUP() function > but SETUP() doesn't currently handle SKIP(). So you'll need to add this > to your series: > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h > index d8bff2005dfc..3091c345452e 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h > @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ > > /** > * FIXTURE_SETUP() - Prepares the setup function for the fixture. > - * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_* and ASSERT_* work correctly. > + * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_*, ASSERT_* etc. work correctly. > * > * @fixture_name: fixture name > * > @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ > > /** > * FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() > - * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_* and ASSERT_* work correctly. > + * *_metadata* is included so that EXPECT_*, ASSERT_* etc. work correctly. > * > * @fixture_name: fixture name > * > @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ > if (setjmp(_metadata->env) == 0) { \ > fixture_name##_setup(_metadata, &self, variant->data); \ > /* Let setup failure terminate early. */ \ > - if (!_metadata->passed) \ > + if (!_metadata->passed || _metadata->skip) \ > return; \ > _metadata->setup_completed = true; \ > fixture_name##_##test_name(_metadata, &self, variant->data); \ ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 18:52 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento @ 2023-06-09 19:21 ` Jakub Kicinski 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2023-06-09 19:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Magali Lemes do Sacramento Cc: davem, edumazet, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang, andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 15:52:10 -0300 Magali Lemes do Sacramento wrote: > > No need to zero init static variables, but really instead of doing > > the main() hack you should init this to a return value of a function. > > And have that function read the value. > > I'm not sure I understand what you mean here. I agree we want to avoid > reading the /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled file for every test. > However, correct me where I'm wrong, if we want to have fips_enabled > as a static global variable I don't think we can directly initialize > it from the return value of a function. > Could you clarify that, please? Hm, I thought that worked, I must be misremembering. If it doesn't - let's steal the trick that the harness itself uses and put the init in a function decorated with __attribute__((constructor)). ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 17:53 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 18:52 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento @ 2023-06-09 20:15 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 2023-06-09 21:08 ` Jakub Kicinski 1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Magali Lemes do Sacramento @ 2023-06-09 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jakub Kicinski Cc: davem, edumazet, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang, andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel Hi, Jakub. On Fri, Jun 9, 2023 at 2:53 PM Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 13:43:22 -0300 Magali Lemes wrote: > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > index e699548d4247..0725c60f227c 100644 > > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ > > #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 > > #define SOL_TLS 282 > > > > +static int fips_enabled = 0; > > No need to zero init static variables, but really instead of doing > the main() hack you should init this to a return value of a function. > And have that function read the value. > > > struct tls_crypto_info_keys { > > union { > > struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 aes128; > > > @@ -311,6 +317,9 @@ FIXTURE_SETUP(tls) > > int one = 1; > > int ret; > > > > + if (fips_enabled && variant->fips_non_compliant) > > + return; > > Eh, let me help you, this should really be part of the SETUP() function > but SETUP() doesn't currently handle SKIP(). So you'll need to add this > to your series: May I add your Suggested-by tag to this upcoming patch in this patchset v3? ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 20:15 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento @ 2023-06-09 21:08 ` Jakub Kicinski 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2023-06-09 21:08 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Magali Lemes do Sacramento Cc: davem, edumazet, pabeni, shuah, vfedorenko, tianjia.zhang, andrei.gherzan, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel On Fri, 9 Jun 2023 17:15:38 -0300 Magali Lemes do Sacramento wrote: > > Eh, let me help you, this should really be part of the SETUP() function > > but SETUP() doesn't currently handle SKIP(). So you'll need to add this > > to your series: > > May I add your Suggested-by tag to this upcoming patch in this patchset v3? No strong preference but sure, why not :) ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 2/3] selftests: net: vrf-xfrm-tests: change authentication and encryption algos 2023-06-09 16:43 [PATCH net v2 0/3] Check if FIPS mode is enabled when running selftests Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 ` Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] selftests: net: fcnal-test: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, shuah, dsahern Cc: andrei.gherzan, David Ahern, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel The vrf-xfrm-tests tests use the hmac(md5) and cbc(des3_ede) algorithms for performing authentication and encryption, respectively. This causes the tests to fail when fips=1 is set, since these algorithms are not allowed in FIPS mode. Therefore, switch from hmac(md5) and cbc(des3_ede) to hmac(sha1) and cbc(aes), which are FIPS compliant. Fixes: 3f251d741150 ("selftests: Add tests for vrf and xfrms") Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Magali Lemes <magali.lemes@canonical.com> --- Changes in v2: - Add R-b tag. tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh | 32 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh index 184da81f554f..452638ae8aed 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/vrf-xfrm-tests.sh @@ -264,60 +264,60 @@ setup_xfrm() ip -netns host1 xfrm state add src ${HOST1_4} dst ${HOST2_4} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_1} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_1} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_1} \ sel src ${h1_4} dst ${h2_4} ${devarg} ip -netns host2 xfrm state add src ${HOST1_4} dst ${HOST2_4} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_1} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_1} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_1} \ sel src ${h1_4} dst ${h2_4} ip -netns host1 xfrm state add src ${HOST2_4} dst ${HOST1_4} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_2} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_2} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_2} \ sel src ${h2_4} dst ${h1_4} ${devarg} ip -netns host2 xfrm state add src ${HOST2_4} dst ${HOST1_4} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_2} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_2} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_2} \ sel src ${h2_4} dst ${h1_4} ip -6 -netns host1 xfrm state add src ${HOST1_6} dst ${HOST2_6} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_1} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_1} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_1} \ sel src ${h1_6} dst ${h2_6} ${devarg} ip -6 -netns host2 xfrm state add src ${HOST1_6} dst ${HOST2_6} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_1} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_1} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_1} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_1} \ sel src ${h1_6} dst ${h2_6} ip -6 -netns host1 xfrm state add src ${HOST2_6} dst ${HOST1_6} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_2} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_2} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_2} \ sel src ${h2_6} dst ${h1_6} ${devarg} ip -6 -netns host2 xfrm state add src ${HOST2_6} dst ${HOST1_6} \ proto esp spi ${SPI_2} reqid 0 mode tunnel \ replay-window 4 replay-oseq 0x4 \ - auth-trunc 'hmac(md5)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ - enc 'cbc(des3_ede)' ${ENC_2} \ + auth-trunc 'hmac(sha1)' ${AUTH_2} 96 \ + enc 'cbc(aes)' ${ENC_2} \ sel src ${h2_6} dst ${h1_6} } -- 2.34.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net v2 3/3] selftests: net: fcnal-test: check if FIPS mode is enabled 2023-06-09 16:43 [PATCH net v2 0/3] Check if FIPS mode is enabled when running selftests Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] selftests: net: vrf-xfrm-tests: change authentication and encryption algos Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 ` Magali Lemes 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Magali Lemes @ 2023-06-09 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, shuah, dsahern Cc: andrei.gherzan, David Ahern, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-kernel There are some MD5 tests which fail when the kernel is in FIPS mode, since MD5 is not FIPS compliant. Add a check and only run those tests if FIPS mode is not enabled. Fixes: f0bee1ebb5594 ("fcnal-test: Add TCP MD5 tests") Fixes: 5cad8bce26e01 ("fcnal-test: Add TCP MD5 tests for VRF") Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Magali Lemes <magali.lemes@canonical.com> --- Changes in v2: - Add R-b tag. tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 27 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh index 21ca91473c09..ee6880ac3e5e 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh @@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ NSC_CMD="ip netns exec ${NSC}" which ping6 > /dev/null 2>&1 && ping6=$(which ping6) || ping6=$(which ping) +# Check if FIPS mode is enabled +if [ -f /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled ]; then + fips_enabled=`cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled` +else + fips_enabled=0 +fi + ################################################################################ # utilities @@ -1216,7 +1223,7 @@ ipv4_tcp_novrf() run_cmd nettest -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" - ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf + [ "$fips_enabled" = "1" ] || ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf } ipv4_tcp_vrf() @@ -1270,9 +1277,11 @@ ipv4_tcp_vrf() log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" # run MD5 tests - setup_vrf_dup - ipv4_tcp_md5 - cleanup_vrf_dup + if [ "$fips_enabled" = "0" ]; then + setup_vrf_dup + ipv4_tcp_md5 + cleanup_vrf_dup + fi # # enable VRF global server @@ -2772,7 +2781,7 @@ ipv6_tcp_novrf() log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" done - ipv6_tcp_md5_novrf + [ "$fips_enabled" = "1" ] || ipv6_tcp_md5_novrf } ipv6_tcp_vrf() @@ -2842,9 +2851,11 @@ ipv6_tcp_vrf() log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" # run MD5 tests - setup_vrf_dup - ipv6_tcp_md5 - cleanup_vrf_dup + if [ "$fips_enabled" = "0" ]; then + setup_vrf_dup + ipv6_tcp_md5 + cleanup_vrf_dup + fi # # enable VRF global server -- 2.34.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-06-09 21:08 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2023-06-09 16:43 [PATCH net v2 0/3] Check if FIPS mode is enabled when running selftests Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 1/3] selftests: net: tls: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 17:53 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 18:52 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 2023-06-09 19:21 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 20:15 ` Magali Lemes do Sacramento 2023-06-09 21:08 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 2/3] selftests: net: vrf-xfrm-tests: change authentication and encryption algos Magali Lemes 2023-06-09 16:43 ` [PATCH net v2 3/3] selftests: net: fcnal-test: check if FIPS mode is enabled Magali Lemes
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