Re: kexec_load(2) bypasses signature verification

From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	kexec <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	"Linux-Kernel@Vger. Kernel. Org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kexec_load(2) bypasses signature verification
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 09:17:28 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150615131728.GK15793@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+5PVA6t_dEQt1M7HkeHy9znFkPd-a7525vtFq-g4a6VKL+gLQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 08:14:19AM -0400, Josh Boyer wrote:
> Yes, which is why most of the distro vendors carry an out-of-tree
> patch that disables the old kexec in an SB setup.  It would be nice if
> we could merge said patches.  However, they depend on Matthew's
> secure_modules/trusted_kernel/<whatever name that works> patchset
> which has gotten little movement since we came up with a tentative
> agreement at LPC 2013.

Signed modules is in, though, right?  And the fact that we have
CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION means we're doing unatural file
signatures w/o using ELF, which I thought was the basis of Linus's
accusation that Red Hat was performing intimate/physical acts with
Microsoft.  :-)

I would have thought those were the nasty bits to get in; out of
curiosity, what's still missing?

Regards,

						- Ted