From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:28:02 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1598563.E145j9ZHLH@sifl> (raw) In-Reply-To: <3206.1415398234@warthog.procyon.org.uk> On Friday, November 07, 2014 10:10:34 PM David Howells wrote: > Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > > This didn't occur to me earlier, but we may want to pick a different > > phrase to use instead of "copy_up" as that has a special meaning for some > > security/MLS folks... > > It does? Yep, think upgrading the sensitivity level, e.g. relabeling a "secret" file up to a "top secret". > security_inode_make_union()? Actually, after thinking on this some more, forget I mentioned anything. The existing "copy_up" makes the most sense for the LSM hook (it matches the naming of the caller in overlayfs, which is a nice thing) and the number of times any MLS will look that closely at the kernel code is going to be very few. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:28:02 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1598563.E145j9ZHLH@sifl> (raw) In-Reply-To: <3206.1415398234@warthog.procyon.org.uk> On Friday, November 07, 2014 10:10:34 PM David Howells wrote: > Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > > This didn't occur to me earlier, but we may want to pick a different > > phrase to use instead of "copy_up" as that has a special meaning for some > > security/MLS folks... > > It does? Yep, think upgrading the sensitivity level, e.g. relabeling a "secret" file up to a "top secret". > security_inode_make_union()? Actually, after thinking on this some more, forget I mentioned anything. The existing "copy_up" makes the most sense for the LSM hook (it matches the naming of the caller in overlayfs, which is a nice thing) and the number of times any MLS will look that closely at the kernel code is going to be very few. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-11-10 15:28 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2014-11-05 15:42 [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells 2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells 2014-11-06 17:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-07 14:49 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 14:49 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 21:22 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 21:22 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 22:10 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 22:10 ` David Howells 2014-11-10 15:28 ` Paul Moore [this message] 2014-11-10 15:28 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells 2014-11-07 21:39 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 21:39 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 22:05 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 22:05 ` David Howells 2014-11-10 15:45 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-10 15:45 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells 2014-11-07 21:44 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 21:44 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-07 22:08 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 22:08 ` David Howells 2014-11-10 15:47 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-10 15:47 ` Paul Moore 2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 4/7] Security: Pass the union-layer file path into security_file_open() David Howells 2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells 2014-11-05 16:35 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-06 12:03 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 12:03 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-06 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-06 13:34 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 13:34 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:15 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:15 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 17:25 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 17:25 ` David Howells 2015-06-12 15:30 ` David Howells 2015-06-12 15:30 ` David Howells 2015-06-15 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-15 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-16 9:41 ` David Howells 2015-06-16 9:41 ` David Howells 2015-06-16 16:49 ` David Howells 2015-06-16 16:49 ` David Howells 2015-06-16 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-16 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-16 21:34 ` David Howells 2015-06-16 21:34 ` David Howells 2015-06-17 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-17 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-18 10:15 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 10:15 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-18 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-18 15:26 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 15:26 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 10:32 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 10:32 ` David Howells 2015-06-18 12:16 ` Stephen Smalley 2015-06-18 12:16 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells 2014-11-05 16:43 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-05 17:54 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-06 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley 2014-11-27 14:17 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:17 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells 2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells 2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 7/7] SELinux: Check against union and lower labels for file ops on lower files David Howells 2014-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support Casey Schaufler 2014-11-06 17:35 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells 2014-11-06 18:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-06 18:40 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-07 15:21 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 15:21 ` David Howells 2014-11-07 18:54 ` Daniel J Walsh 2014-11-07 18:54 ` Daniel J Walsh 2014-11-09 1:31 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-09 1:31 ` Casey Schaufler 2014-11-10 13:59 ` Daniel J Walsh 2014-11-10 13:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
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