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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files
Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 16:22:58 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2455443.WUExuKDC0I@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141105154228.2555.55814.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Wednesday, November 05, 2014 03:42:28 PM David Howells wrote:
> Provide two new security hooks for use with security files that are used
> when a file is copied up between layers:
> 
>  (1) security_inode_copy_up().  This is called so that the security label on
> the destination file can be set appropriately.
> 
>  (2) security_inode_copy_up_xattr().  This is called so that each xattr
> being copied up can be vetted - including modification and discard.

This didn't occur to me earlier, but we may want to pick a different phrase to 
use instead of "copy_up" as that has a special meaning for some security/MLS 
folks (although strangely enough, I suspect most of these copy-on-write 
operations will be "copy up" in the MLS sense of the word).

How about "security_inode_copy_overlay" or something like that?

> + * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
> + *	Filter/modify the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is 
> ...copied
> + *	up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
> + *	@src indicates the file that is being copied up.
> + *	@dst indicates the file that has being created by the copy up.
> + *	@name indicates the name of the xattr.
> + *	@value, *@size indicate the payload of the xattr.
> + *	Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr or a negative
> + *	error code to abort the copy up.  The xattr buffer must be at least
> + *	XATTR_SIZE_MAX in capacity and the contents may be modified and 
> ....*@size
> + *	changed appropriately.

Just so I'm clean, if the LSM wanted to modify the xattr it would modify 
@value/@size and return 0?

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files
Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2014 16:22:58 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2455443.WUExuKDC0I@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141105154228.2555.55814.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Wednesday, November 05, 2014 03:42:28 PM David Howells wrote:
> Provide two new security hooks for use with security files that are used
> when a file is copied up between layers:
> 
>  (1) security_inode_copy_up().  This is called so that the security label on
> the destination file can be set appropriately.
> 
>  (2) security_inode_copy_up_xattr().  This is called so that each xattr
> being copied up can be vetted - including modification and discard.

This didn't occur to me earlier, but we may want to pick a different phrase to 
use instead of "copy_up" as that has a special meaning for some security/MLS 
folks (although strangely enough, I suspect most of these copy-on-write 
operations will be "copy up" in the MLS sense of the word).

How about "security_inode_copy_overlay" or something like that?

> + * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
> + *	Filter/modify the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is 
> ...copied
> + *	up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
> + *	@src indicates the file that is being copied up.
> + *	@dst indicates the file that has being created by the copy up.
> + *	@name indicates the name of the xattr.
> + *	@value, *@size indicate the payload of the xattr.
> + *	Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr or a negative
> + *	error code to abort the copy up.  The xattr buffer must be at least
> + *	XATTR_SIZE_MAX in capacity and the contents may be modified and 
> ....*@size
> + *	changed appropriately.

Just so I'm clean, if the LSM wanted to modify the xattr it would modify 
@value/@size and return 0?

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-11-07 21:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-11-05 15:42 [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:46   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 14:49   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 14:49     ` David Howells
2014-11-07 21:22   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2014-11-07 21:22     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:10   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:10     ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:28     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-10 15:28       ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2014-11-07 21:39   ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 21:39     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:05   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:05     ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:45     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-10 15:45       ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2014-11-07 21:44   ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 21:44     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:08   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:08     ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:47     ` Paul Moore
2014-11-10 15:47       ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 4/7] Security: Pass the union-layer file path into security_file_open() David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:35   ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 12:03   ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:03     ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:13     ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:13       ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:34     ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:34       ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15       ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27   ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27     ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25   ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25     ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30   ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30     ` David Howells
2015-06-15 12:57     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-15 12:57       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16  9:41     ` David Howells
2015-06-16  9:41       ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49     ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49       ` David Howells
2015-06-16 17:20       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 17:20         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 21:34       ` David Howells
2015-06-16 21:34         ` David Howells
2015-06-17 14:44         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-17 14:44           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 10:15         ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:15           ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:48           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 12:48             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:26           ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:26             ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32       ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32         ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:16         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 12:16           ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:43   ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 17:54     ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:39       ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-27 14:17     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:17       ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21     ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21       ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21       ` David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 7/7] SELinux: Check against union and lower labels for file ops on lower files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:35   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 17:58   ` David Howells
2014-11-06 18:40   ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 18:40     ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 15:21   ` David Howells
2014-11-07 15:21     ` David Howells
2014-11-07 18:54     ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-07 18:54       ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-09  1:31       ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-09  1:31         ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-10 13:59         ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-10 13:59           ` Daniel J Walsh

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