From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks
Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:45:37 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3253042.xfZ6VF8OvX@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3148.1415397940@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Friday, November 07, 2014 10:05:40 PM David Howells wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > So the LSM must modify the xattr in place? I suppose that since the
> > @value is allocated to the max size it shouldn't be a problem. Just
> > checking ...
>
> ... And the caller must provide a maximally sized buffer (which it likely
> has to allocate anyway).
>
> I'm not sure I really need to provide the modification thing. I suspect a
> binary keep or discard decision is sufficient.
The docker use case we've been talking about in this thread doesn't really
care about the on-disk file labels (xattrs) because the docker folks want to
use context= mounts; however if someone did care about on-disk file labels for
the upper layer in the overlayfs then they might want to modify the xattr.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks
Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2014 10:45:37 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3253042.xfZ6VF8OvX@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3148.1415397940@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Friday, November 07, 2014 10:05:40 PM David Howells wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > So the LSM must modify the xattr in place? I suppose that since the
> > @value is allocated to the max size it shouldn't be a problem. Just
> > checking ...
>
> ... And the caller must provide a maximally sized buffer (which it likely
> has to allocate anyway).
>
> I'm not sure I really need to provide the modification thing. I suspect a
> binary keep or discard decision is sufficient.
The docker use case we've been talking about in this thread doesn't really
care about the on-disk file labels (xattrs) because the docker folks want to
use context= mounts; however if someone did care about on-disk file labels for
the upper layer in the overlayfs then they might want to modify the xattr.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-11-10 15:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-11-05 15:42 [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support David Howells
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/7] Security: Provide copy-up security hooks for unioned files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 14:49 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 14:49 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 21:22 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 21:22 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:10 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:10 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:28 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-10 15:28 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/7] Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks David Howells
2014-11-07 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:05 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:05 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:45 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2014-11-10 15:45 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 3/7] SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling David Howells
2014-11-07 21:44 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 21:44 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-07 22:08 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 22:08 ` David Howells
2014-11-10 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-10 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2014-11-05 15:42 ` [PATCH 4/7] Security: Pass the union-layer file path into security_file_open() David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 5/7] SELinux: Handle opening of a unioned file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 12:03 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:03 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:34 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 13:34 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:15 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 12:27 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 17:25 ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30 ` David Howells
2015-06-12 15:30 ` David Howells
2015-06-15 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-15 12:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 9:41 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 9:41 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 16:49 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 17:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-16 21:34 ` David Howells
2015-06-16 21:34 ` David Howells
2015-06-17 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-17 14:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 10:15 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:15 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 12:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 15:26 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 15:26 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 10:32 ` David Howells
2015-06-18 12:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-06-18 12:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells
2014-11-05 16:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-05 17:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-06 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-11-27 14:17 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:17 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-27 14:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-05 15:43 ` [PATCH 7/7] SELinux: Check against union and lower labels for file ops on lower files David Howells
2014-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/7] Security: Provide unioned file support Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 17:58 ` David Howells
2014-11-06 18:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-06 18:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-07 15:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 15:21 ` David Howells
2014-11-07 18:54 ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-07 18:54 ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-09 1:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-09 1:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2014-11-10 13:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-11-10 13:59 ` Daniel J Walsh
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